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5Preface: some personal thoughts
The critical attitude
Strikes many people as unfruitful
That is because they find the state
Impervious to their criticism
But what in this case is an unfruitful attitude
Is merely a feeble attitude.
Give criticism arms
And states can be demolished by it.
Canalising a river
Grafting a fruit tree
Educating a person
Transforming a state
These are instances of fruitful criticism
And at the same time instances of art.
(On the Critical Attitude, Bertolt Brecht)
I do not know if I managed to be critical enough in this thesis. I believe at least that my work
contains some criticism for the state and the society. Whether people will decide to transform
them, as the poet suggests, is a question to be answered in the future and by the people, including
myself.
In any case, I do hope that I will get enough constructive criticism for my work. It is far from
being perfect, I could continue working on it my whole life and in a sense I will do so. Nevertheless,
this thesis represents my effort to develop myself from a person that stands critical against the
society to a scientist that has some knowledge and potential to contribute in search of an answer
to the question of how this society should and could look like. This is my perspective on economic
research.
The last four years, I learnt a lot, I got direct or indirect input from many people. I had the
opportunity to work in an environment completely new to me. Regardless of whether I agree or
not with the ’main settings’ of this environment, I benefited from it considerably. Despite the
fact that I am an economist, working on the verge of two disciplines, economics and sociology was
an interesting experience. Contrary to the dominant views in both disciplines in many European
countries, I found the input I got from people working in these two fields very useful.
The first person I should give credit to is, of course, my main supervisor, Ruud Muffels. He
introduced me to this project and, especially at the end of my PhD, he gave me very valuable help in
order to complete my thesis. He encouraged me to write high-quality scientific papers and present
my work in high-level conferences. Next to Ruud, I would like to thank my second supervisor
Jeroen Vermunt. He was the one that introduced me to complicated statistical methodology and
helped me in carrying out the analysis needed in my thesis. He was patient enough to answer all
my questions, basic and complicated, on panel data methodology. Next to them, a great ’thank
you’ belongs to my co-promotor Didier Fouarge. Being a person very open to be contacted, many
times I had the feeling that I was taking advantage of him with all the issues that come into the
mind of a junior researcher. From the very start, he treated me as a colleague and this gave us
the opportunity to work together. I hope that I will have the chance to continue working together
with all three of them. A further ’thanks’ goes to Christos Papatheodorou. He was the one that
introduced me to scientific research, encouraged me to engage on this project and supported me
all these years.
Despite the good words of my supervisors, I was still doubting whether or not my thesis is of
good scientific quality. My doubts were gone after the ’final touch’, the judgement and the comments
6of my PhD committee. I would like to thank therefore, the members of this committee, Paul de
Graaf, Jacques Hagenaars, Jan van Ours, Apostolos Dedousopoulos and Lorenzo Cappellari, for
taking the time to read my thesis and make comments on it. I am particularly grateful to Jan van
Ours for introducing me to the Labour group of CENTER/Tilburg University and giving me the
opportunity to present two of my papers there.
Writing this thesis would be impossible without the help of my friends and colleagues. Many
people helped me in several ways to get through this four-year period. The first one I would like
to mention is Maike. Her presence in the department changed completely my views of spending
my working time in Tilburg. Going drinking after work or in the Hague as well as traveling
numerous times together from Tilburg to the Hague, we had good times and we shared many joyful
experiences. Maike is also responsible for the fact that the ’samenvatting’ is written in correct
Dutch. Two ’seemingly unrelated’ but very much alike (to my view) colleagues, Viki and Heejung,
were also ’important players’ of the last four years. Together with Viki, we have solved a large
number of economic, societal and personal problems, over drinking of course! As for Heejung, she is
a person that one should meet. With Dorota, we went almost all the way together these four years
and shared an office as well as nice experiences and problems caused by living in the Netherlands
and working in Tilburg University. She started earlier but I could catch up when something more
important than a PhD (don’t forget these things do exist...) came to her life; little Stella-Antonia.
Minna was also a very dear colleague with whom I was engaged in many problem-solving sessions
towards the last year of my PhD. Ellen is also ’responsible’ for the pleasant moments I had the
last two years in the department. I also am grateful to Trudie for her help in the first years of my
PhD. Mathilde and Olivier were always there to carry me away from the worries of my PhD and
to spend wonderful moments in the Hague, in Paris, in Lille, in Venice and other places.
Of course, all the rest of my colleagues have a contribution to my project. I want to thank
Christiaan, Anna, Wilfred, Joris, Eric, Johan, Antonia and Anne for commenting on my research
and for making me have relaxed moments. I also would like to thank the director of the PhD school
of the Faculty of Social Sciences in UvT, Ton Heinen, for keeping an eye on the progress of my
project and solving all the practical and financial issues related to it.
Back in Greece, there are many people to mention. To all my friends, to all these people that
I have a lot to share with, I want to promise that I will join them again; not only in mind (this I
never stopped doing) but also in person. All my visits to them gave me an impulse to continue.
My family has also a part of the credit. My parents and my brother helped me always and in
any possible way these years. Their love was necessary for me to finish this effort. Last by not least
(rather first I would say) I want to thank the woman of my life, Stella. This was an important part
of our lives and we were together in it. Nothing would be possible without her.
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Chapter 1
Wage Mobility: an Introduction
“Britain’s income distribution is like a tall multi-storey apartment building with the numbers
of residents on the different floors corresponding to the concentration of people at different real
income levels. The poorest at any one time are on the basement floor, the richest are in the
penthouse, and the majority somewhere in between. Such snapshots at a point in time tell us
nothing about the dynamics of occupancy patterns: we know little about people’s movements
between floors one year to the next. Are the stairs and lifts much used? Who moves the most
and how far?” (Jarvis & Jenkins, 1998)
The income distribution in the countries of the European Union is similar to the British
distribution with many ’multi-storey apartment buildings’ having different heights, different
numbers of residents per floor as well as different patterns of movements up and down lifts
and stairs. An idea about what these multi-storey apartment buildings look like is given in
Figure 1.1., which plots the cumulative distributions of gross hourly wages in 12 European
countries. As shown in this figure, the distribution of individuals on the different floors of
the storeys varies across the apartment buildings. Some buildings have fewer floors than
others. For example, in Greece there are fewer floors than in the UK. The distribution
of individuals on floors in some buildings is more uniform than in other buildings where
individuals are more concentrated on the bottom floors. In Portugal, the group of people
living in the basement is the largest among all countries. By contrast, in Germany we find the
largest group of people living in the penthouse. The aforementioned differences suggest that
moving from the bottom to the top of the wage distribution or vice versa requires changing
a different number of floors depending on the country. This thesis focuses on wage mobility.
In addition to the questions addressed by Jarvis and Jenkins, in this thesis we explore to
what extent people on the various floors demonstrate different behaviour in their movements
between floors. Moreover, we investigate the factors that determine whether people stay on
their own floor or change floors. Finally, we compare mobility patterns across the different
buildings.
More specifically, this thesis tackles the following questions: (i) Is wage mobility different
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for the various parts of the wage distribution? (ii) Do European countries differ with respect
to wage mobility, and which factors explain these cross-country differences? (iii) Which type
of human capital determines whether a low-pay spell at the beginning of the working career
is a stepping-stone to better earnings, or a trap that young workers cannot easily escape
from? (iv) What is the relationship between wage mobility and a job change with another
employer or within the firm, and to what extent does it differ between the low-paid workers
and the high-paid workers? (v) What is the effect of measurement error on the number of
low-pay transitions that we estimate in survey data and on the estimated covariate effects
in a low-pay transition model?
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Figure 1.1: Cumulative distributions of gross hourly wages for males aged 25-55 for the year
2000. Wages are in Euros. Source: own calculations from ECHP.
Wage mobility: why do we care?
Wage mobility is an important issue from a theoretical, empirical, and policy perspective. As
far as economic theory is concerned, wage mobility is related to several core issues of research.
Wage mobility measures the returns to human capital investments and the relationship
3between productivity and wages. Several models try to explain wage dynamics over the
life course. Here, we will only discuss briefly the theories that are used in this thesis. The
school-to-work transition theory (see, for example, Ryan, 2001) suggests that wage levels
at the beginning of the working career are affected considerably by the link between the
education system and the labour market. If the job requirements correspond to specific
educational or vocational training qualifications, the screening of workers takes place at the
moment of hiring, and the employer can immediately pay the worker a wage that is close to
his marginal productivity. However, when there is no such correspondence, the employer has
little information on the productivity of the worker. In this case, the education of the worker
serves as a sign of his productivity, and the screening takes place during the initial period
after hiring. After this period, the employer acquires more information on the productivity
of the worker and the wage can increase.
For the prime-age working career, an upward age-earnings profile is predicted by many
theories. This upward profile is realized by wage growth either within or between jobs. Hu-
man capital theory (Becker, 1962) suggests that positive wage growth takes place primarily
within a job. According to this theory, earnings are higher for highly-educated individuals.
Moreover, earnings grow with the accumulation of labour market experience and firm-specific
skills. Within a firm, workers acquire firm-specific skills by investing in training. Therefore,
the effect of a job change on wages is contingent on the ability of the workers to transfer
firm-specific skills.
The job-search and the job-matching theory provide an alternative explanation for the
upward age-earnings profile. According to these theories, this upward profile is the effect of
the search for more efficient job matches. According to job-search theory (Burdett, 1978;
Mortensen, 1986), workers enter the labour market with a given and fixed stock of human
capital. Their productivity is known ex ante to employers. Firms differ in the level of
productivity they can obtain from the workers. Hence, workers’ productivity depends on the
firm they are employed in. Employed workers are assumed to continue searching for a firm
in which they will be more productive. As a result, job mobility will positively affect the
wage growth. Since productivity is assumed to be fixed and known ex ante, the job-search
theory suggests that controlling for individual and job heterogeneity eliminates the effect of
job mobility on wages.
The reasoning of the job-matching theory (Jovanovic, 1979a) is similar to the reasoning of
the job-search theory. The difference between these two theories lies in the fact that the job-
matching theory assumes that the worker’s productivity, although fixed, is unknown ex ante
to employers. Therefore, there is initially an uncertainty about the worker’s productivity. As
job tenure increases, the employer gains additional information about the actual productivity
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of the worker. Due to this learning effect, wages also grow within jobs. Due to the initial
uncertainty about the worker’s productivity, this model allows for an effect of job mobility
on wage growth even after correcting for personal and job characteristics.
From an empirical perspective, there are four main strands in the literature. The first
strand deals with individual wage dynamics and tests theoretical models on tenure-wage
profiles, job search, job matching and employer learning (see, for example, Abraham &
Farber, 1987; Altonji & Shakotko, 1987; Topel, 1991; Farber & Gibbons, 1996; Dustmann
& Meghir, 2005). The studies within this strand focus typically on the effect of education,
training, tenure, labour market experience, and other job characteristics on wage dynamics.
Most of these empirical studies are performed in a single country or even a single-firm
framework, and avoid comparing institutional contexts.1 Moreover, these studies typically
estimate an average wage effect, without controlling for the initial position in the wage
distribution. The position in the distribution is usually considered as an effect of the worker’s
skills, ability and effort. State dependence is rarely taken into account.
The second strand of the literature derives implications for earnings mobility by mod-
elling the covariance structure of earnings (see, for example, Lillard & Willis, 1978; Dickens,
2000b; Heider, 2001; Moffitt & Gottschalk, 2002; M. Baker & Solon, 2003; Ramos, 2003;
Cappellari, 2004; Kalwij & Alessie, 2007). These studies decompose earnings into a perma-
nent component and a transitory component. Implications for earnings mobility are derived
by the relationship between the proportions of total earnings that are represented by the
permanent component and the temporary component. As the studies within the first strand,
the studies within the second strand of literature do not focus on the effect of institutions
on wage mobility.
The third strand of the literature is smaller than the first two strands but very relevant
to this thesis. This strand focuses on low-pay mobility. The studies within this strand do not
compare different parts of the wage distribution, but deal extensively with the consequences
of being in a particular part of the distribution, i.e. low pay (Stewart & Swaffield, 1999;
Cappellari, 2000, 2002; Cappellari & Jenkins, 2002, 2004b). The main issue that is tackled
by these studies is whether state dependence or heterogeneity matters more for low-pay
mobility. Many of these papers also provide a contribution to econometrics, as they tackle
methodological problems, such as initial conditions and non-response, which are necessary
in order to estimate state dependence. However, although labour market institutions are
quite relevant for low-pay mobility, these studies typically do not compare countries their
institutional contexts.
The fourth strand of the literature is more policy-oriented and focuses on the conse-
1There are noticeable exceptions, such as Dustmann and Pereira (2005) and Perez and Sanz (2005).
5quences of relative wage mobility at the macro level (see, for example, Burkhauser et al.,
1997; Buchinsky & Hunt, 1999; Dickens, 2000a; Cardoso, 2006). The main interest of this
strand is the relationship between wage mobility and wage inequality. Most of these studies
are implicitly based on Friedman’s (1962) claim that among two societies with equal income
distributions, the country with the highest level of mobility is the most egalitarian. Labour
market institutions are assumed to account for cross-country differences in wage mobility
and wage inequality. Firstly, there are institutions that directly affect the ability of employ-
ers to adjust the wages of their workers. Such institutions are national minimum wages as
well as the labour unions, whose effect can be measured typically by trade union density
and collective bargaining coverage. Secondly, other labour market institutions affect wage
mobility indirectly, through job mobility. The ease with which temporary contracts can be
used, as well as the ease with which permanent workers can be hired or fired,is related to the
aggregate level of job mobility in a country. Since wages grow more between jobs than within
jobs, the level of job mobility positively affects the level of wage volatility. However, the role
of all these institutions on shaping wage mobility itself has not been extensively studied.
Moreover, these studies typically do not account for heterogeneity in wage dynamics. As far
as the initial position in the wage distribution is concerned, in the cases where these studies
account for it, their analyses are rather descriptive. In this thesis we shall attempt to deal
with these shortcomings.
The policy relevance of studying wage mobility
Wage mobility is also important from a policy perspective. Achieving more flexibility in
the labour market while maintaining a certain level of job security is one of the core aims
of the European Union. The dominant view in the European political debate seems to be
that improving labour market flexibility can help the EU to become ‘the most competitive
and dynamic knowledge-based economy ’ in the world.2 The idea is that due to the increased
international competition, labour markets are confronted with an increasing pressure to
adapt more quickly to the changing market demands and conditions. The adaptability of
workers and enterprises is therefore one of the major pillars of the European Employment
Strategy. At the supply side, this translates into the need to improve the ’employability’ of
workers. At the demand side, this translates into the need to increase the flexibility of firms.
The basic understanding is that flexibility of firms is hampered by rigidities in the labour
market that are caused by institutional barriers. These barriers are believed to prevent
firms from adapting smoothly to the rapidly changing economic conditions. Therefore, the
2Strategic goal for 2010, set for Europe at the Lisbon European Council, March 2000.
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political agendas of both the EU and the national governments are aimed at increasing
flexibility in the employment relationships. The high levels of employment protection that
existed in the labour market of many European countries are now being gradually reduced.
The issue, however, of the impact of flexibility on both economic growth and social
welfare has not been extensively investigated. Within Europe, different countries are using
different paths to achieve efficiency in the labour market. Countries differ in the way they
are balancing flexibility with job security. Even when national policies do not seem to vary
considerably, differences emerge more outspokenly between groups of countries. The UK is
achieving efficiency through increased levels of job and employment mobility and low levels
of government and trade union intervention in the labour market. This leads to a high
level of flexibility but a low level of job security in the British labour market. The labour
market in Ireland shares similarities with the UK. In Germany, collective bargaining regulates
pay and employment conditions for the great majority of the workers. Furthermore, it
provides a strong link between the education system and the labour market, mainly through
apprenticeship. Consequently, the German labour market ensures a high level of job security
but a low level of flexibility. Some characteristics of the German labour market are also
dominant in Austria, France and Belgium. The Netherlands combines a high level of labour
market flexibility with high level of job security, with the Dutch labour market sharing
similarities with the labour markets of the Scandinavian countries. In the southern European
countries - Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal - segmentation seems to be the dominant feature
of the labour market. In the primary segment, workers enjoy a high level of employment
protection and a low level of flexibility. In the secondary segment, workers are employed in
firms or jobs where employment protection is low and law enforcement is absent. In this
segment, there is a high level of flexibility, which works only in favour of employers, and a
low level of job security.
Wage mobility is interrelated with labour market flexibility and labour market insti-
tutions. As mentioned earlier, labour market institutions affect wage mobility directly or
indirectly. Flexibility policies typically aim at reducing the effect of institutions that affect
wage mobility indirectly, i.e. firing and hiring regulations, employment protection for tem-
porary and permanent employment. However, wage-setting institutions, i.e. trade union
density and collective bargaining, are indirectly affected by these policies. For example,
unionization is much lower among flexible workers than it is among permanent workers.
Therefore, it is particularly pertinent from a policy perspective to investigate the effect of
labour market institutions on wage mobility. This can provide insights into the ways to
increase or decrease wage mobility in a country through certain policy measures.
7The aim of the thesis
The aim of this thesis is to tackle the five research questions that were raised in the beginning
of this chapter. More specifically:
Research question 1: Is wage mobility different for the various parts of the wage
distribution?
Previous research has rarely investigated this issue. As mentioned above, the position in
the distribution is usually considered as an effect of the worker’s skills, ability and effort.
Contrary to these accounts, we consider the position in the wage distribution to also be a
determinant of the future wage and employment perspectives of an individual. We approach
this issue by pursuing two paths. Firstly, we investigate the effect of the full set of origin
states - deciles of the wage distribution - on wage mobility, while controlling for cross-country
differences. This is achieved with a flexible multinomial logit model that applies restrictions
that are common in log-linear analysis. This approach provides much more information on
the effect of the origin state than the descriptive analyses that have been performed up till
now. Secondly, we investigate whether the effect of certain labour market events on wage
mobility, such as a job change or an employment contract change, is different across the
various parts of the wage distribution. Here, the distinction between the various parts of
the wage distribution is cruder - low-paid and high-paid - as our sample sizes are rather
small. In one essay, we model absolute wage mobility, while in another we model transitions
between different earnings states. In both essays, our econometric model involves the use of
a panel regression model.
By following these approaches, we do not formally estimate true state dependence. As
indicated by previous research, this would demand controlling for the endogeneity of initial
conditions. In other words, in three out of the four essays of this thesis we should have
taken into account that selection into the initial state (for example in low pay) may be non-
random. This would complicate considerably our econometric model and make our study
practically unfeasible. Nevertheless, the problem of initial conditions is partly tackled by
using longitudinal data for many time points and by controlling for observed and unobserved
heterogeneity. Further discussion on the relevance of the initial conditions issue in our
analysis is provided in Chapters 3 and 4.
Research question 2: Do European countries differ with respect to wage mobility,
and which factors explain these cross-country differences?
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From the cross-country comparative perspective, contrary to the largest part of the literature
that studies the consequences of wage mobility, we focus on the causes of wage mobility. Our
aim is to investigate the effect of labour market institutions on wage dynamics. Ideally, we
would like to examine the effect of institutions that directly affect the volatility of wages.
These are the wage-setting institutions: minimum wages, trade union density, as well as
collective bargaining coverage, centralization and coordination. However, these institutions
are poorly measured as their indicators either are more an approximation rather than a
’hard figure’ or are inappropriate for cross-country comparisons. Of the wage-setting insti-
tutions, we could only take into account the trade union density and the collective bargaining
coverage. Moreover, we used measures for other labour market institutions that indirectly
affect wage dynamics. The effect of these institutions may be captured by the Employment
Protection Legislation (EPL) index (OECD, 1999). This index is based on hiring and fir-
ing regulations and on criteria concerning the employment protection legislation for regular
employment, temporary employment and collective dismissal. A low value of this index in
a country indicates that there is a low level of employment protection, and therefore there
are few barriers to job changes. Since workers change jobs easier in such a country, their
wage will also change more often. In such a country, wage mobility will ’ceteris paribus’ be
also higher than in countries with a higher EPL index. Therefore, the EPL index is a useful
proxy for the strictness of the wage regulation in a country.
Another approach to measuring the effect of labour market institutions is by using a
classification of countries into regime types. Even when the institutions do not seem to
differ considerably across countries, the dissimilarities emerge more outspokenly across par-
ticular groups of countries. Probably the most commonly used classification is the Esping-
Andersen’s regime type classification (Esping-Andersen, 1990). This classification is based
on his socio-political account of welfare state policies during the 1960s and 1970s, and the de-
gree of de-commodification and stratification of labour caused by these policies. This degree
of de-commodification is interrelated with regulations that control the volatility of wages
(minimum wage, employment protection regulations, collective wage bargaining, union den-
sity, etc.) and public interventions that prevent the labour market from operating as a fully
competitive market.
We follow a two-pronged approach to investigate the effect of labour market institu-
tions on wage dynamics. Firstly, we make use of all available measures of labour market
institutions - trade union density, collective bargaining coverage, EPL index, clustering of
countries in a regime typology - to explain cross-country differences in wage mobility. How-
ever, explaining wage dynamics through the use of macro determinants would only lead to
an overestimation of the effect of these determinants. For this purpose, we want to account
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Figure 1.2: Lorenz curves based on the gross hourly wages for males aged 25-55 for the year
2000. Wages are in Euros. Source: own calculations from ECHP.
jointly for the effect of institutions and heterogeneity. Our flexible multinomial logit model
allows such an analysis, despite the fact that it takes into account only a few individual
characteristics. Secondly, we focus on specific countries with very different labour markets
in order to investigate whether the institutional context affects the microeconomic mecha-
nisms that determine wage mobility at the individual level. Although this approach does
not allow us to test formally for country or institutional differences, it allows us to exam-
ine whether determinants of wage mobility at the individual level, such as a job change or
an employment contract change, exert different effects across countries. The countries we
include in this type of analysis are the UK, which has a liberal-unregulated labour market,
Germany, which has a highly regulated labour market, and the Netherlands, which takes an
intermediate position. The differences in the labour markets of these three countries result
in differences in their wage distributions. In Figure 1.2, we present the Lorenz curves for the
distribution of gross hourly wages in these three countries. In this figure, it is seen that the
distribution of the Netherlands Lorenz-dominates the distributions of both Germany and
the UK, while the distribution of Germany Lorenz-dominates the distribution of the UK.
10 CHAPTER 1. WAGE MOBILITY: AN INTRODUCTION
The difference between the Netherlands and the other two countries is clear for all parts of
the distribution. Thus, of these three countries, the most egalitarian distribution of wages
is found in the Netherlands, while the most unequal one is found in the UK. The difference
between Germany and the UK emerges for the middle and upper parts of the distribution,
while the lower part is similar in the two countries. This gives rise to questions 3-5.
Research question 3: Which type of human capital determines whether a low-pay
spell at the beginning of the working career is a stepping-stone to better earnings
or a trap that young workers cannot easily escape from?
Our aim here is to investigate the wage and employment perspectives of young individuals
who start their career with a low-paid job. Other studies, such as Scherer (2004) and
de Grip and Wolbers (2006), have approached the issue of labour market entry by studying
the consequences of entering the labour market with a flexible job. The effect of entering
the labour market with a low-paid job has received hardly any attention. The question that
emerges concerns which factors determine whether a low-pay spell at the beginning of the
working career is a stepping stone to better earnings or a trap that young workers cannot
easily escape from. We test the predictions of the school-to-work transition theory that
the relationship between the education system and the labour market determines the early
careers of young workers. More specifically, we investigate whether general human capital
- measured by education and apprenticeship - or firm-specific human capital - measured
by tenure and work-related training - are more important in determining the probability of
exiting low pay. This is done with a discrete-time duration model that distinguishes four
competing risks, namely higher pay, self-employment, unemployment, and inactivity.
Research question 4: What is the relationship between wage mobility and a job
change with another employer or within the firm and to what extent does it differ
between the low-paid and the high-paid workers?
Previous research has extensively dealt with the relationship between wage mobility and
a job mobility. The decisions of individuals and firms about separations - layoffs and quits
- and the effect of these separations on wage growth is analyzed in numerous studies that
test theoretical models on tenure-wage profiles and employer learning. However, the results
of these studies are contradicting; some find that a job change has a positive effect on
wage growth, while others find that it has a negative effect. In this thesis, we focus on
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individual behavior and we choose the on-job-search search theory to explain decisions of
individuals on job turnover. We focus particularly on one property of the job-search model
(Mortensen, 1986) that has been neglected in the literature. This property suggests that
both the probability of changing a job and the difference between the current wage and
the reservation wage are higher for the low-paid workers than for the high-paid ones (van
den Berg, 1992). The reasoning behind this prediction is that a low-paid worker expects
more job changes in his working life in order to improve his earnings than a high-paid
worker does. Therefore, compared to a high-paid worker, a low-paid worker will choose a
reservation wage that is relatively higher than the current wage (van den Berg, 1992). In
this way, the low-paid worker reduces the costs related to the job-change, since he can attain
his preferred life-time earnings level in fewer steps. If workers receive wage offers relatively
close to their reservation wage, then the wage gains from a job change are relatively higher
for the low-paid worker than for the high-paid worker. Therefore, distinguishing between
the different parts of the wage distribution can resolve the ambiguity of the effect of a job
change on wage growth.
A further distinction we make is between external job changes (changes of employer)
and internal or in-firm job changes. According to various theories, wage careers within
firms deviate from the assumptions of the fully competitive labour market model. Also, the
position in the wage distribution is relevant here. Since high-paid workers are more involved
in training programs (and therefore develop more firm-specific skills) they are expected to
derive more utility than low-paid workers would from a promotion or a job shift within the
same firm.
Our econometric approach involves the use of a panel regression model. Since several
studies suggest that job mobility is endogenous to wage growth, we tackle this issue with a
two-step estimation of the Heckman type. The unique features of our modelling approach
is that this two-step estimation is applied on panel data, and that the effect of a job change
- external or in-firm - is estimated separately for the low-paid workers and the high-paid
workers.
Research question 5: What is the effect of measurement error on the number of
low-pay transitions that we estimate in survey data and on the estimated covariate
effects in a low-pay transition model?
All the aforementioned research questions have been tackled with the use of data from panel
surveys. Several studies suggest that these data contain quite a degree of measurement
error that may considerably overestimate wage mobility (Rodgers et al., 1993; Bound et
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al., 2001; Rendtel et al., 1998; Gottschalk, 2005). We focus on a particular type of wage
dynamics - low-pay mobility - and we investigate the effect of measurement error on aggregate
low-pay transition probabilities and on the estimates of the determinants of a multivariate
low-pay transition model. Previous research shows that half of the poverty transitions in
the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and in the European Community Household
Panel (ECHP) are spurious (Rendtel et al., 1998; Lollivier & Daniel, 2002). Rendtel et al.
proposed a powerful method to correct for measurement error in poverty transitions. We
extend this approach by adding heterogeneity and by working with a much longer time series.
Our econometric approach is to add a ‘latent structure’ in a random-effects multinomial logit
model.
A brief outline of the thesis
This thesis consists further of four essays and one concluding chapter. The four essays tackle
the five research questions discussed above.
Chapter 2 investigates the first and the second research questions. In this chapter,
we provide an overview of wage mobility patterns between the different parts of the wage
distribution as well as among European countries. We use a European-wide dataset that
provides data for 15 European countries (ECHP) to investigate jointly the effect of the origin
state in the distribution and the effect of labour market institutions on wage mobility.
Chapters 3-5 shift to a more microeconomic approach. Chapter 3 tackles the second and
the third research questions. In this chapter, we use panel data from the UK, Germany,
and the Netherlands (BHPS, GSOEP and SEP, respectively) to investigate the wage and
employment perspectives of the low-paid labour market entrants. We also allow for different
pathways out of low pay; self-employment, unemployment, and inactivity. Chapter 4 deals
with the first, second and the fourth research questions. The main issue we investigate in
this chapter is the relationship between wage mobility and a job change. In investigating
this relationship, we distinguish between low-paid workers, middle-paid workers and high-
paid workers, as well as between external and internal job changes. The cross-country
comparative perspective is provided by performing our analysis in the UK and in Germany.
Chapter 5 tackles the first, second, fourth and the fifth research questions. The main focus
of this chapter is to estimate the effect of measurement error on low-pay mobility. The
distinction between different parts of the wage distribution is cruder than in chapter 4 as
we only distinguish between low-paid workers and higher-paid workers. The cross-country
perspective is provided by comparing the results of our model in the UK, Germany, and the
Netherlands. Finally, in chapter 6, we summarize the main findings of the previous chapters
and we formulate some conclusions. We also discuss the policy relevance of these results and
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propose some issues for further research.
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Chapter 2
Institutions and Wage Mobility in
Europe
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it provides a contribution to the comparative
study of wage mobility in Europe. More specifically, we investigate the effect of labour
market institutions on the cross-country differences in wage mobility in Europe. Standard
economic theory suggests that the less important these institutions are in a country, the
higher the volatility of wages. Two ways of measuring the effect of labour market institutions
are compared. The first way is by studying the effect of specific wage-setting institutions
(trade union density, collective bargaining coverage. and Employment Protection Legislation
- EPL). The second is by using a classification of countries according to the features of
the labour market institutions. This classification resembles the classification of Esping-
Andersen (1990).
The second aim of the paper is to account for the effect of the origin state - the initial
position in the wage distribution - on wage mobility. For this purpose, we apply a novel
approach in measuring and modelling wage mobility. Economists typically use individual
level data to investigate the determinants of absolute changes in wages. Other approaches
rooted mainly in sociology, such as Fritzell (1990), use mobility measures though their main
interest is in aggregate changes in earnings. Regardless of the approach, most studies do
not account for the fact that wage mobility can be different in different parts of the wage
distribution. In this paper, we use an approach that uses individual-level data to derive
a macro-level measure for wage mobility accounting for the initial position in the wage
distribution. Our mobility measure is the year-to-year transition matrix between deciles of
the wage distribution. We model this measure of positional mobility with a variant of the
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multinomial logit model using restrictions that are typical for the log-linear approach. These
restrictions allow us to estimate the parameters of a model that would otherwise involve the
estimation of a huge number of transition tables.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the measures of income and wage
mobility. Section 2.3 elaborates on the measure of mobility that is used in this paper. Section
2.4 presents the previous findings on wage mobility and formulates some hypotheses about
the dissimilarities in wage mobility patterns across countries and regime types. Section 2.5
deals with the data and sampling from the European Community Household Panel. Section
2.6 presents the results of the empirical models. The main conclusions of the study as well
as the issues for further research are discussed in the final section (section 2.7) of the paper.
2.2 The measures of income and wage mobility
Different responses are to be expected when individuals are asked what changes in wages or
incomes they would like to experience over time: some people would just wish to see their
income rise in absolute levels (absolute mobility); another group would like to see its income
improved compared to other people (relative mobility); others prefer their income not to
be too volatile (income risk). In accordance to these differences in individual preferences,
numerous definitions of wage mobility have been developed. These definitions correspond to
different theories about the way income or wage changes affect the well-being of individuals
(Fritzell, 1990).
According to standard economic theory, people are assumed to be primarily interested in
the absolute changes of their (real) income. However, Hirsch (1995) suggests that even if an
individual cared only for the purchasing power of his own income, his rank in the distribution
still matters, as it determines his ability to acquire ’positional’ goods (goods whose assigned
value depends on how many other people possess them) or status goods. Hence, a change in
the relative position of an individual in the distribution, referred to as ’relative positional’
mobility, matters too. Other researchers, such as Duesenberry (1967) and Easterlin (1974),
suggest also that since preferences are endogenous, people tend to adapt them in view of
what others have and want (the ‘keeping up with the Joneses’ aspect). The idea of ‘relative
deprivation’, according to which people always evaluate their income or living conditions in
comparison to the conditions of their peers, was introduced by sociologists such as Runciman
(1966). This theory suggests that an individual considers himself successful if his income
increases more than the income of the individuals he or she compares him- or herself with.
Psychologists such as Brickman et al. (1978), however, argue that individual perception of
happiness tends to diminish due to the rapid adjustment of people’s preferences to the new
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situation and due to their raised expectations about the future. They suggest then that no
gain in happiness or social welfare will occur in the end.
Most studies on wage mobility involve measures that include all the three aforementioned
sorts of mobility (absolute mobility, relative mobility and income risk). Nevertheless, in
many studies it is not always clear why these measures are selected (Headey & Muffels,
2003). Since we want to compare wage mobility at the macro or country level, we have
transformed these measures of individual mobility into measures of overall mobility in society.
At the aggregate level, absolute individual mobility translates into economic growth; relative
individual mobility into income inequality or income dispersion, and income risk into income
stability or income security. Dealing with macro-level mobility, Fields (2000) argues that
changes in the overall wage distribution might change the ranking of the individual in the
distribution without changing his absolute level of income. In metaphorical terms, this is the
question regarding what matters more: ‘changing rooms or rooms changing’ as addressed by
Fields (2000) and van Kerm (2004). The type of rank mobility where individuals exchange
their income positions, while total income and overall income dispersion remain the same, is
known as ‘exchange’ mobility. ’Exchange’ mobility has to be distinguished from ’structural’
mobility, which refers to the growth in absolute income of all people or to the mobility
emerging from the increase in the income dispersion (Markandya, 1982a, 1982b, 1984; Fields
& Ok, 1999). Yet, as in the individual case, we can decompose this structural component
of aggregate mobility into a growth component (equal changes in the income of all people)
and a dispersion or inequality component (a change in the dispersion without a change in
the aggregate income of all people, van Kerm, 2004).
2.3 The choice for the mobility measure
The above discussion on the various types of income mobility leads to a choice for the mobil-
ity measure that is used in this study. From a macro perspective, this paper investigates the
role of macro-economic conditions, regime type and labour market institutions in explain-
ing cross-country differences in wage mobility. These labour market institutions are shaped
according to policies that aim at increasing the growth component and reducing the disper-
sion and risk component of wage mobility in a country. Therefore, investigating the role of
all three components of mobility - growth, dispersion and exchange mobility - is necessary.
Nevertheless, at the individual level, we want to investigate the effect of the origin position
in the wage distribution on wage mobility. Since growth mobility refers to equal absolute
changes in the wage of all individuals, it does not render any information on the differences
between the various parts of the wage distribution. Thus, we need to use a mobility measure
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that takes into account the other two sorts of mobility components explained above: relative
(dispersion) mobility and exchange mobility. For this reason, we choose relative positional
mobility, which is defined as the year-to-year change in the decile ranking, as our mobility
measure. The advantage of the measure is that it takes into account these two sorts of
mobility, although it does not make it possible to separate them.
This can be shown with the following example that is presented in Table 2.1: consider
the case of a group of four people having wages in year 1 equal to 2,000, 3,500, 4,500 and
5,000 euros, respectively. Suppose that in year 2, the individual that was originally ranked
highest in the wage distribution still has a wage of 5,000 euros, but those individuals ranked
second-, third and fourth in the original distribution now have wages of 8,000, 7,100 and
6,900 euros, respectively. Thus, the highest ranked individual in year 1 now has the lowest
rank in the wage distribution of year 2. In this example, we can decompose mobility into a
growth, dispersion, and exchange component in the following way. The growth component is
the absolute change in income of 3,000 euros for all individuals. The dispersion component
results from a transfer of 400 euros from individual 3 to individual 2, and the exchange
component is just an exchange of rank between individual 4 and 1 without a change in the
aggregate income.
Table 2.1: An example of wage mobility decomposition
Year 1 Year 2
Initial Growth mobility Positional mobility Final
ranking Growth Dispersion Exchange ranking
1 2,000 +3,000 5,000 5,000 +3,000 8,000 4
2 3,500 6,500 +400 6,900 6,900 2
3 4,500 7,500 -400 7,100 7,100 3
4 5,000 +3,000 8,000 8,000 -3,000 5,000 1
The inability to decompose positional mobility into a dispersion and exchange component
has to do with the fact that we only observe the rank change, but not how it emanates from
changes in the underlying components. Moreover, since we only measure rank changes, we
cannot examine whether there is more upward or more downward mobility in a particular
country. For the same reason, our measure of relative positional wage mobility renders
2.4. THEORY AND RESEARCH ON WAGE MOBILITY PATTERNS 19
little information about whether an increase in it leads to an increase or decrease of wage
inequality. It informs us, however, about the extent, at least in relative terms, of wage
risk and wage volatility that people experience and hence, about the overall level of wage
stability. The more wages fluctuate over time the more equal they become in the medium and
long-term. High rates of immobility therefore, signal a high persistence of wage inequality
over time.
Table 2.2: 10 by 10 transition matrix for wage mobility
Destination decile
Origin
decile


x1,1 x1,2 x1,3 ... x1,10
x2,1 x2,2 x2,3 ... x2,10
x3,1 x3,2 x3,3 ... x3,10
: : : :
x10,1 x10,2 x10,3 ... x10,10


Our measure of positional mobility
Our aggregate positional mobility measure is based on the year-to-year transitions of work-
ing individuals across deciles of the wage distribution within each country.1 Our aim is
particularly to explain the 10× 10 table (Table 2.2), where cells represent frequencies. The
index for the rows denotes the decile position in year 1, while the index for the columns
represents the decile position in year 2. In a society with perfect mobility (PM) all cells
per row have the same value (xi,k =
P10
j=1 xi,j
10
, for each k = 1, ..., 10 ), while in a perfectly
immobile society (PI) all off-diagonal elements of the table are zero ( xij = 0 , if i 6= j ).
In our analysis, individuals whose destination state differs up to one decile from the origin
state are considered immobile, because a transition of one decile could be the result of a
light level of churning in the wage distribution (see Table 2.2).
2.4 Theory and research on wage mobility patterns
The literature on wage mobility is rather poor compared to the number of studies on income
mobility. Furthermore, studies on wage dynamics focus rather more on the consequences
1In order to test for the sensitivity of our analysis with respect to the clustering of incomes in deciles we
repeated our analysis by clustering incomes in 20 categories. Results showed that country differences did
not change.
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of wage mobility (wage growth, long-term wage inequality) than on wage mobility as such.
From a policy point of view, this is not surprising as politicians are generally more concerned
with fostering economic growth, reducing inequality and increasing stability and security
than with increasing wage mobility per se. However, wage mobility seems to be becoming
a more important issue in both economics and policy-making. Politicians confronted with
a sluggish labour market seem to be aware of the fact that promoting mobility in a labour
market that is hampered by institutional barriers contributes to a more competitive and
efficiently operating labour market, which may in turn raise productivity levels, and thereby
growth.
Table 2.3: Levels and trends in Earnings Inequality
Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) Acemoglu (2003a)
Level Trend 1983-90 Level Mid ‘80s - Mid’90s
Denmark Moderate (+) Moderate
Sweden Low (+) Low Low No change
Finland Low (+) Moderate Low (-) Slight
Netherlands Low (+) Slight Low (-) Slight
France Moderate (+) Slight
Germany Moderate (+) Slight Low (+) Moderate
Belgium Low (-) Slight
Ireland High No change
UK High (+) High High (+) High
Wage dispersion remains, of course, an important issue. Evidence suggests that from
the mid-1980s until the mid-1990s, wage inequality rose steadily, although at a different
level in many Western countries, except for the northern European countries (see Table 2.3).
Specifically, from the mid-1980s onward, wage inequality increased strongly in the UK and
in Portugal (Cardoso, 1998, 2006), but showed moderate increases in continental countries
and no increases or even decreases in Scandinavian countries (Gottschalk & Joyce, 1998;
Aaberge, 2002; Acemoglu, 2003b). There are three leading theories for the explanation of
these changes in the wage patterns: the increased international trade and increased migration
suggesting that non-sheltered sectors in the US and in Europe face increased international
competition by low-wage countries, which has an adverse downsizing effect on the wages of
the low-skilled workers in these sectors (Borjas & Ramey, 1995); the skill-biased technological
change, which explains the increase in the dispersion of wages through the introduction and
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rapid spread of new technologies and the resulting increase in the demand of high skilled
workers at the expense of their low skilled peers (Acemoglu, 2003b, 2003a); the process
of deregulation or removal of labour market regulations and institutions that allows wages
to adjust more adequately and rapidly to market changes. This process of deregulation
permits labour markets to become more flexible and to respond more swiftly to the ongoing
changes. The tendency in policy to promote flexibilization by removing institutional barriers
to mobility is contented to account for the differences in both the trends and the levels of
wage inequality between the US, the UK and the continental European countries (Blau &
Kahn, 1996).
Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) argue that much of the change in earnings inequality
occurred at the bottom of the distribution due to the sharp increase of the skill premium for
the better skilled. As Acemoglu (2002, 2003b) argues, the reason for the skill premium being
much larger in the US than in Europe is that in Europe supply responded more swiftly to
the demand shifts caused by the process of skill-biased technological change than in the US.
Lee (1999) suggests that the erosion of the minimum wage levels in the US might account
for the increase in wage inequality. It is apparent, however, that the effect of skill-biased
technological change is difficult to test empirically, due to the lack of appropriate data and
methods to asses it.
In view of the rising wage inequality, it becomes particularly pertinent to study wage
mobility. Dominant perspectives in economic theory argue that the ongoing changes in the
economy and in the labour market have resulted in a higher level of wage mobility over
time, which has dampened the short-term shocks in wage inequality. Although workers are
less income-secure in the medium-term and long-term than in the past, as wages are more
volatile, they also have more opportunities for moving into a better-paid job. Ultimately,
it is an empirical question concerning how overall wage mobility, in terms of wage growth
and wage dispersion, is balanced against less income security and stability. Nevertheless,
whatever the balance is, there will be winners and losers in this process, dependent on the
demand and supply factors involved, the level of their skills, and their earnings capacities.
Recent studies show that increases in wage inequality are indeed not the result of short-term
shocks in the wage distribution. Dickens (2000a) concludes that they reflect a long-term
increase in the wage disparities across individuals. He finds evidence of high and increasing
levels of immobility (since the 1970s), especially among the low-paid, in the UK. Burkhauser
et al. (1997) conducted a comparative study of earnings mobility in the US and Germany in
the 1980s. Although the welfare systems and the labour markets of the two countries differ
significantly, they found ’a great deal of persistence’ and a similar pattern of mobility in
these two countries. Buchinsky and Hunt (1999) reach the same conclusion for the US, the
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country with the most outspoken liberal labour market. Using panel data from the Survey
on Households Income and Wealth of the Bank of Italy, Cappellari (2002) finds high levels
of immobility among the low-paid Italian workers. Buchinsky et al. (1998) corroborate this
result for the French workers.
The role of institutional constraints
There is a growing amount of literature suggesting that labour market institutions and
employment protection regulations account for the dissimilar mobility patterns in the labour
markets of different countries. The European Commission (2003) already pointed out that
the wage distributions of EU member states seem to vary considerably due to differences
that prevail among them with respect to different kinds and levels of employment protection.
Therefore, we will examine to what extent the level of regulation contributes to explaining
cross-country differences in wage mobility in Europe.
There are various ways to study the impact of institutional constraints. The most
straightforward way is to examine to what extent the specific institutions and regulations
have a bearing on cross-country variation in wage mobility. The OECD (2004) suggests that
the main wage-setting institutions are minimum wages and trade union density, as well as
collective bargaining coverage, centralization and co-ordination. Trade union density refers
to the percentage of workers that are members of a trade union. Collective bargaining cov-
erage is the proportion of workers covered by collective employment agreements. Collective
bargaining centralization refers to the degree that the wage bargaining between unions and
employers is centralized, while collective bargaining coordination refers to the degree that
wage bargaining at all levels (company, industry, country) is coordinated by union and em-
ployers confederations. As documented in several studies, minimum wages and collective
bargaining coverage have an equalizing effect on wages, especially at the bottom end of the
distribution. Union density has a less clear effect since in some countries, such as Denmark
and Finland, being a member of a union provides entitlement to unemployment benefit.
Our expectations for wage mobility are similar. Therefore, we contend that in countries
with high levels of minimum wages affecting a large share of the working population, low lev-
els of wage mobility will be observed, particularly in the lower part of the wage distribution.
Extensive collective bargaining coverage can also prevent wages from being too volatile in
the low and middle parts of the wage distribution. We also expect union density, bargaining
centralization, and bargaining coordination to have a negative effect (but to a lesser extent
than the other two institutions) on wage mobility in a country.
The problem that we face is that there are no reliable measures for the majority of
these institutions that can allow us to make cross-country comparisons. Union density and
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collective bargaining coverage are measured by the OECD, but the relevant levels seem more
an approximation than a ’hard figure’ for many countries. Minimum wage regulations are
determined at various levels (industry, region, national) in different countries. This makes
cross-country comparison of minimum wage levels practically unfeasible. As for bargaining
centralization and coordination, no generally accepted measure exists. As a result, we cannot
include a direct measure for these two institutions in our analysis.
The OECD (1999) has developed another measure of labour market regulation, the Em-
ployment Protection Legislation (EPL). This index is based on hiring and firing regulations
and on criteria concerning the employment protection legislation for regular employment,
temporary employment, and collective dismissal. A low value of this index in a country indi-
cates that there is a low level of employment protection, and therefore there are few barriers
to job changes. Since workers will change jobs easier in such a country, their wage will also
change more often. In such a country, wage mobility will, ’ceteris paribus’, be also higher
than in countries with a higher EPL index. Therefore, the EPL index is a useful proxy for
the strictness of the wage regulation in a country.
Another way of testing the effect of labour market institutions is by using country clus-
tering. Even when the institutions do not seem to differ considerably across countries, the
dissimilarities emerge more outspokenly across particular groups of countries. Countries with
a more flexible labour market due to relatively low levels of employment regulation, such as
the UK and Ireland, are believed to exhibit much more job and wage mobility than strongly
regulated countries, such as the Southern European countries; namely Greece, Italy, Portu-
gal and Spain. Classifying countries in clusters or regime types is quite a common approach
in comparative studies on income and welfare policies. Probably the most commonly used
classification is the Esping-Andersen’s regime type classification (Esping-Andersen, 1990).
This classification is based on his socio-political account of welfare state policies during the
1960s and 1970s and the degree of de-commodification and stratification of labour caused
by these policies. This degree of de-commodification is interrelated with regulations that
control the volatility of wages (minimum wage, employment protection regulations, collec-
tive wage bargaining, union density etc.) and public interventions that prevent the labour
market from operating as a fully competitive market.
More specifically, according to this classification, we contend that countries characterized
by a low public interference and loose levels of employment protection - denoted as liberal
regimes - are likely to attain high levels of wage mobility. Southern European countries are
believed to exhibit low levels of wage mobility due to the strictness of their employment
protection legislation and despite their low union density. The segmented labour markets
of Southern European countries primarily safeguard the position of workers in the inter-
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nal labour market. Similarly, low levels of wage mobility are expected in the continental
European countries - Austria, Belgium, France, Germany - due to their strongly regulated
labour market, high union density, and strict compliance to collective wage bargaining. In
Scandinavian countries and in the Netherlands, notwithstanding the high union density and
the high level of compliance to collective wage bargaining, wages are more flexible than in
the strongly regulated continental countries, but less flexible than the lowly-regulated labour
markets of the liberal countries (Muffels & Fouarge, 2002; Muffels & Luijkx, 2006). This is
the regime classification that we will be testing in this paper.
To sum up, we will test the effect of labour market institutions by examining how much
of the country variation in wage mobility is explained by union density, collective bargaining
coverage, and the EPL index as well as the regime typology described above.
Table 2.4: Macroeconomic and institutional variables in 12 European countries
Regime Country
LFP Unemployment GDP per capita EPL
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
(1995-99) change (1995-99) change (1995-99) change
Continental
Germany 80.3 -0.03 8.3 0.2 104.2 -0.6 2.6
Austria 80.9 -0.3 3.8 0.1 113.5 0 2.4
France 74.8 0.3 9.9 -0.1 103.8 0.1 2.8
Nordic
Finland 77.2 0.2 12.4 -1.5 102 0.3 2.2
Netherlands 82.3 0.6 4.3 -0.8 109.9 0.2 2.3
Denmark 85.2 0.1 5.2 -0.4 114.6 0.1 1.8
Liberal
UK 83.1 -0.2 8.3 -0.9 103 0.4 1
Ireland 78.9 0.5 9.6 -1.6 105.7 2.4 1.2
Southern
Italy 75 0.1 8.9 0 102.6 -0.3 3.1
Greece 74.7 0.2 6.9 0.2 65.4 0.1 3.5
Spain 77.3 0.5 15 -1.7 81.4 0.4 3
Portugal 81.8 -0.2 5.3 -0.6 68.5 0.5 3.7
Source: OECD
LFP refers to the Labour Force Participation rate. EPL refers to the Employment Protection Legislation index.
Macroeconomic conditions and time
The effect of labour market institutions on wage mobility is not a static concept. These
institutions and the corresponding ‘regime types’ might interact with other policy measures
or even with the macroeconomic performance of countries. Therefore, it is important to
study the evolution of cross-country differences over time and to control for the effect of the
business cycle. For this purpose, we use the unemployment rate, the yearly change of GDP
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per capita and the labour force participation rate for males aged 16 to 64 years old (Table
2.4).
Job and employment characteristics
A third topic covered by the paper is to what extent prevailing cross-country differences in
wage mobility are associated with differences in the job and employment structure. Workers
in the public sector usually face lower job turnover rates and experience relatively smaller
wage changes, either upward or downward, than private-sector workers. The more workers
are employed in the public sector, the lower wage mobility tends to be in a country. Workers
with high-level skills and educational qualifications usually experience a steeper upward
career path accompanied by faster wage growth. In contrast, low-educated workers are
usually employed in low-skilled jobs with little opportunities to improve their wage prospects.
Therefore, the more the distribution of education and the reward assigned to skills differ
across countries, the more the wage mobility patterns tend to diverge.
2.5 Data, main concepts and some descriptives
We use the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) designed by EUROSTAT for
income study purposes. This is a longitudinal database that contains comparable socio-
economic data for individuals and households from 15 European countries and over an eight-
year period, namely from 1994 to 2001. It includes information concerning approximately
60,000 households and 130,000 individuals per wave (EUROSTAT, 2001). ECHP data were
collected by the ’National Collection Data Units’ by means of a centrally designed question-
naire. However, some countries (Austria and Finland) lack data for the first wave, or for
the first two waves, as they started participation later. Due to artifacts in the income data,
we have excluded Belgium and Luxembourg. Sweden has also been excluded, as the ECHP
database includes repeated cross-section data rather than panel data for this country. The
first wave of ECHP (1994) is excluded from our analysis as, in the view of EUROSTAT,
the income data for this wave are much less robust than the data for the subsequent waves.
Hence, our sample consists of seven waves and 12 countries.
The sample is restricted to male wage earners between 25 and 55 years old, appearing
in the dataset for at least two subsequent years and declaring paid employment as their
main economic activity for the year prior to the survey. The main reason for restricting
our analysis to male employees is that females tend to have more career breaks and more
intermittent periods of temporary or permanent layoff for very different reasons than males
(e.g. caring obligations). Thus, we cannot include women in our analysis without controlling
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Table 2.5: Overall year-to-year transitions in percentages
Destination decile
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 SUM
Origin
decile
1 53.0 23.7 8.7 5.0 3.4 2.2 1.4 1.3 0.9 0.4 100
2 10.2 51.1 21.4 7.4 4.0 2.7 1.5 0.9 0.5 0.2 100
3 3.3 18.1 58.3 0.3 9.9 4.8 2.8 1.5 0.7 0.3 100
4 1.3 4.1 15.4 42.1 22.1 8.2 3.8 1.8 0.8 0.3 100
5 1.0 2.1 4.9 17.0 40.6 21.6 7.9 3.1 1.3 0.5 100
6 0.6 1.2 2.2 5.3 17.4 40.7 21.8 7.3 2.8 0.8 100
7 0.6 0.7 1.1 2.3 5.5 16.9 43.4 21.8 6.3 1.4 100
8 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.1 2.2 5.8 16.8 47.9 20.8 3.8 100
9 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 1.0 2.1 4.3 16.8 58.0 16.2 100
10 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.3 2.5 13.6 80.4 100
Transitions are pooled over the countries and the years.
for the factors responsible for their different career paths, which goes beyond the scope of
this paper. We excluded men younger than 25 years old because most of them would be
in some kind of education. Men older than 54 years old are also excluded from the sample
as they often participate in early retirement schemes or voluntarily reduce their working
hours. Furthermore, due to our focus on wage earners, we exclude the self-employed and
the unemployed. Finally, in order to reduce measurement error, we follow the standard
approach by trimming the wage distribution. Specifically, we exclude individuals having less
than 10%, and more than 3,000% of the median wage income respectively.
Our basic unit of analysis is the working individual, and our main economic variable
is the total income from paid employment. This is the total personal net labour income
after deduction of taxes and social security contributions, with the reference year being the
year prior to the survey. In order to construct our sample, we ranked the wage income of
individuals according to their decile position within a country, and examined the transitions
between the decile positions across year t and t+1. Our sample population consists of
12,709 individuals for the first pair of years (1995-1996), 13,746 for the second (1996-1997),
13,193 for the third (1997-1998), 15,379 for the fourth (1998-1999), 14,533 for the fifth (1999-
2000), and 14,173 for the last (2000-2001). Henceforth, the time points of our analysis will
correspond to the year from which the data originate. For example, when we refer to time
point 1998-1999, data come from wave 7 (1999-2000) of the ECHP.
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Some descriptives
A basic overview of the decile transitions is given in Table 2.5. This table presents the
origin-destination transitions pooled across countries and time periods. Observations are
concentrated along the main diagonal, especially at the corners of the table. As we move
away from the diagonal, frequencies become significantly lower. Therefore, the main finding
of this table is a significant amount of persistence, especially at the low-wage- and high-wage
strata. Low-wage- and high-wage earners experience hardly any wage change in a one-year
period.
The relevant tables by regime type (Tables 2.5) reveal some interesting differences. Con-
trary to our expectations, wage earners in the Nordic countries (including the Netherlands)
are apparently more mobile than average, while in the lowly-regulated (liberal) countries,
workers are seemingly less mobile than average. In the Southern European countries mobility
rates emerge higher than average, at least in the higher income strata. The lowest mobility
levels are observed in the Continental European countries.
The data that we use in our analysis consist of a separate observed transition table per
country (12 countries), time (6 time points: 1994-1995 up to and including 1999-2000), sector
(2 sectors: private and public), and education (3 groups: completed education lower than
high school, high school, and higher education) combination. As information on two countries
is missing for the first time point and on one country for the second time point, we have
in total 414 (instead of 432) transition tables. It should be noted that for the construction
of these transition matrices, deciles were defined per country and time combination. This
means that the same definition applies across education and sector groups (within country-
time combinations).
2.6 Models for explaining wage mobility patterns
A simple probit analysis
The method for analyzing the 414 10-by-10 transition tables needs to allow for the detection
of differences in the relative positional wage mobility patterns across a large number of
tables. The method should therefore be able to detect differences across countries, time
points, education groups and employment sectors in the tendency of individuals to move
more than one decile in the wage distribution. The log-linear variant of the multinomial
logit regression model shown below can be used for this purpose, but first a simpler and
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Table 2.5: Overall year-to-year transitions across regimes in percentages
Nordic Liberal
Destination decile Destination decile
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 SUM
Origin
decile
1 44.3 27.5 11.1 6.7 4.2 1.9 1.5 1.4 0.9 0.6
Origin
decile
1 56.4 22.6 7.6 4.1 2.6 2.5 1.6 1.3 0.9 0.4 100
2 10.7 46.9 21.5 7.9 4.4 3.7 2.5 1.3 0.6 0.5 2 8.4 55.9 21.9 6.8 3.1 1.9 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.1 100
3 3.0 14.9 44.4 21.1 7.9 3.7 2.5 1.6 0.6 0.4 3 1.9 13.0 50.3 22.9 6.0 2.8 1.8 0.9 0.3 0.2 100
4 1.8 5.1 13.9 43.0 21.3 7.4 3.8 2.0 1.1 0.5 4 1.2 3.2 14.6 45.3 23.4 7.5 2.9 1.1 0.6 0.1 100
5 1.5 2.7 4.9 14.4 40.5 22.7 8.2 3.1 1.2 0.7 5 0.6 1.5 3.5 16.2 44.0 23.0 7.2 2.6 1.1 0.2 100
6 0.6 1.5 2.4 5.1 16.8 40.3 22.0 6.8 3.3 1.2 6 0.6 0.7 1.4 4.7 16.0 44.9 22.7 7.0 1.7 0.3 100
7 1.0 1.0 1.4 2.4 5.2 15.9 42.3 22.6 6.4 1.8 7 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.6 4.8 17.0 45.0 23.4 5.3 0.8 100
8 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.8 2.5 6.0 17.0 45.5 21.8 3.5 8 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.6 5.5 15.0 52.4 21.5 2.3 100
9 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.3 2.6 4.1 16.4 56.8 17.2 9 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.8 1.4 3.4 16.9 61.6 15.0 100
10 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.4 2.5 13.1 80.0 10 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.8 1.3 12.1 84.6 100
Continental Southern
Destination decile Destination decile
Origin
decile
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 SUM
1 67.1 21.7 5.0 2.4 1.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2
Origin
decile
1 54.0 21.7 8.7 5.2 3.9 2.4 1.6 1.4 0.8 0.3 100
2 16.8 48.2 22.8 7.0 2.6 1.3 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.2 2 12.1 47.9 20.7 8.3 4.5 3.0 1.5 1.1 0.7 0.2 100
3 6.0 16.3 43.8 22.1 6.9 3.0 0.8 0.7 0.3 0.1 3 3.3 16.1 39.8 21.3 9.6 4.9 2.6 1.4 0.8 0.3 100
4 3.1 5.4 18.7 40.8 20.8 7.1 3.0 0.9 0.2 0.2 4 1.7 4.8 18.2 35.8 21.4 9.5 4.5 2.6 1.0 0.4 100
5 3.1 2.9 5.8 16.7 40.5 21.5 7.0 1.7 0.6 0.3 5 1.1 2.6 6.5 19.5 36.6 19.2 8.6 3.2 1.8 0.7 100
6 1.5 1.4 3.0 6.7 20.4 39.3 19.6 6.1 1.5 0.5 6 0.6 1.5 3.1 6.3 18.7 36.5 21.0 7.9 3.5 0.9 100
7 1.1 0.5 1.0 3.1 6.3 19.2 44.7 19.0 4.7 0.5 7 0.6 0.8 1.3 3.1 6.2 17.7 42.2 19.7 6.9 1.7 100
8 1.1 0.5 0.8 0.8 1.9 4.8 20.7 50.7 17.0 1.7 8 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.2 2.4 6.3 17.9 46.0 19.3 4.9 100
9 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.9 1.4 3.7 15.5 64.0 12.7 9 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.1 2.6 5.7 17.2 55.4 16.1 100
10 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.7 13.4 81.9 10 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.9 1.7 3.5 15.3 77.4 100
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Table 2.6: Probability of changing more than 1 decile
1994-1995 1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000
Austria - 0.201 0.225 0.186 0.183 0.174
France 0.122 0.114 0.105 0.096 0.106 0.110
Germany 0.157 0.177 0.149 0.143 0.151 0.143
Denmark 0.281 0.290 0.324 0.290 0.305 0.331
Netherlands 0.152 0.157 0.168 0.171 0.208 0.241
Finland - - 0.134 0.120 0.148 0.161
UK 0.152 0.133 0.131 0.152 0.161 0.149
Ireland 0.258 0.283 0.219 0.245 0.262 0.239
Italy 0.281 0.259 0.265 0.226 0.201 0.236
Greece 0.289 0.293 0.261 0.248 0.182 0.185
Spain 0.228 0.238 0.218 0.244 0.263 0.275
Portugal 0.127 0.142 0.158 0.138 0.095 0.112
Note: These probabilities represent the marginal effects from the probit regression. Country, time, time-country
interaction, education (low, high school, higher) and sector (public, private) are used as predictors.
more standard analysis is performed. Specifically, a standard probit regression model is
applied that can serve as a benchmark for the other models. The dichotomous outcome
variable indicates whether a change of more than one decile occurred or not. Country, time,
time-country interaction, education and sector are used as categorical predictors in this
probit regression.
Rather than reporting all the details about the obtained parameter estimates, we sum-
marize the main results in Table 2.6 as represented by the estimated average probability (the
marginal effects) of moving more than one decile for each of the combinations of country and
time period. As can be seen, the highest probability of changing more than one decile in the
wage distribution is found initially for Denmark, Italy and Greece, while the lowest rates
are found for Portugal and France. Across the period of reference, however, the ranking of
countries changes: at the end of the period, Denmark, Ireland and Spain rank first while
Portugal, France and Germany come last. By summing up the results with respect to our
regime typology, we observe that in Southern European countries (with the exception of
Portugal), individuals face high levels of wage mobility that (with the exception of Spain)
show a tendency to decrease. Nordic countries show either high (Denmark) or initially low
but strongly increasing (the Netherlands and Finland) rates of wage mobility. Estimates for
countries of the continental regime are situated somewhere in the middle (except for France,
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which ranks lower) but they are uniformly decreasing. For the lowly regulated labour mar-
kets of the UK and Ireland, we get contradicting results. Ireland has very high levels of
wage mobility, while the UK has unexpectedly significantly lower levels. In both countries,
the probability of changing more than one decile does not change significantly during the
reference period.
A restricted multinomial logit analysis
A limitation of this rather simple probit regression analysis is that all types of transitions
are pooled; this means that it does takes into account neither the origin state from which
a transition takes place, nor the size or the direction of a transition (i.e. whether it is an
upward or downward transition). The analysis could be refined by doing separate analyses
by origin state, by the direction of the change and by taking into account how large the
change is. This could be done, for example, by means of an ordered probit model. In this
case, however, such an approach would require a large number of separate regressions. More
specifically, let us allow for 3 categories for the size of the move (moving 0, 1, 2 or more
deciles). Then, since we have 10 origin states (deciles), 2 directions of the move (upward,
downward) and 3 categories for the size of the move, we would have to perform 60 different
regressions. For this reason, we have opted for a method that can account for all these aspects
in a single analysis. This method includes the application of a variant of the multinomial
logit model that applies log-bilinear restrictions that are typically used in the log-linear
analysis field. We specify a multinomial logit model for the probability that an individual
is in a particular destination (D) state (decile) given his origin (O) state (his state in the
previous year) and the subgroup (G) to which he belongs. This probability will be denoted
by P (D = d|O = o,G = g) . With ‘subgroup’ we mean one of the aforementioned 414 time,
country, education, and sector combinations. The basic structure of the multinomial logit
model we use is:
P (D = d|O = o,G = g) =
exp
(
β
D|G
d|g + β
OD|G
od|g
)
10∑
i=1
exp
(
β
D|G
i|g + β
OD|G
oi|g
) . (2.1)
This model contains two types of regression parameters: β
D|G
d|g and β
OD|G
od|g . The term β
D|G
d|g is
an intercept term for the destination state D=d that may differ across subgroups. The other
parameter - β
OD|G
od|g - captures the strength of the origin-destination association that may also
differ across subgroups. In our application, the term of main interest is this origin-destination
association term. The size of this term indicates the degree of mobility (the smaller the
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association between the origin and destination state, the greater the mobility). What we are
especially interested in is how much the size of this term varies across subgroups defined by
country, time, sector, and education. However, by not further restricting the β
OD|G
od|g term, we
would have to estimate and interpret 81 (=9*9) association parameters for each of the 414
tables, which is, of course, not meaningful. For such situations, where there is a large number
of association parameters (81 in this case) that vary across large numbers of subgroups (414
in this case), in the log-linear modeling field, restrictions have been proposed for specifying
parsimonious higher-order interaction terms. These methods that involve the use of bilinear
decompositions, have been applied among others in the analysis of mobility tables (Hout,
1983; Luijkx, 1994; Vermunt, 1997b; Goodman & Hout, 1998, 2001). In our case, the
following bilinear decomposition is used: β
OD|G
od|g = a
OD
od + b
OD
od · φ
G
g . This decomposition
implies that the various tables have a common component aODod , which serves as a kind
of intercept or overall mean association term. The other component bODod · φ
G
g captures the
differences in the origin-destination associations across tables, where the parameters bODod can
be regarded as ‘slopes’ of the explanatory variables’ effects; they indicate in which parts of
the mobility table the largest differences across subgroups occur. The term φGg is a scaling
factor indicating whether mobility is higher or lower than average in a particular subgroup.
In other words, differences in mobility across tables are described by a single coefficient per
table. For reasons of normalization, we have to impose a location and a scaling restriction on
the φGg parameters. Here, we will use
∑
g
φGg = 0 and
∑
g
(
φGg
)2
= 1 , which implies that the
φGg parameters are centered and restricted to have a sum of squares of 1. For our analysis,
we made use of the program lEM (Vermunt, 1997a).
Table 2.7 illustrates the values of the log-likelihood function and the BIC obtained by the
various models that were estimated. The first two models serve as baseline models. In Model
0, both the aODod and b
OD
od terms are restricted to be equal to zero, which yields a model in
which the destination state is assumed to be independent of the origin state. Model 1 assumes
that bODod is equal to zero for each o-d combination, yielding a homogeneous association model.
Comparison of the log-likelihood and BIC values of Models 0 and 1 shows that the origin
and destination states of individuals in the wage distribution are strongly correlated. Model
2, in which we use the bilinear decomposition described above, fits much better than Model
1 in terms of the log-likelihood, indicating that the origin-destination association is not
equal across tables. In Models 3 to 6, we use several simplifying assumptions for the term
bODod . Among these models, the model that fits best according to the BIC criterion, Model
4, contains only nonzero bODod parameters for the main diagonal and the first subdiagonals,
while the subdiagonal parameters are also restricted to be symmetrical (equal for upward
and downward moves across the two same states). This model does not only present the
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Table 2.7: Comparison of the models
Model Restrictions on a and b Parameters Log-likelihood BIC
0 Independence aODod = b
OD
od = 0 7,776 -368,598 825,482
1 Homogeneous association bODod = 0 7,938 -310,472 711,068
2 General no 8,368 -307,350 717,779
3 Diagonal bODod = 0 if o 6= d 8,297 -309,083 712,367
4 Diagonal and 1 decile transition bODod = 0 if o− d > 1 and b
OD
od = b
OD
do 8,306 -308,560 711,423
5 Diagonal and 2 deciles transition bODod = 0 if o− d > 2 and b
OD
od = b
OD
do 8,314 -308,534 711,462
6 Symmetric associations bODod = b
OD
do 8,341 -308,517 711,734
4a Only significant interaction effects as Model 4 7,984 -308,910 708,466
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Table 2.8: Homogeneous part of the association (exp aODod )
Destination decile
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Origin
decile
1 27.59 5.91 1.67 0.89 0.59 0.40 0.34 0.30 0.30 0.56
2 10.36 19.98 5.73 1.58 0.76 0.43 0.21 0.23 0.13 0.27
3 2.37 6.88 10.10 3.96 1.18 0.56 0.31 0.23 0.17 0.19
4 0.95 2.07 4.04 6.07 2.74 0.99 0.51 0.29 0.23 0.23
5 0.67 0.85 1.33 2.92 5.00 2.81 1.03 0.43 0.29 0.24
6 0.34 0.50 0.71 1.13 2.72 5.09 3.17 1.02 0.54 0.30
7 0.31 0.25 0.33 0.58 1.12 2.76 6.74 3.86 1.27 0.66
8 0.23 0.17 0.23 0.33 0.58 1.24 3.98 11.26 6.88 1.53
9 0.23 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.34 0.56 1.52 5.86 29.15 13.75
10 0.42 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.38 0.67 1.94 16.26 153.85
best fit to the data according to the statistical indices, but it is also straightforward in its
interpretation; Model 4 captures country differences in immobility (i.e. in the probability of
changing at most one decile), which makes the results somewhat comparable with the results
obtained by the probit regression. The added value of the multinomial logit analysis is its
ability to discern cross-country differences in the various parts of the wage distribution.
Nevertheless, Models 2-6 fit worse than the homogeneous model (Model 1) in terms of
the BIC. This is probably due to the large number of parameters included in these mod-
els. Therefore, a more parsimonious version of Model 4 (Model 4a) was employed in which
insignificant predictor effects have been omitted.2 Model 4a fits much better than the ho-
mogeneous model in terms of log-likelihood and BIC values. Findings for model 4a seem to
establish the existence of differences in origin-destination association between tables defined
by the predictors. Since the coefficient estimates were the same for models 4 and 4a, it
was decided to use estimates from model 4 since all effects (both the significant and the
non-significant) are informative with respect to our expectations.
Results of the multinomial logit regression
Table 2.8 reports the overall association terms - in their multiplicative form exp(aODod ) -
as obtained with Model 4. The numbers indicate how much more likely the ‘transition’
concerned is compared to the perfect mobility situation. Perfect mobility is defined as the
situation in which the origin and destination states are independent of one another. As can
easily be seen, observations tend to be concentrated along the main diagonal, indicating
2The significance of the effects of model 4 is discussed later in this section.
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Table 2.9: Coefficients showing how much transition tables differ (bODod )
Destination decile
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Origin
decile
1 -6.38 -7.84 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 -7.84 -16.87 -9.71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 -9.71 -14.78 -8.96 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 -8.96 -15.99 -9.14 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 -9.14 -15.68 -10.75 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 -10.75 -16.22 -8.18 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 -8.18 -15.87 -10.74 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 -10.74 -22.33 -14.87 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -14.87 -27.78 -19.41
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -19.41 -32.14
large immobility. Moreover, even if the huge parameter estimates for cells (1,1) and (10,10),
which may be the result of ceiling effects, are ignored, the bottom right and the upper left
parts of the table still contain the largest coefficients. This indicates that the highest levels of
immobility emerge in the lowest and especially in the highest parts of the wage distribution.
For example, an individual situated in the second lowest decile of the wage distribution in
year t is almost 3.5 (≃ 19.98/5.73) times more likely to remain in the same decile than
to move one decile upwards in year t + 1 compared to the average worker. In contrast,
workers with wages in the middle part of the wage distribution are more likely to change
their position in a one-year period. However, transitions of more than one decile are rather
rare in the whole range of the distribution. These results are in accordance with previous
studies (Burkhauser et al., 1997; Bigard, Guillotin, & Lucifora, 1998; Buchinsky et al., 1998;
Cappellari, 2000; Dickens, 2000a; Hofer & Weber, 2002). The next question that has to
be addressed is how much the pattern presented in Table 2.8 differs across countries and
whether these cross-country differences evolve with time and vary across personal and job
characteristics. In Table 2.9, the estimates for the bODod coefficients obtained with Model 4 are
presented. Each of the coefficients that is not a priori fixed to zero takes on a negative value;
therefore these coefficients denote the tendency towards more mobility. This implies that a
positive φGg value corresponds to more wage mobility than average in the relevant table. The
pattern of the estimates for bODod shows that differences across subgroups (countries, time
points, education and sector groups) are larger with respect to the mobility in the higher
wage deciles (-32.14) than in the lower ones (-6.38).
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Table 2.10: Analysis of Variance for the country effects
Dependent Variable: Number of obs = 414 R-squared 0.776
EFFECT Root MSE = 0.028 Adj R-squared 0.683
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob>F
Model 0.776 121 0.006 8.4 0
Country 0.513 11 0.047 60.8 0
Time 0.014 5 0.003 3.6 0
Education 0.002 2 0.001 1.1 0.32
Sector 0.053 1 0.053 69.4 0
Country*Education 0.046 22 0.002 2.7 0
Country*Time 0.087 52 0.002 2.2 0
Country*Sector 0.038 11 0.003 4.6 0
Time*Education 0.004 10 0.000 0.6 0.84
Time*Sector 0.002 5 0.000 0.6 0.71
Education*Sector 0.006 2 0.003 3.7 0.03
Residual 0.224 292 0.001
Total 1 413 0.002
Note: the variables included in the ANOVA are described in table 2.6
The 414 φGg coefficients obtained with Model 4 describe the differences across countries,
time points, education groups, and sectors of employment. However, the interpretation of all
φGg coefficients is still unfeasible due to their large number. Therefore, φ
G
g coefficients were
subjected to a further analysis in order to establish which of the main and interaction effects
included among them, are worth being thoroughly scrutinized and interpreted. More pre-
cisely, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed, the results of which are reported in
Table 2.10. The first result is that the higher-order interaction terms are of little importance
as the model with main effects and two-way interaction effects explains 77.6% of the variance
in the φGg terms. Secondly, country is by far the most important factor in the explanation of
mobility differences across tables (its main effect accounts for 51.3% of the total variance).
This might be an important result as it shows that it is not so much the common trends and
structural factors explaining the dissimilarities in wage mobility but primarily the particular
country characteristics indicating the relevance of institutional, socio-economic (education,
demography, employment structure) and also cultural explanations. Moreover, we find that
differences between the mobility patterns in the public and private sectors are important
determinants of the observed variance (5.3%). The time effect is not significant, while the
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country-time interaction component is, explaining about 8.7% of the variation. The findings
for education are similar; even though no direct education effects are found, the country-
education interaction effect explains a significant part of the overall variance (4.6%). Also
sector and the country-sector interaction explain a noticeable part of the variance. Again
this points to the significant impact that the employment structure exerts on wage mobility
patterns.
Figure 2.1: The effect of country on wage mobility in the first and the last time period
Figure 2.1 depicts the mean value of φGg per country in the first and in the last time points.
As can be seen, there is no clear pattern that could associate cross-country differences with
regimes types. The hypothesis that in less regulated countries individuals experience higher
levels of wage mobility is confirmed in the case of Ireland but has to be rejected in the case of
the prototype of a lowly-regulated country in Europe, the UK. In this country, wage mobility
is lower than in most other EU countries. This difference between the UK and Ireland is
probably due to the fact that the Irish economy experienced an economic boost during the
1990s (see also Table 2.4). In most Southern European countries that have a rather high
level of employment protection, wage mobility is higher than most other countries. Given the
segmented labour market of these countries, this might point to a high level of in-firm wage
mobility in these countries. However, Portugal exhibits the lowest level of wage mobility
of all European countries. Except for Portugal and the UK, low levels of wage mobility
are found for France and Finland, which are classified as belonging to the strongly-regulated
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continental regimes or, like Finland, to the rather flexible Nordic countries. Finland therefore
does not fit particularly well in this Nordic picture, probably because its labour market is
much less flexible than its peers in this cluster combined with its underperforming economy
during this period. The picture for Denmark, which presents one of the highest levels of wage
mobility, confirms our prior conjectures for the Nordic regime. This might be explained by
the fact that the Danish labour market seems to be particularly successful in combining high
levels of flexibility, while safeguarding simultaneously appropriate levels of income and work
or employment security through active and activating labour market policy programmes
(OECD, 2004). The strongly-regulated Austria and Germany are positioned somewhere in
the middle of the league table of countries. A similar position is taken by the Netherlands,
which we classified as also belonging to the Nordic cluster, with medium levels of regulation
and a fairly favorable balance between wage flexibility on the one hand, and income and
work security on the other.
Figure 2.2: The effect of sector on wage mobility across countries
In Figure 2.1, it can be seen that the ranking of countries with respect to the levels
of wage mobility varies during the observation period. In most countries, mobility rates
decreased during the late 1990s. Therefore, the economic upturn during this period was not
accompanied by an increase in wage mobility levels. The only countries for which we observe
a considerable increase in mobility are Denmark and the Netherlands. Once again, these are
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the countries that combine a flexible labour market with a high level of income and work
security. In the other countries, mobility rates are decreasing or remain fairly stable.
Figure 2.3: The effect of education on wage mobility across countries
As Figure 2.2 illustrates, the estimates for the sector of employment confirm our prior
expectations: individuals working in the private sector experience higher levels of wage
mobility than individuals working in the shielded public sector. Moreover, these differences
increase over the observation period. However, comparing the sector effects across countries,
some unexpected outcomes emerge: although wage mobility is lower in the public sector
than in the private sector in most countries, this is not the case for Ireland, which belongs
to the lowly regulated (liberal) cluster. On the contrary, in the UK, we find markedly less
mobility in the public sector than in the private sector. For the other countries, mobility
rates in the private sector are somewhat higher than in the public sector.
Figure 2.3 demonstrates that the impact of education level differs across countries. Highly
skilled employees exhibit more wage mobility than their less educated peers in France, Ger-
many, the Netherlands, Finland, the UK and Greece. In contrast, lower levels of education
qualifications are associated with more wage mobility in Austria, Italy, Spain and especially
in Denmark. No clear pattern is found in Ireland and Portugal. These results indicate that
we have to be cautious when drawing conclusions on the basis of only these partial analyses.
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Levels of education are not very well measured in these surveys. Moreover, education levels
are very difficult to compare due to the extremely large variation in education systems.
Figure 2.4: The effect of education on wage mobility across sectors
Educational effects, however, do not only vary across countries but also between sectors
of employment. Figure 2.4 suggests that higher education is rewarded, in terms of more wage
mobility, in the public sector but not in the private sector. This macro-level analysis, how-
ever, tends to confirm the findings of micro-level analyses of many other researchers, which
show that although investments in human capital pay-off in terms of raising the employment
opportunities, career opportunities and wage prospects, this pay-off is not unconditional.
The effects of regime type and macroeconomic conditions and employment
protection
The results presented above indicate that countries belonging to the same country clus-
ter according to our regime classification do not necessarily show similar mobility patterns.
In order to obtain a more formal test as to whether the regime typology or the specific
wage-setting institutions explain cross-country differences in wage mobility, some additional
ANOVA modelling was performed, in which country was replaced by regime type, the Em-
ployment Protection Legislation (EPL) index, the union density and the collective bargaining
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Table 2.11: Percentage of variance explained
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 8
Country Union Collective EPL Regime Institutions
Country and macro density bargaining and macro and macro macro and
and macro and macro interactions
Country 52.1 52.1
Regime 13
EPL 7.1 7.1
Density 0.3 3.5
Coverage 3 0.1
Macro 0.3 1.3 0.3 6.5 5 5.5
Institution*institutiona 26.8
R2 77.6 77.6 11.8 14.8 34 29.9 52.1
Note: the cell entries are the percentages of the variance of the effects estimated in the multinomial logit regression that
are explained by the variables included in this table. These percentages were estimated with ANOVA regressions. The rest
of the variables included in the ANOVA were the same as in table 2.10.
a This adds the percentage of the variance that is explained by the interactions between the measures of institutions - EPL,
coverage and density.
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coverage. Moreover, three time-varying macroeconomic indicators were added to the model
as covariates: the Labour Force Participation rate for men between 15-64 years old (LFP),
the unemployment rate for males and the GDP per capita (GDPpc). These indicators are
included in order to explain country differences that are related to the business cycle.
The main results of these ANOVA models are presented in Table 2.11. The baseline
model (Model 1) is the model described in Table 2.10. This model has an overall explained
variance of 77.6%. The inclusion of macroeconomic indicators leaves the explained variance
practically unchanged (Model 2). Macroeconomic conditions apparently explain only a small
part of the total variation. Nevertheless, the findings reveal that if the interaction effect
of country with time is removed from the model, the macroeconomic conditions will then
explain the variance that was previously explained by this interaction term. The rising wage
mobility levels would seem to coincide with a favourable economic development in a number
of European countries during the late 1990s.
As far as the wage-setting institutions are concerned, if we were to replace country by
any of the direct measures of these institutions, the explained variance drops dramatically.
The model with union density (Model 3) explains only 11.8% of the overall variance, and
the model with bargaining coverage (Model 4) explains 14.8% of the overall variance. This
indicates that although bargaining coverage is a better indicator of wage mobility than
union density, these two indicators explain only a small part of cross-country differences.
EPL (Model 5) performs better (34%), but is still unable to explain a large part of the
cross-country variation. However, if we include all the direct measures of labour market
institutions together in the ANOVA model, the explained variance increases to 52.1%. Thus,
our measures for labour market institutions explain two thirds of the overall variance that
is explained by country.
‘Regime type’ seems to perform slightly better than union density and bargaining cov-
erage but worse than the EPL index. Nevertheless, replacing country with our regime type
(Model 6) still results into a considerable reduction of the explained variance (29.9%), com-
pared to model 1. In Model 6, macroeconomic indicators take over a large part of the
cross-country variance (5%). Nevertheless, the significant part of the country variance that
is explained by the regime type indicates that the way flexibility and income and work se-
curity is balanced plays a role in explaining country differences even after controlling for a
number of important macroeconomic indicators. Moreover, the fact that the EPL index and
regime typology perform better than single-institution indicators shows that wage mobility
at the country level is a complex issue that is affected by several policies and institutional
arrangements.
Figure 2.5 shows that the ranking of regime types varies across time points. The only
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Figure 2.5: The effect of regime type on wage mobility across time
expectation that is clearly confirmed is that wage mobility levels in the strongly-regulated
regimes (continental European countries) are lower than in all other regimes. In the southern
strongly-regulated regime, wage mobility was initially high in the beginning of the period, in
1994-95, but decreased considerably thereafter, until 1998-1999, to rise again in the year after.
In the Nordic countries, wage mobility was initially quite high, until 1996; but decreased,
to catch up again strongly until 1999. In 1999-2000, it even ranked first among all regimes.
Individuals from the very flexible liberal regime experience higher rates of wage mobility than
individuals from the strongly -regulated continental regime but lower rates than the Nordic
regime. It should, however, be noted that we need to be cautious in drawing conclusions
on the basis of these regime findings only, since our evidence shows that there are large
cross-country differences within the various regime types. On the other hand, the outcomes
highlight a common trend; during the economic upturn period in the mid- and late-1990s,
wage mobility rates tended to decline unexpectedly and to recover in some regimes (the
Nordic and the Southern) only at the very end of the period. The slow wage mobility growth
during this period might be due to the rather low levels of flexibility and job mobility in the
European labour markets.
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2.7 Main findings and conclusions
In this paper we examined wage mobility patterns across countries and over time. We applied
a restricted multinomial logit regression model to investigate cross-country differences in
relative positional wage mobility in Europe, using data from the ECHP for 1995-2001. The
method we applied was sufficiently powerful to allow us to control for the full set of origin
states of individuals in the year-to-year transitions. It also was flexible enough to impose
a variety of restrictions to the association parameters of our model, which enabled us to
interpret the covariate effects and their time patterns. Both properties of our approach are
unique compared to the standard (probit) regression techniques.
At the individual level, our findings suggest that controlling for the origin state is crucial
when studying wage mobility. We found an inverse U-shaped pattern of wage volatility for
the different parts of wage distribution. Low levels of mobility emerge for the lowest and
the highest strata of the wage distribution. A low-wage earner jumping to a highly paid
managerial job, or a firm manager with a very high wage degraded to a minimum wage
worker is a rather unlikely event.
At the country level, striking differences emerge compared with our expectations. Labour
market institutions go some way to explain a part of these differences. In countries with a
liberal labour market, where there are few institutional barriers, increased income risks do
not necessarily go hand-in-hand with better wage prospects for workers. On the contrary,
we find that more flexibility in wages emerges in countries that combine flexibility in the
labour market with a high level of income security (the Nordic countries lead by Denmark).
Contrary to our expectations, we found a high level of wage mobility in countries with strong
employment protection - the Southern European countries, with the exception of Portugal.
A possible explanation for this could be that the low level of wage mobility in the external
labour market is counterbalanced by a high level of in-firm or in-job wage mobility. Another
explanation involves the existence of a large informal sector in the Southern European labour
markets that might also exert a similar up-leveling effect on wage mobility. Our conjectures
are largely corroborated with respect to the finding that the strictly-regulated continental
European countries ensure high levels of wage stability for workers. However, although this
clustering of countries in regime types can account for a part of the cross-country differences
in wage mobility, significant variation remains within the regime clusters.
The testing of specific measures of labour market institutions showed that these measures
account for the largest part of cross-country variation in wage mobility. The role of labour
market institutions in explaining cross-country differences in wage mobility becomes more
important if we consider that the effect of country is considerably overestimated by our
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analysis. Our restricted multinomial logit model does not allow us to account for the effect
of many variables at the individual level. Therefore, country also captures some variation of
wage mobility that is actually due to differences at the individual level.
Contrary to the direct measures of labour market institutions, the regime typology ex-
plains a small part of cross-country variation (29.9%). The lesson to be learned from this
is that multiple indicators for institutional variation and the macroeconomic performance
of countries should be taken into account to explain wage mobility patterns. Therefore,
a regime type classification can only be effective if it takes these multiple indicators into
account.
Further research is needed to investigate the effect of labour market institutions on wage
mobility. Firstly, better measures for the wage-setting institutions are necessary. The direct
measures of labour market institutions that were used were time-constant for the period of
reference, while the regime typologies may also partly reflect country differences that are
driven by factors other than institutions, such as cultural differences. Furthermore, it would
be particularly informative to investigate the effect of these institutions separately for the
low, middle and high strata of the wage distribution, as these institutions affect the wage of
these three groups of workers in different ways. Such an analysis will hopefully be possible
in the future when more advanced statistical software has been developed.
Chapter 3
Escaping low pay in one’s first job
3.1 Introduction
Over the past decades, the issue of the transition from education to work has gained increas-
ing attention in the economic and political debate (Ryan, 2001). Rising youth unemployment
rates and low-wage employment emerge as considerable threats for labour market entrants.
The youth unemployment rate increased from 12.3% to 13.4% in OECD countries between
1990 and 2004 (OECD, 2005), and the relative earnings of youths have decreased by some
9 percentage points between the 1970s and the 1990s (OECD, 2006). Early research on
the school-to-work transition scrutinized issues such as the labour force participation, the
unemployment risk, the job and occupational mobility, as well as the job quality of young
job starters. For example, Ryan (2001) studied the labour market position of young work-
ers and the effects of policies in seven European countries (see also Hannan et al., 1996
for an overview of international comparative studies). Recent studies have focused on the
consequences of labour market entry in flexible jobs (Gangl, 2001; Scherer, 2004; de Grip
& Wolbers, 2006). However, little research has been devoted to the wage and employment
consequences of entering the labour market with a low-paid job.
Investigating this issue is necessary since low pay is not specific to flexible jobs: there is
increasing heterogeneity in both the type of low-paid job, and in the type of young people
that get these jobs at the beginning of their career. Firstly, permanent jobs, especially
in low-skilled sectors, may be low-paid. Secondly, the initial wage upon hiring does not
always reflect the productivity of the worker. When the job requirements correspond to
specific education or vocational training qualifications, screening takes place at the moment
of hiring, and the employer can immediately pay the worker a wage that is close to his or her
marginal productivity. However, when such a correspondence is absent, the employer has
little information on the productivity of the worker. In this case, the education of the worker
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serves as a signal for his or her productivity, and the screening takes place during the initial
period after hiring. This assumption of imperfect information on the productivity of workers
is typical in various economic models on wage dynamics, such as the job-matching model
(Jovanovic, 1979b), the signalling theory (Spence, 1973) and the employer learning model
(Farber & Gibbons, 1996). Lange (2007) suggests that it takes an employer three years to
resolve 50% of the initial uncertainty about the worker’s productivity. During this period
of uncertainty, a worker with high skills may be getting a low wage. After this period, the
employer has more information on the productivity of the worker and the wage can increase.
Thus, even highly qualified young people may start their working career in a low-paid job
(OECD, 2003).
However, relevant empirical findings differ across countries. Galindo-Rueda (2003) finds
high levels of employer learning about worker’s productivity in the UK, as employers have
little direct information on the productivity of workers. On the contrary, Bauer and Haisken-
DeNew (2001) find only weak evidence of employer learning for blue-collar workers and no
evidence for white-collar workers, in Germany. Similar differences emerge in the types of
human capital that account for low-pay exits in different countries. In the UK, job tenure is
shown to be the most important determinant of upward mobility (Gosling et al., 1997). In
Germany, apprenticeship is crucial for the earnings progression of young workers (Harhoff &
Kane, 1997; Ryan, 2001). In the Netherlands, general skills contribute more to low-pay exits
(van Opstal et al., 1998). These studies, however, are not specific to labour market entrants.
Therefore, it is particularly pertinent to investigate whether cross-country differences in the
early careers of low-paid job starters can be attributed to the type of human capital that is
mainly rewarded in different countries.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the wage and employment perspectives of the low-
paid labour market entrants in a cross-country comparative perspective. Low pay is defined
as an hourly wage level below two-thirds of the median. Firstly, we investigate whether low
pay at the beginning of the working career is a stepping stone to better earnings or a trap
that young workers cannot easily escape from. Secondly, we examine which aspects of human
capital - general or firm-specific - contribute to low-pay exits for the young workers. Thirdly,
we investigate the degree to which countries with different institutions for the school-to-work
transition vary with respect to the persistence and the determinants of low-pay exits of job
starters. For this purpose, three European countries that differ considerably with respect
to the relationship between the education system and the labour market are included in
our analysis: the UK, which has a liberal labour market as well as a relatively weak link
between education and the labour market; Germany, which has highly stratified education
and occupational systems and a highly regulated labour market, and the Netherlands, which
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takes an intermediate position (see Section 3.2).
The stepping-stone and the trap hypotheses do not necessarily refer to wage increase
and low-pay persistence, respectively. Alternative paths in the labour market, such as self-
employment, may be a ‘way-out’ for the low-paid job starters. Accordingly, several studies
find a large number of transitions between low pay and non-employment (Dickens, 1997;
Sloane & Theodossiou, 1998; Stewart & Swaffield, 1999; Cappellari & Jenkins, 2003). Hence,
we analyze the exits out of low pay, not only to higher pay but also to unemployment, to self-
employment and to inactivity by employing a competing-risks discrete-time duration model.
Contrary to most of the relevant studies that control only for observed characteristics, our
model also controls for unobserved heterogeneity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the findings of the
relevant literature and elaborates on the hypotheses of our analysis. In Section 3.3, the
econometric model is described. The data used for the estimation is discussed in Section 3.4.
Section 3.5 presents the results from the estimations. Conclusions are drawn in Section 3.6.
3.2 Theoretical background
The interplay between the education system and the labour market
The idea that labour market institutions account for differences between the liberal labour
markets of the US and the UK, and the regulated markets of continental Europe is well-
established in the literature (Freeman & Katz, 1995; Blau & Kahn, 1996). According to this
literature, in regulated labour markets, institutions - such as minimum pay regulation and
extensive collective bargaining - create wage rigidity at the bottom of the wage distribution.
This wage rigidity leads to high rates of unemployment as employers cannot pay the marginal
product of labour to their workers. Moreover, a high level of regulation can lead to a
segmentation of the labour market. In the primary segment, workers enjoy a high level
of security, while in the secondary segment compliance to employment regulation is low,
and the wage and employment prospects of workers are minimal. In such labour markets,
low-paid workers are highly concentrated in the secondary segment. These workers are
threatened by low-pay persistence. Segmentation is even stronger in Southern European
countries where compliance to employment regulation in the secondary segment is minimal
(Muffels & Luijkx, 2006). In liberal countries, however, there is more flexibility in wages,
and therefore unemployment is lower, but low pay is more prevalent.
A particular strand of this ‘institutional’ literature attempts to explain cross-country
differences in patterns of labour market entry. More specifically, Marsden (1990), Marsden
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and Ryan (1990), Hannan et al. (1997), Ryan (2001) and de Grip and Wolbers (2006)
suggest that the link between the education and the vocational training system on the one
hand, and the labour market on the other plays a key role in determining the prospects of
labour market entrants. In countries with both a highly stratified education system and a
high level of job classification in the labour market, job requirements are strongly connected
to specific education or vocational training qualifications. Hence, education and vocational
training qualifications provide all the necessary information that employers need in order to
screen job applicants. Moreover, skills are transferable across employers. In such countries,
a low-pay episode is usually a temporary incident for the highly-qualified job starters, but a
trap for their low-skilled colleagues.
In contrast, in countries with a more universal education system, less centralized voca-
tional training, and a low level of job classification in the labour market, firm-specific skills
are the most important determinant of earnings. In such countries, the ‘internal labour
markets’ dominate. Employers seek to fill vacancies for unqualified jobs with workers from
outside the firm, while vacancies for more qualified jobs are filled with workers from within
the firm (Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Marsden, 1990; Ryan, 2001). Such firms rely heavily on
‘on-the-job’ training. This, however, does not mean that education credentials are not rele-
vant for the working career. On the contrary, employers use education qualifications as an
initial screening device for assigning tasks and functions to their employees. As firm-specific
skills are rewarded, and because it takes time to acquire such skills, earnings progression of
both high-qualified and low-qualified employees is strongly related to tenure.
The reward of human capital in the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands
Three countries that comply remarkably well with the above-mentioned different patterns of
labour market entry are included in our analysis: the UK, the Netherlands, and Germany.
Germany is a country where the link between the education system and the labour market
is strong (Gangl, 2001; Scherer, 2004; de Grip & Wolbers, 2006). Many young people
go through a period of apprenticeship lasting up to three years. Employers are directly
involved in the provision and delivery of apprenticeships (Hannan et al., 1997; Ryan, 2001).
Therefore, approximately half of the apprenticeships end in regular jobs as apprenticeship
is the main screening device for recruitment (CPB, 1997). Especially apprentices trained
in large firms are more likely to experience a smooth transition to regular employment
(Winkelmann, 1996). Apprenticeships develop skills that are transferable across jobs and
employers. Although most job matches of the ex-apprentices with their employer terminate
within five years of the end of the apprenticeship, these ex-apprentices do enjoy a higher wage
growth by changing jobs (Dustmann et al., 1997; Franz et al., 2000). Furthermore, the labour
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market is strongly regulated by collective bargaining, which covers more than 80% of West-
German workers. Since long-term cooperative employment relationships are widespread in
the German labour market, the German employment system can be characterized as a typical
insiders’ labour market (Blossfeld, 2001).
In the UK, the link between the education and vocational training system with the labour
market is weaker than in Germany (Hannan et al., 1997; Gangl, 2001). Compared to the
German system, the UK education system is more flexible and only weakly stratified. Ap-
prenticeships are much less widespread in the UK, and hold a considerably lower status than
in Germany (Brauns et al., 2000).1 There are also more possibilities to move across voca-
tional training and university education than in Germany (Mu¨ller & Shavit, 1998). Market
forces rather than statutory regulations are dominant in the British labour market. Collec-
tive bargaining is less widespread and unionization rates are low. Only 22% of the private
sector workers are covered by collective bargaining. In addition, minimum wage regulation
was absent from 1993 until 1999, when a national minimum wage was introduced. Efficiency
is achieved through an increased level of job mobility and facilitation of entrepreneurship.
Consequently, the employment system of the UK is much more open than that of Germany;
low pay is observed among all categories of employees and not just among labour market
entrants. Therefore, skills acquired on the job are a more important factor for earnings
progression. This is supported by previous evidence. Gosling et al. (1997) find that job
tenure is the most important determinant of low-pay transitions in the UK. Using matched
employer-employee data, Belfield and Wei (2004) suggest that wage growth is higher for
workers in large firms.
The Dutch labour market offers an interesting case that is situated between the highly-
regulated German dual system, and the liberal system of the UK (van der Velden & Lodder,
1995). It combines some institutional arrangements for the promotion of job security that
are dominant in Germany, with extensive flexibility in employment in terms of temporary
contracts and working hours (Wilthagen et al., 2004). Although the overall setting of the
education system resembles the German one, the association between education and em-
ployment is weaker than in Germany but stronger than in the UK. There is an extensive
range of occupational entries (approximately 200) with specified education or training cre-
dentials as prerequisites according to Hannan et al. (1997). The main difference between the
Netherlands and Germany is that apprenticeship is less common in the Netherlands than in
Germany. Moreover, it is distributed across all age groups (CPB, 1997), while in Germany
it is observed predominantly among young people. Previous research shows that general
1This applies only after the deregulation of the UK labour market in the 1980s. The characteristics of the
countries presented here are not static. Marsden (1990), for example, suggests that the UK labour market
resembles the German one, as he uses data from the early 1980s.
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skills are more important than firm-specific skills for escaping low pay in the Netherlands
(van Opstal et al., 1998).
Table 3.1: Indicators on youth employment and unemployment
(in percentages)
Germany Netherlands UK
1995 2005 1995 2005 1995 2005
Low-pay incidence
15-24 50.4 - - - 45.8 -
25-34 6.7 - - - 15.0 -
Total (15-64) 14.3 15.7 13.3 16.6 20.9 19.4
Low-pay persistence a
15-24 10.7 - - - 23.6 -
25-34 12 - - - 35.6 -
Total (15-64) 15.5 - - - 33.8 -
Labour force
participation rate
15-24 56.8 53.5 65.5 68.8 74.4 69.0
25-34 90.2 90.6 93.5 92.4 94.1 92.0
Total (15-64) 79.5 80.6 80.8 81.4 84.7 82.8
Unemployment
rate
15-24 8.3 16.1 12.0 9.5 17.9 13.4
25-34 7.0 12.0 6.2 4.3 10.1 4.7
Total (15-64) 7.2 11.5 5.9 4.9 10.2 5.1
Share of long-term
unemployment (> 1 year)
15-24 25.2 32.0 38.5 20.8 30.5 17.3
Total (15-64) 45.9 53.8 51.6 44.7 49.6 26.2
Share of temporary
employment
15-24 41.6 60.4 29.5 41.3 13.4 11.3
Total (15-64) 9.9 14.0 8.6 13.8 6.2 5.2
Share of part-time
employment
15-24 31.8 37.7 45.7 46.2 41.6 40.5
Total (15-64) 12.6 17.5 26.1 22.7 17.7 22.1
Source: OECD, online statistical database, OECD (1996) and European Commission (2004).
a This refers to the 5-year period 1986-1991.
The different patterns of labour market entry in these three countries are projected in the
main indicators for youth employment (Table 3.1). This table illustrates that, in the UK,
youth labour force participation is high and unemployment is decreasing. More importantly,
long-term unemployment decreased sharply between 1995 and 2005. However, the British
labour market does not perform well with respect to low-pay mobility. Low-pay persistence
and increased mobility between low pay and unemployment is a well-established fact for
the UK (Stewart & Swaffield, 1999; Dickens, 2000a; Cappellari & Jenkins, 2004a; Stewart,
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2007).
In Germany, the picture is reversed. Youth participation rates are much lower than in
the UK. Unemployment is increasing and becoming more persistent. Temporary contracts
are much more widespread than in the UK, as employers try to avoid the strict arrangements
that regulate permanent contracts. Low pay is common among workers below 25 - although
many of these are apprentices. Nevertheless, low-pay is less persistent in the UK. This
indicates that in Germany, young low-paid workers have more chances of improving their
earnings than their counterparts in the UK.
The Dutch labour market seems to have performed quite well during the decade 1995 -
2005. Youth participation rates increased and unemployment fell. Furthermore, long-term
youth unemployment was almost halved. Unfortunately, no data on low pay among young
workers exist for the Netherlands.
3.3 A duration model for low-pay mobility
Our aim is to study transitions of young labour market entrants out of low pay. However,
transitions out of low pay are not restricted to transitions within paid employment (e.g. from
low to ‘higher’ pay). Low-paid workers often become unemployed, start their own business
or move to inactivity. Therefore, we need to apply an econometric model that allows for
these different exit states while controlling for low-pay duration. For this reason, we apply a
discrete-time duration model with four competing risks. These competing risks are: moving
to higher pay, unemployment, self-employment, and inactivity, with remaining in low pay as
the reference state.2 We use a discrete-time model and not a continuous-time model as our
data come from yearly observations. After organizing our data in a person-period file (where
the number of observations per individual equals the number of years at risk), we estimate
the model through the use of a multinomial logit regression.
Our choice for the duration model entails a cost. The possible endogeneity of initial
conditions may bias our analysis. As our sample includes only people who gain their first
job within the reference period, the problem of initial conditions does not emerge from
left-censoring 3. However, the sample of individuals that start employment may be selective.
Individuals that expect to find a low-paid job may postpone labour market entry by enrolling
in an education or training program or even by remaining jobless. In this way, they wait
2We consider that workers are constrained in their transitions. Namely, we suggest that all low-paid
workers would like to move to higher pay and that staying in low pay as well as moving to unemployment
or inactivity is an involuntary action. Therefore, we can estimate the model in a reduced form.
3There still may be some endogeneity if the unobserved characteristics that determine the initial pay level
are correlated with low-pay transitions.
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until labour market opportunities improve while - if following an education/training program
- they increase their human capital. The problem of endogeneity of initial conditions could
be tackled with the model of Stewart and Swaffield (1999). However, controlling for the
endogeneity of initial conditions in a competing-risks duration model is much more difficult
and lies beyond the scope of this study. To control partly for the endogeneity of initial
conditions, we include as covariates a dummy variable for calendar time - that pick the
effect of the business cycle - as well as a dummy for the existence of a non-employment spell
before starting the first job.
Let Pm(Xit, t) be the probability that individual i escapes the low-pay status (remaining
in low pay is the reference state) to a status m after t years. Let Xit denote a vector
of covariates for individual i after being at risk for t years. Covariates can be either time-
constant or time-varying. The transition probability is specified by the following multinomial
logit model:
Pm(Xit, t) =
exp (b′m0 + b
′m
1 ln t+ b
′m
2 Xit)
1 +
4∑
n=1
exp(b′n0 + b
′n
1 ln t+ b
′n
2Xit)
, (3.1)
for 1 ≤ m ≤ n and P0(Xit, t) = 1−
4∑
m=1
Pm(Xit, t). b
m
0 ,b
m
1 ,b
m
2 are vectors of coefficients to
be estimated. Therefore, the likelihood contribution of an individual for whom no event has
taken place until Ti − 1 is:
Li =
[
Ti−1∏
t=1
P0(Xit, t)
][
P0(XiTi, Ti)
]1− 4P
m=1
δtim

4∏
m=1
[Pm(XiTi, Ti)]
δtim , (3.2)
where δtim =

1 if dti = m0 if dti = 0 .
In equation (3.1), it is assumed that transition probabilities depend only on observed charac-
teristics and time. This might not be the case, as unobserved characteristics, such as ability
and effort, are likely to be relevant. Duration models that fail to account for unobserved het-
erogeneity run the risk of overestimating negative duration dependence (or underestimating
positive duration dependence) as well as underestimating the effect of time-varying covari-
ates (Lancaster, 1990; Vermunt, 1997b). Therefore, we control for unobserved heterogeneity
using the non-parametric mass-points approach introduced by Heckman and Singer (1984).
According to this approach, the transitions to different states vary between a finite number
of mass points or groups of people in the sample. These L groups, which are indexed by
ℓ, are not a priori defined but they refer to groups of people with a different probability of
exiting low pay (e.g. those with a high exit probability to high pay and those with a low
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exit probability). This methodology involves allowing the intercept and the slopes to vary
across the L mass points. The slopes are allowed to vary across mass points as it is possible
for the returns to specific observed characteristics to be different across mass-points. Such
a model is known as a random-slope model. Each mass point (or group) is indexed by ℓ in
the relevant parameters. We base our choice for the number of mass points on the Akaike
(AIC) and Bayesian (BIC) Information criteria. All estimations were carried out in Latent
Gold (Vermunt & Magidson, 2007).
The transition probability for individual i that belongs to mass-point ℓ is given by:
Pm(Xit, t, ℓ) =
exp (b′m0ℓ + b
′m
1 ln t+ b
′m
2ℓXit)
1 +
3∑
n=1
exp(b′n0ℓ + b
′n
1 ln t+ b
′n
2ℓXit)
. (3.3)
In two out of the three countries under scrutiny, we allow the group membership ℓ to affect
only the constant bm0ℓ. Thus, we usually assume that b
m
2ℓ = b
m
2 . The likelihood contribution
of an individual belonging to group ℓ is obtained as follows:
L′i =
L∑
ℓ=1
Li|ℓ πℓ , (3.4)
where πℓ is the probability of belonging to the mass point ℓ and the likelihood Li|ℓ is defined
as in equation (3.2), but now with Pm(Xit, t) replaced by Pm(Xit, t, ℓ).
3.4 Data and Main Concepts
The study uses panel data covering the period 1984-2004. For the UK, we use the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The BHPS waves 1-14, covering the years 1991-2004,
are used. For Germany, we make use of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). All
the available waves are used covering the period 1984-2004. Note that we use data only
for former West Germany, as the labour market of East Germany presented considerable
differences with the West German one. For the Netherlands, our data come from all 18
waves of the Socio-Economic Panel (SEP), covering the years 1985-2002. The information
from the three datasets has been made highly comparable for the purpose of this study.4
Furthermore, the selected waves from these panels cover similar parts of the business cycle
in the three countries.
Since our focus is on labour market entrants, males aged 16-30 are selected who are
4The BHPS data (Taylor et al., 2006) were made available by the Data Archive at Essex University.
The GSOEP (Wagner et al., 1993) was provided by the German Institute for Economic Research. The SEP
(CBS, 1991) was made accessible by Statistics Netherlands.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of gross hourly wages, males aged 16-55, year 2000. The minimum
wage applies to workers above 21 years old.
entering the labour market for the first time in the period under scrutiny. This is why most of
them are school leavers. Seasonal or part-time jobs that are combined with education are not
taken into account. Female employees are excluded as they tend to leave the labour market
more often and for very different reasons than males (such as caring obligations). Thus, we
cannot include female workers in our analysis without controlling for the factors responsible
for their different career paths, which goes beyond the scope of this study. In Germany,
many young people enter the labour market through an apprenticeship, which is part of the
education system. For this reason, we consider them as labour market entrants only after
they have completed their apprenticeship. The possession of apprenticeship qualifications is
used as a covariate in the model.
Our main economic variable is the gross hourly wage. Since only retrospective wage
information is available from the SEP and the GSOEP, wage in t is derived from wave t+1.
The low-pay threshold is set to two-thirds of the median hourly wage income. This threshold
is the one most commonly used (for a discussion about low-pay thresholds see OECD, 1996).
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The analyses have also been performed using the first quartile of the wage distribution as the
low-pay threshold, which did not affect the results in any significant way. Figure 3.1 plots the
lower part of the cumulative distribution of hourly wages for male workers in the year 2000.
In Figure 3.1, we also plot the low-pay threshold and the legal hourly minimum wage for
workers above the age of 21. The line for the minimum wage appears only in the UK and in
the Netherlands as there is no national minimum wage in Germany. Our low-pay threshold
‘cuts’ the distribution at a bit higher than the minimum wage. In the UK, about 21% of the
workers are low-paid, while the relevant proportion in Germany is approximately 19% and
in the Netherlands in only 10%. The fact that no spike of the distribution is observed at the
minimum wage can be explained by the fact that our measure for the working hours refers
to the actual working hours rather than the contracted working hours.
Three measures of human capital are included in the model. General human capital is
captured by the highest education level completed by the individual. Apprenticeship is also
a measure of general human capital in Germany. Firm-specific human capital is measured
by the length of the tenure in the current job and by the occurrence of formal training.
Formal training, however, may also be a measure of general human capital as it sometimes
provides general skills that are transferable across employers. This can especially be the case
in the Netherlands and in Germany, where job requirements usually correspond to certain
education or vocational training qualifications. All the covariates included in the analysis
are described in the Appendix.
3.5 Results
Low-paid entrants
Our sample consists of 613 individuals for the UK, 251 individuals for the Netherlands and
900 individuals for Germany. Table 3.2 shows some descriptives for our sample. This table
indicates that the incidence of low pay is higher in Germany and in the UK than in the
Netherlands. The longest mean duration is observed in the Netherlands (2.5 years), while
the shortest is observed in Germany (1.6 years). The composition of our sample shows that
the low-paid job starter is usually a single individual younger than 25 years of age, with high
school education, working as a blue-collar worker on a temporary contract in the commercial
services or in the industry sector. He has often experienced a period of non-employment after
completing his education, and before getting his first job. Some cross-country differences
emerge. Low-paid labour market entrants are on average younger in the UK, and relatively
older in Germany than in the other two countries. The majority of the Dutch low-paid
job starters did not complete their high school education. As expected, the distribution of
56 CHAPTER 3. ESCAPING LOW PAY IN ONE’S FIRST JOB
Table 3.2: Composition of the sample of low-paid labour market entrants, pooled years
(in percentages)
UK Netherlands Germany
Incidence of low paya 55.6 33.9 48.4
Mean low-pay
duration (in years)
2.2 2.5 1.6
Age
16-20 60.0 48.6 32.6
21-25 31.8 44.2 48.9
26-30 8.2 7.2 18.5
Married 5.1 3.2 11.8
Education
low 22.9 51.6 28.8
high school 53.2 36.4 65.9
tertiary 23.8 12.0 5.3
Training 33.3 45.1 58.6
Firm size
small 44.1 - 32.0
medium 26.6 - 29.1
large 29.3 - 38.9
Industrial sector
commercial ser-
vices
42.4 45.7 21.1
industry 24.9 35.3 51.5
primary sector 22.6 4.7 2.3
non-commercial
services
5.1 4.3 12.9
public sector 5.0 9.9 12.2
White collar 12.1 7.4 27.6
Part-time 10.1 32.3 12.3
Temporary contract 21.2 43.0 36.9
Non-employment spell 25.5 36.3 13.0
Apprenticeship - - 70.1
(prior to labour market entry)
Cases 613 251 900
a This is the incidence of low pay among all labour market entrants.
the British sample is more uniform across education levels than in the other two countries.
In Germany, the low-paid job starter works more often in the industry sector than in the
UK and in the Netherlands. A period of non-employment before the first job is much more
common for young Dutch job starters.
Exits from low pay
A straightforward means for investigating cross-country differences in exits from low pay is to
use turnover tables. As shown in Table 3.3, low-pay persistence is higher in the Netherlands
and in the UK than in Germany. Although low-pay persistence is somewhat higher in
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Table 3.3: Overall year-to-year transition rate, pooled years
(in percentages)
UK Netherlands Germany
Remaining in low pay 61.0 68.8 41.9
Higher pay 24.8 24.6 39.5
Unemployment 9.4 3.5 6.8
Self-employment 2.9 - 2.4
Inactivity 2 3.1 9
Total 100 100 100
Transitions 1,192 545 1,355
the Netherlands than in the UK, transitions to higher pay are almost equal in these two
countries. The earnings of the German low-paid labour market entrants increase more often
above the low-pay threshold than in the other two countries. This suggests that low-paid
job starters in Germany experience more upward wage mobility. As expected, transitions
from low pay to unemployment are more common in the UK than in Germany and in the
Netherlands. In the Netherlands, transitions to unemployment are much lower than in
the other two countries. Employment growth in the Dutch economy in the period under
scrutiny resulted in a substantial increase in labour market participation as well as in a
sharp decrease in unemployment. Therefore, the labour market opportunities of the low
paid improved considerably.
Transitions to self-employment are rather rare in our sample. Although we expected
transitions to self-employment to take place more often in the liberal labour market of the
UK than in the regulated German labour market, transition rates to self-employment do
not differ considerably between these two countries. An explanation for this is provided by
Thurik (2003), who suggests that the favorable conditions for entrepreneurship in the UK
concern mainly large firms. Therefore, individuals starting their employment career with a
low-paid job do not find an ”easy way out” to self-employment by starting a small business.
Transitions to inactivity are much more common in Germany than in the other two countries.
Low-pay duration
Information on the duration of low-pay spells is provided by the survival functions. Figure
3.2 plots the cumulative staying probability after t years of low-pay employment for all three
countries, considering only transitions to higher pay. Escaping low pay appears to be easier
in Germany than in the UK or the Netherlands.
Plotting the survival functions per education status reveals more differences both between
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Figure 3.2: Cumulative staying probability in low pay
and within countries. Figure 3.3 shows that the most obvious differences in the staying
probability between the three education levels emerge in the Netherlands. In this country,
the highly educated exit quickly from a low-pay spell. After a duration of four years, the
high school graduates also have an advantage over their less educated colleagues. In the
UK, high school and tertiary education graduates have a similar advantage over the low
educated. Finally - contrary to our expectations - no obvious differences between education
groups emerge in Germany. We shall investigate this issue in more detail later on.
Results from the competing-risks model
Tables 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 present the main estimates for the coefficients from the competing-
risks model. The competing-risks analysis is performed separately for each country. Since we
do not observe exits to self-employment in the Netherlands, these have not been modelled.
Thus, our model has four competing risks for the UK and for Germany, and three for the
Netherlands. In all countries, the model that best fits the data is the two-mass-points
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Figure 3.3: Cumulative staying probability in low pay per education level
model. In the Netherlands and in Germany, the best model is the one allowing only the
constant to vary across groups (mass-points). In the UK, however, the main variables of
interest (education and tenure) are found to have a different effect across groups. In the
UK, tenure is also allowed to have a different effect for the various firm sizes. Allowing the
same coefficients to differ in the other two countries did not improve the fit of the model.
Moreover, the interaction effect of tenure with firm size was significant only in the UK.
Before interpreting the covariate estimates, we discuss our findings with respect to un-
observed heterogeneity. This feature of the approach of Heckman and Singer (1984) has
rarely been exploited, despite the fact that it provides very useful information. The two-
mass-points model suggests the existence of two types of labour market entrants, each with
common unobserved characteristics. These two groups of individuals have intrinsically differ-
ent transition probabilities (see Section 3): the group of ‘movers’, and the group of ‘stayers’.
These probabilities are derived from equation 3.3 by filling in the average values of the co-
variates for our sample and are presented in Table 3.4. Taking the weighted average of the
probabilities in the two groups in Table 3.4 shows that the probability for a transition to
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Table 3.4: Group size and transition probabilities in the two classes
UK Netherlands Germany
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2
Remaining in low pay 0.396 0.809 0.719 0.466 0.400 0.385
Higher pay 0.432 0.071 0.274 0.083 0.467 0.019
Unemployed 0.121 0.057 0.007 0.259 0.022 0.419
Self-employment 0.036 0.021 - - 0.033 0.000
Other 0.015 0.043 0.000 0.192 0.078 0.177
Total 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Group Size 0.675 0.325 0.796 0.204 0.857 0.143
higher pay is higher in Germany (.40) than in the UK (.32) and in the Netherlands (.24).
In all three countries, the first and largest group of workers (67.5%-85.6% of the sample)
has a high probability of moving to higher pay. This is the group of movers. The transition
probability to higher pay is much higher in the UK and in Germany (.43 and .47 respectively)
than in the Netherlands (.27). In the UK, however, workers from this group also have a
high probability of moving to unemployment (.12). This probability is almost negligible in
Germany (.02) and in the Netherlands. In Germany, individuals from this group have a small
but non-negligible probability of falling into inactivity (.08). In the Netherlands, the staying
probability for workers in this group is higher (.72) than in the other two countries. If we
assume that transitions to higher pay and to self-employment are transitions that improve
the earnings status of the worker, a low-paid labour market entrant from group 1 has a .47
chance of improving his earnings status in the UK, .50 in Germany, and only .27 in the
Netherlands. In the Netherlands, the probability of entering the labour market in a low-paid
job is low, but even in the group of movers, the chances of improvement are much lower than
in the other two countries.
In all three countries, the second group (the group of stayers) is considerably smaller
than the first one. The main characteristic of this group is the small probability of increas-
ing the wage above the low-pay threshold: in all three countries this probability is between
.01 and .08. However, important cross-country differences emerge. In the UK, the wages of
workers from this group do not change easily, due to the high staying probability (.81). In
the Netherlands and in Germany, however, the staying probability is much lower (.47 and
.39 respectively). In Germany, this probability does not differ much from the corresponding
probability of the workers from group 1. The bad news for the Dutch and German low-paid
workers in this group is that they have a very high transition probability to unemployment
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and inactivity. All in all, of all the three countries, German stayers are in the most disadvan-
taged position compared to movers. This is consistent with the existence of segmentation in
the German labour market.
Table 3.5: Parameters from competing-risks model for exit from low pay - the UK
Part A: Coefficients common across groups
Higher pay Unemployment Self-employment Other
Log duration
1.453∗∗∗ -0.181 -0.899 -0.604
(0.360) (0.380) (0.727) (0.557)
Age (16-20 years)
21-25 years
1.049∗∗∗ 0.305 -0.096 0.098
(0.277) (0.295) (0.509) (0.641)
26-30 years
2.074∗∗∗ -0.222 -0.477 0.374
(0.273) (0.687) (0.812) (0.448)
Training
-0.041 -0.615∗∗ -1.504∗∗∗ -0.506
(0.187) (0.521) (0.704) (0.329)
Firm size (small firm)
Medium size
firm
-0.643∗ 0.127 0.671 0.871
(0.345) (0.392) (0.705) (0.870)
Large firm
-0.204 -0.276 -0.149 -0.898
(0.328) (0.397) (0.751) (0.852)
Part-time job
0.462 0.242 1.502∗∗∗ 1.164
(0.411) (0.476) (0.620) (0.887)
Temporary 0.068 0.844∗∗∗ 0.575 2.217∗∗∗
contract (0.288) (0.301) (0.544) (0.643)
White collar job
0.658∗∗∗ -0.222 0.051 0.690
(0.275) (0.413) (0.650) (0.671)
Industrial sector (commercial services)
Industry
0.708∗∗∗ -0.095 0.121 -0.728
(0.263) (0.281) (0.572) (0.655)
Primary sector
0.227 -0.457 -0.222 -1.799∗∗
(0.309) (0.396) (0.691) (0.859)
Non-commercial 0.624 -0.916 0.587 -3.016
services (0.496) (0.651) (0.793) (2.787)
Public sector
0.926∗∗ -2.747∗ -19.117 0.054
(0.470) (1.562) (64.408) (1.372)
Non-employment -0.340 -0.147 0.106 -0.873
spell (0.258) (0.285) (0.484) (0.676)
Remaining in low pay is the reference state. In the variables Age, Industrial sector and Firm size
the reference categories are in brackets.
The brackets under the coefficient values contain the standard errors.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The covariate estimates are presented in Tables 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7. Since, remaining in low
pay is treated as the reference category, the estimates in Tables 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 concern
the transitions to higher pay, unemployment, self-employment (in the UK and in Germany)
and inactivity. We tested several specifications of duration dependence (linear, nominal,
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quadratic). The logarithmic specification performed best. In addition to the variables pre-
sented in Tables 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7, we control for marital status and business cycle effects
through the inclusion of year dummies. In the discussion of the results, we mainly focus on
the covariates that are of interest in the light of our expectations (see Section 3.2): duration
dependence, formal education level, training and job tenure.
Table 3.5 (continued), Part B: Coefficients different between groups
Group 1 Group 2
Higher Unemplo- Self-
Other
Higher Unemplo- Self-
Other
pay yment employment pay yment employment
Education (low)
High-School
0.075 -1.408∗∗∗ -0.796 -11.643 1.549∗∗∗ -0.654 -5.287 3.077∗
(0.394) (0.441) (0.604) (18.852) (0.628) (0.873) (22.093) (1.775)
Tertiary
0.531 -1.323∗∗ -0.519 -15.237 1.918∗∗∗ -0.154 5.684 2.589
(0.448) (0.626) (1.873) (34.863) (0.678) (0.895) (3.572) (1.871)
Tenure
-0.026 0.015 0.050∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.304∗∗ 0.067∗ -0.017
(0.016) (0.020) (0.022) (0.027) (0.010) (0.120) (0.036) (0.028)
Tenure*medium
size firm
0.050∗∗∗ -0.021 -0.080 -0.054 -0.011 0.209∗ -0.021 -0.226
(0.020) (0.025) (0.051) (0.060) (0.015) (0.123) (0.036) (0.137)
Tenure*large
firm
0.051∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.022 0.096 -0.060∗∗ 0.240∗∗ -0.089 0.018
(0.021) (0.027) (0.041) (0.121) (0.027) (0.122) (0.079) (0.036)
Constant
-2.041∗∗∗ 0.489 -1.547∗∗∗ -3.500∗∗∗ -6.383∗∗∗ -0.341 -7.222 -6.089∗∗∗
(0.518) (0.475) (0.774) (1.163) (0.976) (0.926) (4.419) (2.075)
Remaining in low pay is the reference state. In the variables Age, Industrial sector and Firm size the reference categories
are in brackets. The brackets under the coefficient values contain the standard errors.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The results indicate the presence of positive duration dependence for transitions to higher
pay in all three countries. However, the relevant coefficient is only significant for the UK.
Positive duration dependence is found for transitions to unemployment in the Netherlands.
For self-employment, positive duration dependence is evident in Germany but no significant
results in the UK. For transitions to inactivity, duration dependance is found to be positive
in the Netherlands but negative in Germany. Therefore, the longer the low-pay spell, the
higher the probability that a UK job starter will increase his earnings above the low-pay
threshold. For a German labour market entrant, the longer the low-pay spell, the higher the
probability of becoming self-employed, and the lower the probability of becoming inactive.
For their Dutch colleague, the longer the low-pay spell, the higher the probability of becoming
unemployed or inactive.
General and firm-specific human capital accounts for a large share of the differences in
exit probabilities at the individual level. In Germany, although education appears to be
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Table 3.6: Parameters from competing-risks model for exit from low pay - the Netherlands
Higher pay Unemployment Other
Log duration
0.166 3.195∗∗∗ 2.654∗∗∗
(0.253) (1.264) (1.049)
Age (16-20 years)
21-25 years
0.619∗∗ 1.405 -0.590
(0.272) (1.286) (1.203)
26-30 years
0.566 20.991∗∗ 14.187
(0.432) (10.060) (12.587)
Education (low)
High-School
0.804∗∗∗ -1.374 0.209
(0.255) (1.426) (1.320)
Tertiary
1.735∗∗∗ 2.055 1.900
(0.431) (2.083) (1.937)
Training
0.149 7.117 1.973
(0.330) (3.832) (1.769)
Tenure
0.008 -0.106∗∗ -0.051
(0.008) (0.052) (0.035)
Part-time job
-0.496 -0.134 0.418
(0.354) (1.116) (1.001)
Temporary -0.467 1.840 1.720
contract (0.350) (1.752) (1.329)
White collar job
-0.201 -29.723 -13.610
(0.422) (69.604) (12.680)
Industrial sector (commercial services)
Industry
-0.362 1.033 -0.236
(0.264) (1.012) (0.875)
Primary sector
-0.420 17.543* 16.015
(0.557) (9.219) (9.503)
Non-commercial
services
0.301 -0.935 -1.114
(0.536) (3.116) (1.880)
Public sector
-0.242 0.449 -0.773
(0.415) (1.557) (1.515)
Non-employment 0.284 -3.514 -1.181
spell (0.300) (3.186) (1.717)
Constant
group 1
-1.479∗∗∗ -27.190∗∗∗ -25.173∗∗
(0.356) (10.330) (12.576)
Constant
group 2
-2.320∗∗∗ -4.187∗∗ -1.521
(0.889) (1.966) (1.145)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
In the variables Age, Education and Industrial sector the reference categories
are in brackets.
The brackets under the coefficient values represent the standard errors.
unimportant for transitions to higher pay, it is found that the higher the education level,
the lower the probability of moving to unemployment. What matters more in Germany
is apprenticeship. Apprenticeship raises the probability of increasing the wage above the
low-pay threshold. Apprenticeship also protects workers from becoming unemployed. These
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Table 3.7: Parameters from competing-risks model for exit from low pay - Germany
Higher pay Unemployment
Self-
Other
employment
Log duration
0.195 0.590 1.191∗∗∗ -1.335∗∗∗
(0.183) (0.524) (0.449) (0.373)
Age (16-20 years)
21-25 years
0.259 -0.023 0.340 -0.750∗∗∗
(0.185) (0.459) (0.713) (0.260)
26-30 years
1.019∗∗∗ -0.636 1.201 -0.978∗∗
(0.273) (0.687) (0.812) (0.448)
Education (low)
High-School
0.123 -1.383∗∗∗ 0.929 0.177
(0.171) (0.443) (0.578) (0.273)
Tertiary
0.226 -2.026∗∗ 1.752∗ -0.546
(0.366) (1.275) (0.931) (0.736)
Training
0.520∗∗∗ 0.864∗ -1.231∗ 0.643∗
(0.187) (0.521) (0.704) (0.329)
Apprenticeship
0.46∗∗ -2.024∗∗∗ 0.431 -0.082
(0.198) (0.717) (0.481) (0.486)
Firm size (small firm)
Medium size
firm
0.212 -1.611∗∗∗ -1.047∗∗ -0.047
(0.192) (0.596) (0.516) (0.332)
Large firm
0.908∗∗∗ -1.315∗∗∗ -1.751∗∗ -0.097
(0.208) (0.536) (0.758) (0.409)
Tenure
0.003 -0.028∗∗∗ 0.006 0.005
(0.004) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006)
Part-time job
0.133 0.105 1.816∗∗∗ 1.920∗∗∗
(0.277) (0.751) (0.562) (0.348)
Temporary -0.286∗ 1.072∗∗∗ -0.205 0.377
contract (0.168) (0.425) (0.566) (0.273)
White collar job
0.321∗ -1.067∗∗ 0.784 0.318
(0.192) (0.520) (0.469) (0.366)
Industrial sector (commercial services)
Industry
0.633∗∗∗ 0.843 -0.193 0.221
(0.210) (0.559) (0.568) (0.317)
Primary sector
0.412 -1.716 0.850 0.051
(0.576) (1.311) (1.488) (0.737)
Non-commercial
-0.033 -0.124 -0.390 -0.426
(0.284) (0.654) (0.666) (0.393)
Public sector
-0.471 0.029 -1.078 -0.335
(0.292) (0.814) (1.000) (0.576)
Non-employment -0.300 1.480∗∗∗ -0.988 -0.055
spell (0.235) (0.598) (0.678) (0.463)
Constant
group 1
-0.906∗∗∗ -2.197∗∗∗ -2.624∗∗∗ -2.000∗∗∗
(0.324) (1.011) (0.958) (0.513)
Constant
group 2
-4.553∗∗∗ 2.389∗∗ -10.423 -0.921
(1.102) (1.038) (9.313) (1.380)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
In the variables Age, Education, Industrial sector and Firm size the reference categories are in brackets.
The brackets under the coefficient values contain the standard errors.
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findings suggest that in Germany, general human capital that is directly related to the job
is crucial for moving out of low pay at the beginning of the working career. As far as firm-
specific human capital is concerned, formal training increases the probability of a transition
to higher pay, while tenure decreases the probability for a transition to unemployment but
is not significant for transitions to higher pay. We should stress again here that, especially
in Germany, training can be also considered as a measure of general human capital. As
the coefficients for firm size indicate, German low-paid job starters have better prospects
in large firms than in small firms. Moreover, the larger the firm, the less likely it is for a
worker to make a transition to unemployment. The firm size is probably a variable related
to the duality in the German labour market. In large firms, workers are more often covered
by collective bargaining than in small firms.
For the Netherlands, the picture is clear. Education rather than firm-specific capital is
the main determinant of low-pay transitions. This confirms the earlier findings of van Opstal
et al. (1998). Workers possessing a high-school degree or a tertiary education degree have a
higher probability of moving to higher pay than their colleagues with lower education.
The picture is more complex in the UK than in the other two countries. The estimates
for education and tenure, as well as the interaction effects of tenure with firm size, differ
considerably between the stayers and the movers. In the group of movers, firm-specific skills
are more important. These skills, however, are only important in medium-size and large
firms. Young low-paid workers employed in such firms can increase their wage above the
low-pay threshold by developing their skills in the internal labour market. For the British
movers, education merely protects them from becoming unemployed.
In the group of stayers, however, the picture is reversed. Education increases significantly
the probability of moving to higher pay, while tenure has a zero or even a negative effect.
In large firms, the longer a young worker stays in a low-paid job, the lower his probability
of moving to higher pay.5 Therefore, for the group of movers, firm-specific skills in medium
and large firms can make the low-pay spell a stepping stone to better earnings, while for the
group of stayers, this can be achieved by a high-school or tertiary education degree. Finally,
training has a smaller effect in the UK than in Germany, as it only protects workers from
unemployment. It should be stressed again, however, that training in the UK is more a
measure of firm-specific skills than of general skills.
Further interesting findings from the model concern age, the sector of industry, the type
of employment contract, and the occurrence of a non-employment spell between leaving
full-time education and the first job. Late labour market entry is related to faster exits to
5We should stress here that tenure refers to the time that the workers is employed in the same job. If the
worker changes a job within the same employer, tenure starts back at zero.
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higher pay. This is found for all age categories in the UK and for some age groups in the
Netherlands (21-25 years) and in Germany (26-30 years). Working with a temporary contract
increases the probability of a transition to unemployment in the UK and in Germany but
not in the Netherlands. Differences between sectors of industry are found in the UK and
in Germany. In the UK, chances for increasing the wage above the low-pay threshold are
higher in industry and in the highly-unionized public sector, than in commercial services.
In Germany, transitions to higher pay are more common in the highly-regulated industry
sector than in commercial services. Germany is the only country where a non-employment
spell before the commencement of the first job has a scarring effect on the early career of
the labour market entrant. The occurrence of such a non-employment spell increases the
probability of becoming unemployed.
3.6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we performed a cross-country comparison of the wage and employment per-
spectives of the low-paid labour market entrants. This subgroup of wage earners has received
little attention in research to date. We assessed the role of two types of human capital -
general and firm-specific - on transitions from low pay, and in three countries with different
school-to-work institutions: the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands.
Our results from a competing-risks duration model suggest the existence of two types of
low-paid job starters. For the largest group of these (the movers), a low-pay spell is only
a stepping stone to better earnings. The smaller, but still significant group of these (the
stayers) is trapped between low-pay, unemployment and inactivity.
In compliance with the theory on the school-to-work institutions, we find striking cross-
country differences in the transition probabilities of the movers and the stayers as well as
in the type of human capital that determines low-pay transitions. In Germany, the dual
education system and the regulated labour market provide more upward mobility oppor-
tunities to the low-paid labour market entrants in the movers’ group than in the UK and
in the Netherlands. The transition probability to higher pay is .40 in Germany, while it
is .32 in the UK and only .24 in the Netherlands. However, we found a strong indication
of segmentation in the German labour market. In contrast to the other two countries, the
group of stayers has almost no chances of improving its earnings status. The German stayers
are threatened more by unemployment and inactivity than by low-pay persistence. General
human capital that is directly related to the job (i.e. apprenticeship) accounts for low-pay
exits in Germany. On the contrary, both tenure, which is a measure of firm-specific human
capital, and education are much less important.
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In the UK, the disadvantaged group of low-paid labour market entrants (the stayers)
faces a different threat than its German counterpart. In accordance with previous studies,
this large group of British young workers is found to be threatened by low-pay persistence.
Contrary to Germany, firm-specific human capital and education account for low-pay tran-
sitions. In both medium-sized and large firms, the majority of low-paid job starters can
improve their earnings in the internal labour market.
For the Netherlands, some estimation results do indeed position this country in between
the UK and Germany. The group of stayers is threatened by unemployment and inactivity,
as in Germany. Dutch stayers have, however, some chances of improving their earnings, as is
the situation in the UK. The most important determinant of low-pay transitions is education.
However, the overall characteristics of low-paid labour market entrants in the Netherlands
lead to the conclusion that this is a quite selective group. Most of these young workers did
not finish high school - and are probably drop-outs - and remained jobless for some time
before getting their first job. Therefore, the initial wage is quite crucial for the prospects
of Dutch job starters. Individuals who get their first job with low-paid earnings will most
probably remain low-paid for a lengthy period of time, unless they have (or manage to get)
a higher-education degree.
Further research should elaborate more on cross-country differences. The development
of large panel datasets containing more detailed information on the actual education level,
skills, and the firm characteristics of workers could contribute to such research.
Appendix: the description of the variables
Low-pay duration: This refers to the duration as measured in years of the low-pay spell
till the time of the interview.
Age: We defined the following age groups: (0) 16-20 years, (1) 21-25 years and (2) 26-30
years.
Married: This is a dummy (0/1) indicating whether the individual is legally married.
Education: This refers to the education level completed by the individual with respect to
high school. It, therefore, has three values: (0) lower than high school, (1) high school and
(2) tertiary education.
Training: This is a dummy indicating whether the individual participated in a formal
training scheme in the year prior to the interview.
Apprenticeship: This is a dummy (0/1) indicating whether the individual has ever finished
an apprenticeship. It is only valid for Germany.
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Firm size: We defined three firm sizes: (0) small, (1) medium and (2) large firm. In the
UK these three values refer to firms with less than 25 employees, firms with between 25 and
99 employees, and firms with more than 100 employees. In Germany, they refer to firms
with less than 20 employees, firms with between 20 and 199 employees and firms with 200
employees or more. In the Netherlands, we did not include this variable in the analysis as
there were too many missing values.
Industrial sector: We defined five industrial sectors: (0) commercial services, (1) industry,
(2) primary sector, (3) non-commercial services and (4) public sector.
Part-time: This is a dummy (0/1) indicating whether the individual is working part-time.
An individual is defined to be working part-time if he is employed for less than 35 hours per
week.
White collar: This is a dummy (0/1) indicating whether the individual is performing
supervising work.
Temporary: This is a dummy (0/1) indicating whether the individual is employed under a
temporary contract.
Tenure: This is the length of employment in the current job, measured in months.
Non-employment spell: This is a dummy indicating whether the individual had a non-
employment spell after finishing education and before getting his first job.
Chapter 4
Who Benefits from a Job Change?
4.1 Introduction
Job mobility is an important determinant of lifetime wage growth. Topel and Ward (1992)
suggest that job mobility accounts for one third of overall wage growth in the early stages of
the working career. However, the effect of a job change on the wage growth remains an open
issue. Some theories predict a positive effect, others a negative one. Empirical research has
failed to resolve this debate since it has produced contradictory findings (see section 4.2).
In all these studies, however, the effect of a job change on wage growth is assumed to be
independent of the position in the wage distribution. This assumption is questionable since
on-the-job search theory suggests that the decision of a worker to change job is contingent
on the level of the initial wage. More specifically, on-the-job search theory suggests that
both the hazard rate of leaving the current job and the difference between the current wage
and the reservation wage decrease with the current wage (Mortensen, 1986; van den Berg,
1992).1 A low-paid worker expects more job changes in his working life than a high-paid
worker does in order to improve his earnings. Therefore, compared to a high-paid worker, a
low-paid worker chooses a reservation wage that is relatively higher than the current wage
(van den Berg, 1992). In this way, the low-paid worker reduces the costs related to the job
change, as he can attain his preferred life-time earnings level in a fewer number of steps. If
workers receive wage offers relatively close to their reservation wage, then the wage gains from
a job change are relatively higher for the low-paid than for the high-paid worker. Therefore,
distinguishing between the different parts of the wage distribution can resolve the ambiguity
of the effect of a job change on wage growth.
The type of job change - within the firm or with another employer - is also relevant for
1The reservation wage refers to the lowest wage that the worker will accept in order to leave his current
job.
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these differences between low-paid and high-paid workers. According to various theories,
wage careers within firms deviate from the assumptions of the fully competitive labour
market model. Employers in large firms often pay a wage above the market wage, in order to
retain the most productive workers. Therefore, on average, we would expect positive returns
due to job changes in the internal labour market. However, since high-paid workers are
more involved in training and therefore develop more firm-specific skills, they are expected
to derive more utility than low-paid workers from a promotion or a job shift within the same
firm.
The aim of this paper is to compare the effect of a voluntary job change on wage growth for
the low-paid and the high-paid worker, accounting for the different mechanisms driving them
to change jobs, and differentiating between external and in-firm job changes. From a policy
perspective, this is an important issue as the demand for low-skilled/low-paid employment
has considerably decreased over the past decades (Acemoglu, 2003b). Moreover, the creation
of jobs of a given quality and earnings level (i.e. high-level jobs) is considered to be a
significant policy tool to tackle earnings inequality within European labour markets (Salverda
et al., 2001).
Another novel aspect of this study is that it investigates the costs and benefits related
to a job change in a cross-country comparative perspective. These costs and benefits are
not uniform across countries, since they can be influenced by labour market institutions.
More specifically, in the presence of strong wage regulation - due to collective bargaining or
a national minimum wage - downward wage adjustments will be rather rare at the bottom
of the earnings distribution, but not necessarily at the top. Furthermore, in countries where
jobs are closely linked to educational qualifications, a change of employer will mean fewer
costs being incurred by a worker who invests in firm-specific skills. Such a worker is more
often a high-paid worker than a low-paid worker. Therefore, the analysis is performed in two
countries: in Germany where all of the above-mentioned institutional characteristics prevail,
and in the UK, where these characteristics are absent.2
Investigating the effect of job mobility on wage growth entails several methodological
complications. The most important one is the endogeneity of job mobility. The wage is
not only dependent on a job change, it is also a determinant of it (Topel & Ward, 1992;
Le Grand & T˚ahlin, 2002). To tackle this endogeneity, we apply a two-step approach of the
Heckman type. In a first step, we model job mobility with a panel multinomial logit model.
In a second step, we use the predicted probabilities derived from the first step to control
for endogeneity in a panel wage-growth equation. The interesting feature of our approach is
2By restricting the analyses to two countries, we are not able to test formally the effect of institutional
differences. This would require data for a large number of countries, which are not readily available yet.
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that we control for unobserved heterogeneity in both steps of the estimation procedure.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 elaborates on the findings
of the relevant literature. Section 4.3 presents the job-search model from which we derive
our expectations. The role of the institutional framework is explained in section 4.4. The
data used in our analysis are discussed in Section 4.5. The econometric model is developed
and explained in Section 4.6. Some descriptive results are reported in Section 4.7. Section
4.8 reports on the results from the two-step estimation of the effect of job mobility on wage
growth. Conclusions are drawn in Section 4.9.
4.2 The link between wage mobility and job change
Several theories attempt to establish a link between job turnover and wage dynamics. Four
main approaches can be identified in the standard economic theory: the movers-stayers
approach, the job-search approach, the job-matching approach, and the human capital ap-
proach.
The movers-stayers model of Blumen et al. (1955) is rooted in psychology. In this model,
some workers are expected to be more likely to move than others. This instability is assumed
to lower productivity, and thereby to reduce the wage of movers below the wage of stayers.
The job-search model (Burdett, 1978; Jovanovic, 1979b; Mortensen, 1986) predicts a
positive effect of job mobility on wages. According to this model, workers enter the labour
market with a given and fixed stock of human capital. Firms differ in the level of productivity
they can extract from the workers. Hence, workers’ productivity depends on the firm they
are employed in. Employed workers are assumed to continue searching for a firm in which
they will be more productive. As a result, job mobility will affect wage growth positively.
In both the movers-stayers model and the job-search model, productivity is assumed to be
fixed and known ex-ante. Therefore, these two models suggest that controlling for individual
and job heterogeneity eliminates the effect of job mobility on wages. This prediction is not
supported by longitudinal empirical research. A series of studies, such as those conducted
by Light and McGarry (1998) and Munasinghe and Sigman (2004), finds that job mobility
has an effect on wages even after controlling for observed and unobserved personal and job
characteristics. In general, voluntary employer changes are associated with wage gains in
the US (Royalty, 1998; Gladden & Taber, 2000) and in Europe (Davia, 2005; Perez & Sanz,
2005). Black (1980) suggests that the positive wage gains are higher when on-the-job search
precedes a voluntary job change. However, these gains decrease with age as well as with
tenure and with the number of job changes (Jovanovic, 1979b; Blau & Kahn, 1981; Bartel
& Borjas, 1981; Topel & Ward, 1992; Farber, 1994; Light & McGarry, 1998; Dustmann &
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Meghir, 2005).
The matching model (Jovanovic, 1979a) has a dynamic approach as it allows for both
within-jobs wage growth as well as between-jobs wage growth. According to this model, the
worker’s productivity, although fixed, is unknown ex-ante to employers. Therefore, jobs are
considered as ‘pure experience goods’. In other words, there is initially an uncertainty about
the worker’s productivity. As job tenure increases, the employer gains additional information
about the actual productivity of the worker. Due to this learning effect, wages grow also
within jobs. Wages can also grow due to job changes, as a reward for searching for more
efficient job matches. Due to the initial uncertainty about the worker’s productivity, this
approach allows for an effect of job mobility on wage growth even after correcting for personal
and job characteristics. However, employers may interpret frequent job changes as a signal
for poor productivity. Hence, frequent job mobility may reduce future wage prospects. A
contradicting approach stems from Lazear (1986). In his ‘raiding’ model, Lazaer suggests
that firms compete for high-quality workers. For this reason, job movers are workers with
high skills and high quality, and job mobility has a positive effect on wage growth.
According to human capital theory (Becker, 1962), productivity is largely determined
by firm-specific human capital. Job mobility is strongly related to investments in specific
human capital. Returns to job mobility depend on the transferability of specific human
capital across jobs. The more specific human capital can be transferred, the smaller the
wage loss will be due to a job change. Therefore, human capital theory does not provide
clear predictions about the wage differences between movers and stayers. Mincer (1986,
1988) finds evidence that, although movers gain from changing a job, stayers experience a
higher wage growth as they invest more in specific human capital in the form of getting
involved in job training.
The effect of within-firm job changes has received much less attention in economics,
whereas within-firm mobility is found to account for a considerable part of the life cycle
earnings variation (McCue, 1996). Efficiency wage theory suggests that employers of large
firms motivate their employees by offering them wages above the market rates. According
to this theory, then, we would expect positive returns of within-firm job changes (see, for
example, Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984; Akerlof & Yellen, 1986).3 Empirical studies, however,
provide contradicting evidence. Lazaer (1999) argues that promotions have an immediate
positive effect on wages. Booth et al. (2003) quantify this effect to 5% for the British
workers. However, Hannan et al. (1990) find that within-firm job mobility does not result
3All the above-mentioned approaches assume that job turnover is voluntary and direct (job-to-job).
Involuntary mobility and mobility through unemployment is associated with loss of specific human capital
and therefore result in slowed wage careers. In this paper, however, we restrict our analysis to job-to-job
transitions.
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in faster wage growth for West German workers, while G. Baker et al. (1994) find that the
wage premium of an in-firm promotion in the US is significantly less than the average wage
disparity between the same job positions.
But these studies only estimate an average wage effect. To our knowledge, no study has
ever differentiated the effect of a job change on wages between the different parts of the wage
distribution. Such differences, as argued above are likely to exist.
4.3 The on-the-job search model
Our theoretical model follows closely Mortensen (1986). Let us assume that workers are
homogeneous and rational in their choices. Every worker aims at maximizing the expected
life-time utility U(c, l), where c represents consumption and l leisure. Workers allocate their
time between labour supply, job search, and leisure. Job offers for employed workers arrive
from two sources: from other employers and from their own employer. Both job-offer flows
follow a Poisson process with rate λ. These job offers are random draws from a wage offer
distribution F (x). Every job can last for ever and it is fully described by the wage w. All
workers are assumed to be involved in on-the-job search. In every time period dt every worker
can receive a maximum of one job offer with wage x. This job offer may come either from
another employer or from his own employer. Every worker chooses his search intensity s and
his leisure consumption l. Therefore, the worker’s job offer arrival rate is λs. Conditional
on the arrival of a job offer, the worker employed with wage w has two choices: reject the
job offer and continue working with wage w, or accept the job offer with wage x.
In the absence of search costs, the decision would be determined solely by the offered wage.
The worker would just choose the max{x, w}. The assumption of zero search costs, however,
is unrealistic. Firstly, there are several fixed costs associated with search. Furthermore,
there are opportunity costs of search. When an individual spends time on job search, he has
less time to spend on leisure. Finally, there are costs associated with moving from one job
to another. Job movers may have to move to another city. They may lose pension claims
or job-specific benefits. Moreover, a change in social and working environments may involve
psychological costs, such as getting acquainted with a new working environment and new
colleagues. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that there are non-zero search costs c1 for
moving to another employer and c2 for changing a job within the same employer. Following
Mortensen (1986), we assume that the search cost function is twice differentiable, increasing
and convex, with zero initial value for the total cost, i.e. c(0) = 0, c′(w) > 0 and c′′(w) > 0.
Costs related to a change of employer are usually higher than costs related to changing a
job within the same firm. Therefore, it is also reasonable to assume that c1(w) > c2(w). It
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is also reasonable to assume that search costs in the external labour market increase faster
with the wage than search costs in the internal labour market, so c′1(w) > c
′
2(w).
The optimal search strategy maximizes the sum of the instantaneous utility level net of
search costs and the expected gain attributable to search. For an employed individual, this
problem can be expressed with the following Bellman equation:
W (w) =
1
1 + r
max
s,l

w − c(s)− l(w) + λs
∞∫
0
max [V,W (x),W (w)] dF (x)
+(1− λs)W (w)} , (4.1)
where c(s) =

c1(s) for an external job changec2(s) for an internal job change and s = s(w) .
The first term on the right hand side is the instantaneous utility level w−c(s)− l(w).The
second and third parts represent the expected gain from the two options that the worker faces,
times the relevant probability. All terms are discounted with the intertemporal discount rate
r.
A wage offer x is now acceptable if W (x)− c(s) > W (w).
The lowest wage for which the worker would accept a job offer is the reservation wage
ξ = ξ(w). In the presence of non-zero search costs, every worker has two reservation wages,
one ξi1(w) for offers from the external labour market, and another ξi2(w) for offers from the
internal labour market.
Since the value of leisure V is the lowest value for which a worker will accept being
employed, equation (1) is transformed:
rW (w) = max
s,l

w − c(s)− l(w) + λs
∞∫
w
[W (x)−W (w)]dF (x1)

 .
The optimal search effort s∗(w) and the optimal leisure consumption l∗(w) equate the rele-
vant marginal return and cost. The first order conditions for the previous equation suggest
that:
r∂W (w)
∂s
= 0, thus c′(s∗(w)) = λ
∞∫
w
[W (x)−W (w)]dF (x) . (4.2)
It is shown by Mortensen (1986) and Christensen et al. (2005) that the optimal search effort
is continuous and strictly decreasing with respect to the current wage w, if b < w < w∗
where b is the value of leisure and w∗ is a sufficiently high wage above which the worker
stops searching altogether (the search reservation wage). Specifically, since c′(w) > 0 and
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W (w) is increasing with w, it follows from equation 4.2 that s∗(w) is decreasing with w.
As c′1(s) > c
′
2(s), then the optimal search effort in the external labour market should be
decreasing faster with the wage than the optimal search effort in the internal labour market.
This means that ds∗1(w)/dw > ds
∗
2(w)/dw. The wage w
∗ for which the optimal search effort
becomes 0 is given by:
c′(0) = (λ/r)
∞∫
w
(x− w∗)dF (x) . (4.3)
It follows from equation 4.3 that w∗2 > w
∗
1. Thus, the search reservation wage for searching in
the internal labour market is higher than the search reservation wage in the external labour
market.
The hazard rate for leaving the current job is given by: ϕ(w) = (λ1+λ2)s
∗(w)[1−F (w)].
Since both the optimal search effort s∗(w) and the probability of getting an acceptable job
offer [1− F (w)] are decreasing functions of the current wage w, the instantaneous quit rate
declines also with the wage. Moreover, since ds∗1(w)/dw > ds
∗
2(w)/dw, the instantaneous
quit rate in the external labour market declines faster with the wage than the instantaneous
quit rate in the internal labour market.
What is important in our case is an expression of the reservation wage. However, it is
extremely difficult to get an analytical solution for ξ(w). Van den Berg (1992) approximates
ξ(w) with a Taylor series around c(w) = 0. This is done under the following assumptions:
1. 0 < λ < +∞.
2. F (x) is a strictly increasing differential function on [0, w¯], where w¯ is a number 0 <
w¯ < +∞. For x ≤ 0, F (x) = 0, while for x ≥ w¯, F (x) = 1. Further 0 < w ≤ w¯.
3. c(w) is a continuously differentiable function on [0, w¯].
4. For each wǫ(0, w¯], c′(w) < 1/λ.
Assumption 4 means actually that c(w) increases only slowly, as a function of w.
If the above-mentioned assumptions are met, and if further c(w) depends on a parameter
η such that c(w)−η does not depend on η and η does not depend on w, van den Berg (1992)
shows that for every wǫ[0, w¯]:
ξ(w) = w +
r + ϕ(w)
1− c′(w)ϕ(w)
c(w) + o(c(w)). (4.4)
The term o(c(w)) can be neglected as dt −→ 0.
Equation 4.4 suggests that the gap between the reservation wage and the current wage,
ξ(w) − w, is a decreasing function of the current wage. This result is quite plausible: a
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low-paid worker needs a larger relative increase of his income in order to change job than
his high-paid colleague. This is because the low-paid worker expects many job changes in
order to reach a higher earnings level. Therefore, he wants to minimize the search costs
that he will pay, and he sets his reservation wage relatively higher than his current wage
than his higher-paid colleague. Since c1(w) > c2(w) and c
′
1(w) > c
′
2(w) this gap between the
reservation wage and the current wage decreases faster with the wage in the external labour
market than in the internal labour market.
4.4 The role of the institutions
The two countries - UK and Germany - included in this study present important differences
with respect to their labour market institutions. In fact, they are often perceived as different
worlds of labour and as each other’s opposites within Europe. The liberal British labour
market is characterized by low levels of job protection through public regulation. Efficiency
in the British labour market is achieved through a high level of labour market mobility
and job turnover. Government intervention is reduced to a minimum, and the extent and
impact of collective bargaining is rather limited (only 22% in the private sector). Minimum
wage regulation was been absent from 1993 until 1999, when a national minimum wage was
introduced. Wage inequality is much higher in the UK than in Germany; the D9/D1 ratio4
in 1996 was 4.14 compared to 2.67 for Germany (Salverda et al., 2001).
Compared to the UK, the German labour market is characterized by a high level of
job protection through public law and an extended system of collective bargaining. Even
the wages of the upper middle-class workers are set by collective employment agreements.
Minimum pay regulation is determined at both the sectoral level and the regional level.
Specifically, collective bargaining covers about 70% of the West German workers in the
private sector. Jobs are closely linked to educational credentials, which are acquired through
formal education and apprenticeship. Apprenticeship lasts for a period of up to three years
and many young people go through it. Furthermore, employers are directly involved in
the provision and delivery of apprenticeships (Hannan et al. 1997). Thus, apprenticeships
are aimed at developing skills that are transferable across jobs and employers (Winkelmann,
1996). This strengthens the position of workers who change jobs. As a result, in Germany we
expect to find smaller differences between internal (within-firm) job moves and external job
moves, as skills are more transferable across employers. In the UK, on the other hand, job-
specific skills, acquired in the internal labour market, are more important. Since educational
qualifications act more as a signal or a screening device for learning about the ability of the
4This is the ration of the 90th to the 10th percentile of the wage distribution.
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worker’s potential to acquire these skills, job movers may suffer from a severe loss of human
capital.
The macroeconomic performance of the two countries also shows considerable variation
since the early 1990s. The UK was engaged in a considerably stronger economic upturn than
Germany. The average annual GDP growth rate in the UK was twice that of Germany in
the period 1991-2004 (2.8 and 1.4 percent respectively). The average labour productivity
(for the years 1992-2004), in the UK, measured in GDP per hours worked was 2.58, whereas
it was only 1.97 in Germany. The male unemployment rate in the UK dropped sharply from
12.1 percent in 1993 to 5.5 percent in 2003, while in Germany it increased from 5.9 percent
to 8.7 percent in the same time period. Male labour force participation rates remained stable
between 1991-2004 in the UK (79.6% and 78.9% respectively), but decreased considerably
in Germany (77.6% and 71% respectively).5 Consequently, we expect to find higher returns
to job mobility for the British workers than for the German workers.
4.5 Data and main concepts
Our data cover the period 1991-2004 and originate from two national panel datasets. For
the UK, we use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), which contains information
on labour market participation and income of approximately 10,000 individuals per wave
aged 16 years or above. For Germany, we use the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP),
which covers about 13,000 individuals aged 16 years or above. Waves 8-21 are used, which
refer to the period 1991-2004.6 The information from the two datasets has been made highly
comparable for the purpose of this study.
The sample is restricted to full-time working males between 25 and 55 years of age.
Specifically, we select males that declared paid employment as their main activity and who
work at least 35 hours a week. We exclude the self-employed and the apprentices. Our
main economic variable is the gross hourly wage. This hourly wage is calculated from the
previous month’s earnings from paid employment, and the usual number of hours worked per
week. Monthly pay includes overtime but no other kind of additional payments. Including
additional payments, such as bonuses and fringe benefits, would certainly be informative
since the high-paid might receive more of these payments than the low-paid. However, in
GSOEP, information on these payments is only available on a yearly basis and therefore it
5All the data in this paragraph come from OECD (2006).
6The BHPS data (Taylor et al., 2006) were made available by the Data Archive at Essex University. The
GSOEP (Wagner et al., 1993) was provided by the German Institute for Economic Research. We only use
data for the former West Germany as the labour market of East Germany differed considerably from that
of the West Germany, especially at the beginning of the 1990s.
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does not necessarily refer to the current job. From the GSOEP dataset, only retrospective
wage information about the previous year is available. As a result, information for wave t
is derived from wave t + 1. Unfortunately, these panel surveys offer no information on the
reservation wage so we are assuming that the workers accept job offers with a wage close to
their reservation wage. We define as low-paid and high-paid workers those belonging to the
lowest and the highest quartile of the wage distribution, respectively. We should stress here
that there is no widely agreed threshold for high pay. This threshold is sometimes defined in
terms of the median wage (e.g. 1.5 times the median wage) or in terms of quartiles or deciles.
A caveat is always involved when comparing countries with very different wage distributions.
Setting the high-pay threshold to 1.5 times the median wage would result in having very
different population proportions for the various countries, while choosing the fourth quartile
as the threshold implies that workers included in different country samples vary a lot with
respect to the proportion of the median wage they earn.
Following similar approaches in the literature (Perez & Sanz, 2005), we define as vol-
untary, a job change that is direct,, i.e. without any intervening spell of unemployment or
inactivity. Since our focus is on voluntary separations, involuntary job changes are excluded
from the analysis.
4.6 The two-step Heckman empirical model
We aim at investigating the wage returns to job mobility in the different parts of the wage
distribution. This is done by modelling the year-to-year relative wage growth of individuals.
Let wit be the natural logarithm of the wage of the individual i in the time period t. Con-
sider the following standard panel wage equation that includes job mobility as one of the
predictors:
wit+1 − wit = x
′
itβ +
2∑
j=1
pijtbj +
2∑
j=0
2∑
k=1
(
pijtdik(t+1)cjk
)
+ ui + εit , (4.5)
where xit is a vector of covariates including a constant term (see note in Table 4.2). pijt is
an indicator variable representing the position in the wage distribution and taking one of
the two values 0 or 1. The index j = 0, 1, 2 corresponds to low-, medium- and high-paid,
respectively. The categorical variable for the job change appears in the equation as dummies
(dik(t+1)) indicating whether a change of employer or job change within the firm takes place
between t and t + 1 (di1(t+1) = 1 for an external job change and di2(t+1) = 1 for an in-firm
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job change).7 To capture the differentiating effect of the job change in the various parts of
the wage distribution, we interact the dummies for the job change with the dummies for the
position in the distribution. For identification, we assume that b0 = 0 and cj0 = 0. The term
ui represents the individual-specific unobserved fixed effects and εit the idiosyncratic error.
The term εit is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and uncorrelated with ui.
Clearly, the issue of initial conditions emerges in our analysis. This means that the group
of individuals that is in a certain pay level at a given point in time may be endogenous.
However, controlling for initial conditions in a panel model is rather difficult and thus left
as an issue for further research. By controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity
we are able to control at least partly for the possible endogeneity of initial conditions.
Furthermore, in this study we focus on another problem of endogeneity: the endogeneity
of the job change. There are two potential sources for endogeneity. The first is reverse
causality; the decision of a worker to change job may be caused by the expectation of a
higher wage-growth in the new job. Munasinghe (2000) suggests, accordingly, that high
wage-growth jobs are less likely to end than low wage growth jobs. Secondly, there may
be unobserved factors such as ability and effort affecting both the wage and the decision of
a worker to change jobs. Both sources of endogeneity might lead to bias in the parameter
estimates.
The estimation of equation 4.5 involves a panel model with a continuous dependent
variable and a categorical endogenous predictor (for changes of employer and for job changes
with the same employer). In a cross sectional framework, endogeneity is usually tackled by
the approach introduced by Heckman (1978, 1979) and developed further by others, such as
Vella and Verbeek (1999). Other approaches, such as the endogenous switching model used
by Perez and Sanz (2005) provide a better estimate of the effect of job mobility on wages, but
fail to control for unobserved personal characteristics. Our approach is to employ a two-step
procedure of the Heckman type in a panel framework, applying correction for unobserved
heterogeneity: first, we model the probability of job mobility; second, we estimate a wage
regression that includes the correction terms for endogeneity that are derived from the first
step.
In order to respect the panel structure of our sample in the first step, we apply a random-
effects multinomial logit model for job mobility, distinguishing between no job change, exter-
nal job change, and within-firm job change.8 Non-pay related components of job satisfaction
7If we restrict cjk = ck we get a simpler model, in which the effect of the job change is independent of
the position in the wage distribution.
8The multinomial logit model has been criticized for producing biased estimates when the assumption of
the Independent Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) is violated. However, Bourguignon et al. (2007) argue that
the multinomial logit model can be trusted in the first step of a cross-sectional selection model when the
propensity scores are transformed in a certain way before being used as controls for endogeneity in the second
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are used as the exclusive variables that allow the identification of the model. For the UK, we
use the satisfaction with working hours and with the work content. For Germany, we use the
variable indicating how much the worker is worried about job security.9 The components of
job satisfaction that are used as exclusive instruments are not influenced by thesatisfaction
for the wage. The overall job satisfaction would be inappropriate as exclusive variable as
it is correlated with the wage (see, among others, Clark, 1999). This correlation, however,
is produced mainly by the satisfaction for the wage. In BHPS, respondents are asked to
report their satisfaction for pay, working hours, work content, as well as their overall job
satisfaction. In GSOEP, respondents are asked to report their overall job satisfaction, and
their worry about job security. Thus, we can safely assume that our exclusive variables are
uncorrelated with wage growth.
The probability that worker i makes a job change k at time point t, conditional on
observed characteristics zit and unobserved characteristics µis can be written as follows:
P (dikt = 1) =
exp(z′itγk + µik)
1 +
2∑
n=1
exp (z′itγn + µin)
, (4.6)
where zit is a vector of covariates including human capital and job characteristics. zit also
includes a vector of intercepts. k represents the three destination states: remaining in the
same job, moving to another job outside the firm, and changing job with the same employer.
Parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood using LatentGold (Vermunt & Magidson,
2007). The likelihood contribution of an individual i is the joint probability of obtaining the
T outcomes of di1, di1, ..., diT . This joint probability can be written as:
P (di|zi) =
∫
µ
f(µi)P (di|zi,µi) dµi , (4.7)
where
P (di|zi,µi) =
T∏
t=0
[P (dit|zit,µi)]
δit , (4.8)
and
δit =
{
1 if dit is observed in time period t
0 otherwise
. (4.9)
We use this model to estimate the probability of a job change with another employer
step of the estimation procedure. The transformation they suggest is based on the approach of Dubin and
McFadden (1984).
9We also tested other instruments, such as the housing tenure status. The results we obtained were
similar. These results can be obtained upon request from the author.
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(
Pˆ (di1t = 1)
)
and the probability of a job change with the same employer
(
Pˆ (di2t = 1)
)
.
Note that the unobserved individual effects (µis) are specific for each destination state s.
They follow the normal distribution with variance Σµ, µis ∼ N(0,Σµ). For the identification
of the model we assume that µi0 = 0. In the variance-covariance matrix Σµ, we also impose
the restrictions:
σ11 = (υ1)
2, σ22 = (υ2)
2
and σ12 = σ21 = (υ1 ∗ υ2)
Therefore, the variance-covariance matrix Σµ of the random effects has the structure (Ver-
munt, Tran, & Magidson, 2007):
Σµ =


0 0 0
0 (υ1)
2 (υ1 ∗ υ2)
0 (υ1 ∗ υ2) (υ2)
2

 (4.10)
The second step of the estimation procedure is a fixed-effects linear wage regression10, where
the inverse Mills ratios (λ1 and λ2), derived from the first step, are used as controls for
endogeneity. For computing the inverse Mills ratios we use the specification of Dubin and
McFadden (1984):
λs =
2∑
j = 0
j 6= s
(
Pˆj ln Pˆj
1− Pˆj
− ln Pˆs
)
, (4.11)
where Pˆs = Pˆ (dikt = 1). For a particular individual, this is the expected posterior mean of
this probability. The dependent variable is the year-to-year wage growth wit+1 − wit. The
wage regression can be written as follows:
wit+1 − wit = x
′
itβ +
2∑
j=1
pijtbj +
2∑
j=0
2∑
k=1
(
pijtdik(t+1)cjk
)
+
2∑
r=1
λritδ
′
r + ui + εit . (4.12)
where wit is the natural logarithm of the hourly wage and x
′
it is a vector of covariates. εit
is the idiosyncratic error, while ui represents unobserved individual specific characteristics.
The vector β and the scalars bj , cjk, δ
′
1 and δ
′
2 are the regression parameters to be estimated.
10In first step, we use a random-effects multinomial logit model because there is no way of estimating a
fixed-effects multinomial logit model. In the primary equation the Hausman test rejects the null assumption
of the joint coefficients’ equality of the fixed-effects and random-effects model, suggesting that the fixed-
effects specification should be preferred.
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Table 4.1: Composition of the sample
(in percentages)
Germany UK
Stayers Movers Stayers Movers
External In-firm External In-firm
Married 82.2 79.8 84.4 75.6 63.5 67.1
Age (in years) 38.9 36.4 36.7 39.1 34.9 36.4
Education
Low 20.7 21.0 10.3 18.9 17.7 10.0
Medium 32.1 31.7 30.5 58.0 60.3 48.0
High 47.3 47.3 59.2 23.2 22.0 42.0
Training 34.0 30.9 48.2 3.5 4.7 11.6
Industry
Manufacturing 26.2 25.5 23.2 46.0 37.7 35.3
Energy 1.6 1.7 0.6 1.5 0.8 3.1
Mining 3.4 2.6 4.2 1.1 0.6 0.6
Agriculture 5.7 3.2 5.9 0.8 0.9 0.2
Construction 6.5 8.5 4.0 9.8 13.9 3.5
Trade 11.6 16.9 13.0 7.2 13.2 3.3
Transport 9.9 10.1 7.4 4.9 6.7 6.4
Banking, Finance 12.7 17.4 17.4 3.7 2.3 7.6
Other services 22.5 14.1 24.5 25.0 23.9 40.0
Firm size
Small firms 26.3 35.6 17.7 13.6 29.3 2.9
Medium-sized firms 25.9 28.3 24.7 26.0 33.6 12.4
Large firms 47.8 36.1 57.6 60.4 37.1 84.7
Temporary 2.4 10.4 2.8 3.8 13.1 6.1
White collar 47.0 43.2 62.5 39.0 45.9 52.3
Apprenticeship 74.4 72.5 70.2
4.7 Descriptive results
The composition of our sample is represented in Table 4.1. Workers staying in the same job
and workers changing an employer do not differ significantly. Especially in Germany, the two
groups look remarkably similar. However, in both countries stayers are, on average, older
than movers. Moreover, external movers are employed more often than stayers in small firms
and in the sectors of trade, banking and finance and less often than stayers employed in the
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Table 4.2: Proportion of job movers and stayers, and associated relative wage growth
(in percentages)
UK Germany
Stayers Movers Stayers Movers
External In-firm External In-firm
Low paid
proportion 80.2 10.8 9.0 92.0 6.8 1.2
wage change 13 27 24 12 14 14
Medium
paid
proportion 80.1 7.3 12.6 93.4 4.6 2.0
wage change 5 8 10 4 6 8
High paid
proportion 78.4 6.3 15.2 92.3 4.7 3.1
wage change 0 1 3 1 2 1
Total
proportion 79.8 8.0 12.3 92.8 5.2 2.1
wage change 6 13 11 5 7 6
cases 12,968 1,300 1,999 11,404 639 258
Note: A worker is low paid when his earnings belong to the lowest quartile of the hourly wage distribution, and high
paid when his earnings belong to the upper quartile of the wage distribution. The worker is middle paid if his
earnings are in the second or third quartile of the distribution.
sector of ‘other services’. These differences between external movers and stayers are more
pronounced in the UK. Employer changes are more common for workers in construction and
trade and less common for workers in manufacturing. The same applies for workers of small
and medium sized firms, as well as for white collar workers.
Large differences in human capital characteristics emerge between workers that change
jobs within the same firm and the rest of the workers. There are more highly educated among
the workers that change jobs within the firm than among the rest of the workers. Work-
related training also more often precedes an in-firm job change. This type of job change is
also more common for white collar workers and for large-firm employees. With respect to
sector differences, German in-firm movers are more usually employed in banking and finance,
while their British colleagues are also more usually employed in banking and finance, but
also in ‘other services’, and less usually employed in manufacturing, construction and trade.
Table 4.2 presents the proportion of job movers as well as the relative wage growth
between t and t+1 averaged over the years, with a breakdown according to the initial position
in the wage distribution. It shows that job mobility rates and the corresponding wage returns
are higher in the liberal British labour market than in the regulated German labour market.
Furthermore, Table 4.2 indicates that in both countries, the low paid tend to change employer
more often than the high paid, while the high paid change jobs within the firm more often
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than the low paid. The average relative gain for the low paid, in terms of year-to-year wage
growth, is larger than for the high paid. On average, high-paid workers do not experience
any significant relative change in their wage.
4.8 Results from the two-step estimation
First-step results: the job mobility equation
Table 4.3 shows the main results of the first-step regression for job mobility. The main
finding is that the probability of changing job varies across the different parts of the wage
distribution only in the UK. In this country, we find that the higher the position in the
distribution the lower the probability of changing employer. The probability of an internal
job change is higher for the middle part of the wage distribution than for the upper or lower
parts. Our exclusive variables (satisfaction for working hours and satisfaction with work
content in the UK and worry concerning job security in Germany) are strongly significant
for external mobility. These variables also have the expected effect: the more satisfied a
worker is, the lower the probability of changing employer. For the UK, Table 4.3 shows
only the results for working hours satisfaction. The results for work content satisfaction
are similar. Despite the lack of significance of the exclusive variables in the in-firm mobility
equation, additional tests on the wage equation confirmed the adequacy of the instruments.11
The estimates for the rest of the covariates are not presented here. However, all the
estimates are consistent with previous findings. Correction for unobserved heterogeneity is
important in both countries: unobserved idiosyncratic characteristics, such as ability and
effort, affect the likelihood of a job transition. The estimated variance-covariance matrices
of the individual effects are:
UK Germany
Σµ =


0 0 0
0 0.830 −0.625
0 −0.625 0.471
Σµ =


0 0 0
0 0.287 −0.860
0 −0.860 2.576
The variance-covariance matrices show that the individual effects for external and internal
11Specifically, the Wald test for the overall significance of the exclusive variables rejects the null hypothesis
that these variables can be omitted from the regression. The full results for this regression can be obtained
from the author.
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job changes are negatively correlated in both countries. Therefore, in both countries workers
with a higher propensity for changing employer have a lower propensity for changing their
job within the firm.
Table 4.3: Random effects multinomial logit model for the job change
(robust standard error)
UK Germany
External movers Internal movers External movers Internal movers
Hours satisfaction
(reference category 1
- not satisfied at all)
value 2
-0.170 0.025
(0.229) (0.214)
value 3
-0.265 -0.044
(0.200) (0.186)
value 4 -0.410∗∗ 0.076
(neutral) (0.202) (0.186)
value 5
-0.499∗∗∗ 0.128
(0.196) (0.181)
value 6
-0.484∗∗∗ 0.057
(0.195) (0.181)
value 7 -0.713∗∗∗ 0.204
(completely satisfied) (0.219) (0.192)
Worry about
job security
(very concerned)
Somewhat
concerned
-0.533∗∗∗ -0.062
(0.107) (0.236)
Not concerned
at all
-0.710∗∗∗ -0.190
(0.111) (0.240)
Position in the
distribution
(low paid)
medium paid
-0.195∗∗ 0.159∗∗ 0.000 -0.077
(0.086) (0.073) (0.087) (0.191)
high paid
-0.313∗∗∗ 0.012 0.033 0.248
(0.117) (0.091) (0.129) (0.239)
Constant
0.426 -2.208∗∗∗ 0.499 -5.783∗∗∗
(0.967) (0.753) (1.068) (2.069)
Random effect
0.911∗∗∗ -0.686∗∗∗ -0.536∗∗∗ 1.605∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.050) (0.094) (0.127)
Log likelihood -11,397.50 -5,281.75
Reference categories in brackets
Note: The following variables are included as controls in the regression: a dummy for married, age in years, age squared,
labour market experience in months, experience squared, education with respect to high school (low, high-school, tertiary),
a dummy for formal training in the previous year, the industry sector (sic level 1), the firm size (small, medium and large
firms), the type of contract (permanent/temporary), tenure in months, yearly dummies, and the regional unemployment
rate. For Germany, we also included a dummy indicating whether the worker ever acquired apprenticeship qualifications.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Second-step results: wage mobility
Table 4.4 presents the results of the second step, the fixed-effects regression on wage growth.
We applied four versions of the model, namely first a simple fixed-effects regression, a second
one correcting for endogeneity, a third one correcting for the position in the wage distribution
but not endogeneity and finally a model applying both corrections.
86 CHAPTER 4. WHO BENEFITS FROM A JOB CHANGE?
For both countries, in Models 1 and 2 the F-test for the individual effects does not reject
the null hypothesis that individual effects ui are jointly significantly different from zero.
Therefore, the OLS specification is to be preferred to these fixed-effects models. However,
the joint zero-hypothesis for the individual effects is rejected when we take into account the
position in the wage distribution (Models 3 and 4). The inclusion of the ‘position’ terms
also increases the percentage of variance explained (in terms of the R2) from 3.6% to 19.6%
in the UK and from 1.9% to 22.3% in Germany.
The significance of the endogeneity terms depends on the model specification. The endo-
geneity coefficients are significant in Model 2 (see Table 4.4)12, but become insignificant in
Model 4, the model that corrects for the position in the wage distribution. This finding sug-
gests that the endogeneity of job mobility in the wage equation disappears when we correct
for the position in the wage distribution. Therefore, the discussion of the results is based on
Model 3 for both countries.
Our model contains two dummies for the position in the distribution and six cross-terms
between the position in the distribution and the type of job change (see equation 4.5).
The parameters corresponding to the dummies for the position in the distribution represent
the difference in wage growth of the low-paid worker with the middle-paid and high-paid
worker, respectively. The cross-terms represent the difference in the wage growth between
the relevant groups of movers and stayers. For example, the term ‘external change * high
paid’ represents the difference in wage growth between the high-paid external mover and the
high-paid stayer. In other words, we estimate conditional effects with these cross-terms. In
both countries, the low-paid worker experiences, on average, a higher relative wage growth
than the high-paid worker, regardless of whether he changes job or not. This difference is
more pronounced in the UK than in Germany. Moreover, in both countries, the low-paid
external mover enjoys a higher wage growth than the low-paid stayer (6.7% higher in the
UK and 6.3% higher in Germany). The British low-paid in-firm mover also experiences a
higher wage growth than the low-paid stayer. The wage growth of the German low-paid
in-firm mover does not differ significantly from the wage growth of a colleague who stays in
the same job. A change of employer has a negative effect on the wage growth of the British
high-paid worker. The German high-paid external mover does not differ significantly from
a colleague who stays in the same job. Finally, the wage growth of the high-paid in-firm
mover does not differ significantly from the growth of the high-paid stayer, in any of the two
countries under scrutiny. If within-firm job changes were to refer only to promotions, this
finding would be surprising. However, in our sample, in-firm job changes also include job
12According to Vella and Verbeek (1999) the t-test for the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio is an
adequate test for endogeneity.
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Table 4.4: Second step regression - Fixed effects model for wage growth
(robust standard error)
UK Germany
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Mills ratios
Mills ratio for
external job change
0.042∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.018∗∗∗ -0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Mills ratio for
in-firm job change
-0.114∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.023∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.010) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
Job change (reference category: no change)
External
job change
0.031∗∗∗ 0.018∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
In-firm
job change
0.025∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.005
(0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.010)
Position in the distribution (reference category: low paid)
Medium paid
-0.260∗∗∗ -0.259∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
High paid
-0.521∗∗∗ -0.520∗∗∗ -0.441∗∗∗ -0.439∗∗∗
(0.541) (0.114) (0.089) (0.150)
Cross terms
Low paid * No change ref ref ref ref
Low paid *
External change
0.065∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.020) (0.011) (0.014)
Low paid *
In-firm change
0.051∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗ -0.023 -0.017
(0.014) (0.018) (0.024) (0.025)
Medium paid * No change ref ref ref ref
Medium paid *
External change
-0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010)
Medium paid *
In-firm change
0.008 0.007 -0.004 -0.000
(0.008) (0.007) (0.015) (0.012)
High paid * No change ref ref ref ref
High paid *
External change
-0.033∗∗ -0.035 0.010 0.005
(0.016) (0.021) (0.015) (0.019)
High paid *
In-firm change
0.012 0.011 -0.024 -0.029∗
(0.011) (0.010) (0.017) (0.015)
Constant
0.801 0.412 0.245 0.235 0.346∗∗∗ 1.334∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗ 0.121
(0.817) (2.306) (0.736) (2.169) (0.106) (0.155) (0.094) (0.164)
R2 0.006 0.036 0.196 0.196 0.014 0.019 0.223 0.220
F-test (ui = 0) 0.62 0.72 1.36∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗ 0.57 0.58 1.30∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The list of the control variables is the same as in Table 4.3.
changes at the same level and demotions.13 Furthermore, as indicated by G. Baker et al.
(1994), a wage gain from a job promotion might not take immediate effect, but be delayed
13For the UK, two-thirds of the internal job changes are related to promotions. For Germany, we cannot
distinguish promotions from other types of internal job changes.
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until a certain point in the future.
In order to visualize the above-mentioned effects, in Figure 4.1 we present the estimated
wage change for the stayers, the external movers, the within-firm movers, and for the low-
paid, medium-paid and high-paid workers.14 Figure 4.1 shows that, in both countries, the
low-paid worker that changes employer enjoys a considerably high relative wage increase.
The British low-paid in-firm mover also enjoys a wage gain. This gain is, however, smaller
than the gain of a colleague who changes employer. The rest of the effects are negligible.
For the high-paid worker, we find that his average wage growth is negative regardless of the
type of job transition made.
Two words of caution should be added to the interpretation of these results. First, the
finding that the low-paid worker experiences, on average, a higher relative wage growth
than the high-paid worker should not be interpreted as an indication of decreasing earnings
inequality. This finding is due to the fact that we are only observing part of the overall wage
mobility, as we have excluded workers moving in and out of paid employment. Secondly, our
wage measure is the hourly wage. The high-paid worker might derive more utility than the
low-paid worker from bonuses paid on a yearly basis or from fringe benefits.
A sensitivity analysis: long-term effects
Up till now, we have only modelled year-to-year wage growth. However, wage gains from
a job change might not take immediate effect, but be delayed until a certain point in the
future (Blau & Kahn, 1981). Workers might accept the same, or even a lower, wage when
changing a job, if they expect a steeper wage growth in the new job.15 Therefore, it is also
necessary to compare the long-term wage growth of movers and stayers. For this purpose,
we repeat the same multivariate analysis by using the wage growth between t and t+3 as the
dependent variable.16 In this analysis, our sample consists of workers that were continuously
employed from t until t + 3 and did not change jobs between t + 1 and t + 3. Thus, we
compare workers that changed jobs between t and t+ 1 and then remained in this new job
at least until t+ 3, with workers that remained in the same job from t until t+ 3.
Table 4.5 shows the results of the second-step regression for the long-term wage growth.17
This table indicates that the main finding remains the same. The low-paid worker that
14The baseline of this figure is the wage growth of the low-paid stayers, which is rather arbitrary. It
represents the wage growth of a low paid stayer having average personal and job characteristics.
15A reservation wage lower than the current wage is not allowed by a job-search model, but is allowed by
a job-matching model.
16Our data do not allow the use of a time span longer than three years. This would dramatically reduce
the number of cases in our sample.
17The results of the first step of the estimation are not presented, but are available on request from the
author.
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Figure 4.1: Wage changes across job transitions
changes employer experiences a larger wage growth than the low-paid stayer. An employer
change is also profitable for the middle-paid worker in the UK. The gains of the middle-paid
British worker are, however, lower, than the gains of his low-paid colleague. By contrast, in a
three-year period, the German middle-paid external mover experiences a lower wage growth
compared to the middle-paid stayer. In both countries, a high-paid worker who changes
employer does not differ with respect to wage growth from a colleague who stays in the same
job. Finally, as in the case of the year-to-year wage growth, a job change within the same
firm is only profitable for the British low-paid worker. Therefore, we can conclude that the
main findings of our study indicate little sensitivity to the time period for which the wage
growth is observed.
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Table 4.5: Long-term effects - Fixed-effects model for wage growth
(robust standard error)
UK Germany
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Mills ratios
Mills ratio for
external job change
0.051∗∗∗ 0.008 -0.021∗∗∗ -0.009
(0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Mills ratio for
in-firm job change
-0.147∗∗∗ -0.024 -0.030∗∗∗ -0.007
(0.017) (0.015) (0.005) (0.004)
Job change (reference category: no change)
External
job change
0.050∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.027∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015)
In-firm
job change
0.023∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.012 0.011
(0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.019)
Position in the distribution (reference category: low paid)
Medium paid
-0.314∗∗∗ -0.300∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.013) (0.006) (0.007)
High paid
-0.595∗∗∗ -0.569∗∗ -0.428∗∗∗ -0.424∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.017) (0.009) (0.010)
Cross terms
Low paid * No change ref ref ref ref
Low paid *
External change
0.064∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.024)
Low paid *
In-firm change
0.061∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗ -0.016 -0.016
(0.019) (0.022) (0.038) (0.038)
Medium paid * No change ref ref ref ref
Medium paid *
External change
0.027∗∗ 0.024∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.032∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016)
Medium paid *
In-firm change
0.016 0.016 0.022 0.024
(0.010) (0.011) (0.021) (0.024)
High paid * No change ref ref ref ref
High paid *
External change
-0.028 -0.033 0.010 0.013
(0.021) (0.022) (0.026) (0.027)
High paid *
In-firm change
-0.008 -0.013 -0.027 -0.026
(0.014) (0.015) (0.027) (0.027)
Constant
1.121 0.512 0.697 0.638 0.692∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗
(0.937) (5.400) (0.839) (4.926) (0.155) (0.186) (0.139) (0.167)
R2 0.015 0.057 0.231 0.231 0.034 0.041 0.235 0.235
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The list of the control variables is the same as in Table 4.3.
4.9 Conclusions
Most studies on the effect of job mobility on wage growth implicitly assume that this effect
is the same at all wage levels. In this paper, we developed a simple variant of the on-the-job
search model of Mortensen (1986). According to this theoretical model, both the hazard rate
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of changing a job and the difference between the current wage and the reservation wage are
decreasing functions of the current wage. Moreover, these differences between the low-paid
worker and the high-paid worker are more pronounced for external job changes than for
in-firm job changes.
These predictions were tested with a panel regression model, using data from the UK
and Germany. Since we had no information on the reservation wage, we approximated
the reservation wage with the wage in the new job. The prediction that the probability
of changing jobs is higher for the low-paid worker than for the high-paid worker is only
verified for the British external movers. In all other cases, no differences between the low-
paid workers and the high-paid workers emerge. By contrast, the findings on wage growth
are more in accordance with the expectations of our theoretical model. The relative wage
returns to external job changes are higher for the low-paid worker than for the high-paid
worker in both countries. On average, the low-paid external mover enjoys (in the UK) a 6.7%
or (in Germany) a 6.3% higher wage growth than the low-paid stayer. The wage growth of
the high-paid external mover is, on average, the same (in Germany) or even lower (in the
UK) than the wage growth of the high-paid stayer. This means that a voluntary change of
employer might be a good career move for the low-paid worker. With respect to in-firm job
changes, our results are in accordance with the predictions of the model only in the UK.
In the liberal UK labour market, the low-paid worker enjoys a higher wage growth than his
high-paid colleague by an in-firm job change. In Germany, however, an in-firm job change
does not produce any gains or losses either for the low-paid worker or for the high-paid
workers.
The main findings of this study remain the same if we extend the period for which we
model wage growth, from one to three years. The only difference refers to the middle-paid
worker who derives long-term gains from an employer change in the UK, as opposed to losses
in Germany.
Caution should be taken with respect to the initial conditions problem. Several studies,
such as Stewart and Swaffield (1999) and Cappellari and Jenkins (2004a) suggest that initial
conditions are endogenous. Other studies, such as Ramos (2003) argue that initial conditions
are less of a problem. In this study, we have considered initial conditions (i.e. the selection
in the pay level) exogenous as controlling for endogeneity would complicate our analysis.
Further research can elaborate on the possible bias that initial conditions may cause.
Country differences concerning the return to job change emerge in two points. Firstly,
the differences in wage returns from an external job change between low-paid, medium-paid
and high-paid workers are more pronounced in the UK than in Germany. In fact, the findings
for the UK are in accordance with the predictions of our on-the-job search model, as wage
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returns to an external job change decrease with the position in the wage distribution.18
Secondly, we found some evidence of positive returns to job changes in the internal labour
market only in the UK. We expected more returns to in-firm job changes in the UK than in
Germany. However, such country differences were found only for the low-paid workers.
Further research can shed more light on the alternative explanations of why people change
jobs. Devine and Kiefer (1991) suggest that empirical findings on the effect of job mobility on
wage mobility are contradicting because of heterogeneity in the reasons that drive individuals
to change jobs. This is particularly important for the high-paid workers. Our study suggests
that changing jobs does not, on average, result in higher hourly wages for this group of
workers. These workers are likely to benefit more often from bonus payments that are paid
on a yearly basis, or from other forms of fringe benefits.
18This was also verified by using quintiles of the wage distribution.
Chapter 5
How real is low-pay mobility?
5.1 Introduction
The issue of low-pay mobility is receiving increasing interest in economic and political de-
bate (OECD, 1996, 1997, 2003; Acemoglu, 2003b, 2003a). Low-pay mobility may have an
equalizing effect on the earnings of workers at the bottom of the wage distribution. The
higher the level of upward low-pay mobility in a country, the greater the chances low-paid
workers have of improving their earnings level. Previous research, using data from household
surveys, suggests that there is substantial year-to-year mobility, especially at the bottom of
the wage distribution. Using data from the BHPS, Stewart and Swaffield (1999) find that,
depending on the low-pay threshold used, between 29% and 48% of the British low paid
move to a higher earnings state within one year. Cappellari and Jenkins (2004b) conclude
from their analysis that the fraction of the British low-paid workers is 42.3% if we take into
account non-response and attrition. Similar percentages are found inseveral other studies
and for several other countries (see, for example, Cappellari, 2002). These studies show
that although there is a considerable state dependence in low pay, the average transition
probabilities are much higher than common sense would suggest.
A possible methodological explanation for these rather unexpected findings is that panel
surveys contain measurement error. Survey respondents may misreport their income and
interviewers do not always record the responses correctly, which can produce a substantial
amount of error in wage measurement. Using the SIPP dataset, Gottschalk (2005) argues
that two-thirds of the observed downward adjustments of nominal wages without a job
change are due to measurement error. When, as in the majority of economic studies on wages,
hourly wages are recorded instead of yearly earnings, measurement error may even be greater
(Rodgers et al., 1993). When these hourly wages are derived from annual, monthly or weekly
earnings, the amount of measurement error may be increased even more, as measurement
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error is introduced via two sources: wages and hours of work. In an investigation of the effect
of measurement error on poverty transitions in the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP),
Rendtel et al. (1998) conclude that approximately half of the observed transitions are due
to measurement error. Lollivier and Daniel (2002) corroborate this result for the European
Community Household Panel (ECHP). Despite the enormous bias that measurement error
can cause in the estimation of wage dynamics, most relevant studies ignore this phenomenon.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the bias that measurement error causes on tran-
sitions from low pay. For this purpose, we develop a panel regression model for low-pay
transitions that corrects for measurement error. To correct for measurement error we use
a Mixed Latent Markov model, advancing the approach of Rendtel et al. (1998). While
Rendtel et al control for measurement error in aggregate transition probabilities, we also
correct for observed and unobserved heterogeneity and moreover work with a much longer
time series. Using three panel surveys (BHPS, GSOEP, SEP) we determine which proportion
of the observed low-pay transitions are spurious. Furthermore, we examine how much bias
ignoring measurement error causes in the effects of certain determinants of wage mobility in
a panel regression model. We choose to focus on those determinants that can account for
a considerable upward or downward change in the wage, and can therefore cause a worker
to move from low pay to high pay or vice versa. Such determinants include labour market
events, such as a job change, a change of the employment contract type, or a considerable
change in working hours. We expect the effects of these determinants to be considerably
underestimated by measurement error. In our analysis, we distinguish between two earnings
states, low-paid and higher-paid, as well as the state of non-employment. For low pay, we
apply the most common definition: a low-paid worker is someone who earns less than two-
thirds of the median wage (OECD, 1996). Moreover, we test the sensitivity of our results to
alternative definitions of low pay.
Another novel aspect of this paper is that it investigates low-pay transitions in a cross-
country comparative perspective. Labour market institutions are believed to account for
differences in the opportunities and the risks that individuals face in the labour market
(Freeman & Katz, 1995; Blau & Kahn, 1996). In liberal-unregulated labour markets, such
as the UK, there is a much higher level of job and wage mobility than in regulated labour
markets, such as Germany. Countries combining protection of employment security with
flexibility in the labour market in terms of regulations enhancing job mobility, such as
the Netherlands, occupy an intermediate position. Investigating low-pay transitions that
are corrected for measurement error can be more informative concerning the real extent of
cross-country differences in low-pay mobility than by simply looking at observed transitions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 5.2 discusses further the implications
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of measurement error on wage mobility and reviews the previous approaches to correct for
it. Section 5.3 elaborates on the model we apply. The three datasets we use are presented in
section 5.4. In section 5.5, we discuss the results of our data analysis. These results consist
of a descriptive part, where the aggregate amount of measurement error is estimated as well
as an analytical part, where we discuss the effect of measurement error in low-pay transitions
on the parameter estimation of a multivariate panel regression model. Finally, section 5.6
contains the conclusions of our study..
5.2 Previous approaches on measurement error
An simple conclusion from the above-mentioned studies on measurement error could be that
income data from household surveys contain so much error that they are not worthy of being
used for the purpose of investigating earnings dynamics. However, as will be shown below,
this is not necessarily the case. Hagenaars (1990, 1994) shows that even small amounts of
classification error can lead to considerable bias in the estimation of transition matrices. As
a simple illustration, let us assume a fictitious transition matrix for a discrete variable X
with two categories and between two time points. We further assume that there is error in
the observation of the variable X. Instead of X1 and X2, we rather observe the states Y1
and Y2. The model for the joint distribution of Y1 and Y2 has the form of a Latent Class
model for two time points. More specifically, the joint distribution of the observed states Y1
and Y2 can be expressed as follows:
P (Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2) =
∑
Y1,Y2
[P (X1 = x1)P (X2 = x2|X1 = x1) (5.1)
P (Y1 = y1|X1 = x1)P (Y2 = y2|X2 = x2)] .
In the above probability expression P (X1 = x1) denotes the probability of being in the
latent (true) state x1 at the first time point and P (X2 = x2|X1 = x1) the probability of
being in the latent state x2 at the second time point, conditional on being in the latent state
x1 at the first time point. The other two terms refer to the relationship between the latent
and observed states, and represent the measurement error component. P (Y1 = y1|X1 = x1)
denotes the probability of observing the state y1 conditional on being in the latent (true)
state x1. The expected observed transition probability is:
P (Y2 = y2|Y1 = y1) =
P (Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2)
P (Y1 = y1)
=
P (Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2)∑
Y2
P (Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2)
. (5.2)
96 CHAPTER 5. HOW REAL IS LOW-PAY MOBILITY?
To illustrate the impact of measurement error, assume that P (X2 = x2|X1 = x1) = .05 for
x1 6= x2 and that P (Y1 = y1|X1 = x1) = P (Y2 = y1|X2 = x2) = .05 for y1 6= x1 and y2 6= x2.
Using equations (5.1) and (5.2) one can easily verify that the probability P (Y2 = y2|Y1 = y1)
for y1 6= y2 equals .136 . In other words, even a small amount of classification error (5%)
results in a large increase in the number of the observed transitions, here by a factor of 2.72
(13.6% observed versus 5% real transitions).
Measurement error does not only result in an overestimation of the aggregate number of
transitions, but may also have severe implications when trying to explain earnings dynam-
ics. When failing to control for classification error, the dependent variable in an earnings
transition model is full of noise. Therefore, the effect of covariates in such a model will,
most probably, be underestimated. This will happen even if these covariates are error-free.
Following Bound et al. (2001), let us assume a simple regression y = zβ + ǫ, with y mea-
sured with error v (y = y∗ + v, where y∗ is the true value of the dependent variable) and
v = δy + v∗, where v∗ is uncorrelated to z and ǫ. Then even if z is measured without error,
there is bias in the estimation of β, which is proportional to δ. Empirical findings, however,
are scarce and contradictory. Using the PSID validation study, Duncan and Hill (1985) find
that measurement error in log earnings attenuates the effect of tenure by 30% in a wage
regression.1 However, they do not find a significant effect on the coefficient for education
and labour market experience. Comparing data from the Current Population Survey and
the Social Security records, Bound and Krueger (1991) fail to find any significant bias in the
effects of education, experience, age or other covariates on log earnings. The detection of
this particular type of bias, however, is difficult since, in practice, these covariates are never
error-free. The error in these covariates can be correlated with the error in earnings causing
either an increase or decrease of the bias in the wage-regression coefficients.
The conclusion of the above-mentioned illustrations is that when using survey data to
investigate earnings transitions, the results can be severely affected by measurement error.
An obvious solution is to circumvent this issue by using error-free data. Many researchers
suggest that administrative records provide such data. Administrative records usually offer
larger sample sizes than panel surveys, and allow the matching of firms and workers. How-
ever, such datasets are available in only a few countries, and there are severe restrictions
regarding their accessibility. Moreover, subjective information on attitudes and preferences
that is useful in explaining employment behavior - and is therefore needed in labour market
research - is unavailable in administrative records. Thus, the use of panel surveys is some-
times preferable and tackling measurement error is unavoidable. Finally, some researchers
1The PSID validation study does not refer to the same individuals as in the original survey. It was in
fact conducted on a sample of employees from a large firm.
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suggest that administrative data are not necessarily error-free (Kapteyn & Ypma, 2005).
Indisputably, the optimal way to correct for measurement error is by using validation
or re-interview data. This approach does not require the use of strong assumptions about
the structure of the error. Pischke (1995), using the PSID validation study, suggests that
measurement error in PSID overstates annual earnings fluctuation by 20%-45%. Poterba and
Summers (1986) use the re-interview of the Current Population Survey to investigate the
effect of classification error in labour market dynamics. Nevertheless, although very useful,
validation studies are costly and therefore rarely available.
In the absence of a validation study, research has to rely on assumptions about the nature
of measurement error. The usual assumption made by economists is that measurement error
in wages is uncorrelated with either the true wage, the true value of all covariates, the
measurement error in these covariates, or with the disturbance terms. This type of error,
which is referred to as classical measurement error, reduces the efficiency, and biases the
regression estimates downwards (Bound et al., 2001). Classical measurement error is usually
tackled by instrumental variables estimation (see, for example, Lewbel, 1997). However, if
the assumption of classical measurement error is violated, IV estimation may increase instead
of reduce the relevant bias. And, indeed, this is often the case, as a number of studies find
that measurement error in earnings is mean reverting; that is, that measurement error in
earnings is negatively correlated with the observed value of earnings (Bound & Krueger,
1991; Bound et al., 1994; Bollinger, 1996). Moreover, in categorical variables measurement
error is always mean reverting, a simple illustration of which, using the case of a binary
response variable, is proposed by Bound et al. (2001). As in the current paper, we model
transitions across wage categories, the possible measurement error is mean reverting, thereby
making IV estimation inappropriate for our study.
An approach that is more suitable for the study of earnings transitions has also been
proposed by Rendtel et al. (1998). Rendtel et al. use a Latent Markov model with two
measurements of income to correct for measurement error in the German Socio-Economic
Panel (GSOEP). This approach is similar to several models dealing with classification error
in categorical variables (van de Pol & Langeheine, 1990; Vermunt et al., 1999; Bassi et al.,
2000; Paas et al., 2007). It is based essentially on the same idea as the model by Poterba
and Summers (1986, 1995) who assume a probabilistic relationship between the observed and
true states to estimate the true transitions. The difference between their approach and that
of Rendtel et al. is that the latter estimate this probabilistic relationship using longitudinal
information from a single sample rather than deriving this relationship from external data.
In this paper, we extend the approach of Rendtel et al. (1998) in two ways. Firstly, while
Rendtel et al. investigate the effect of measurement error on aggregate transition probabil-
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Figure 5.1: Path diagram for the Latent Markov model
ities, we add to the model correction for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Secondly,
because of our more efficient estimation algorithm, we are able to use many more panel
waves than Rendtel et al. did, yielding a much more realistic panel regression model.
5.3 A Mixed Latent Markov model
Specification of the model
Our aim is to control for measurement error in the year-to-year transitions from and to low
pay. This can be achieved with a Latent Markov model (van de Pol & Langeheine, 1990)
as depicted in Figure 5.1. According to this model, the true state Xit of an individual i at
a time point t cannot be observed; it is a latent state. We rather observe state Yit, which
might differ from the true (latent) state Xit. Yit and Xit are probabilistically related. The
observed states at different time points are mutually independent, conditional on the true
latent states. In other words, we assume that measurement error is not serially correlated
in any way. This means that the independent classification error (ICE) assumption is made
(Bassi et al., 2000).
The true state Xit follows a Markov process. Thus, the state of an individual i at time
point t, Xit, is independent of the state at time point t
′, Xit′ , where t
′ < t− 1, conditionally
on the state at t − 1, Xit−1. An arrow indicates a direct effect, for example of the state at
one time point on the state at the next time point. In our study, Xit and Yit are the true
and observed earnings state, respectively that are assumed to take on three values: low-paid,
higher-paid and non-employed.2
The joint probability of following a certain path over the T+1 time points can be specified
2It is obvious that our definition of earnings states includes a state where the individual has no income
from paid employment, the ‘other’ or non-employment state. For reasons of simplicity, however, we will refer
to these states as ‘earnings states’.
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as:
P (Yi = yi) =
3∑
x0=1
3∑
x2=1
...
3∑
xT=1
P (Xi0 = x0)
T∏
t=1
[P (Xit = xt|Xit−1 = xt−1 )]
T∏
t=0
P (Yit = yit|Xit = xt) , (5.3)
where i = 1, ..., I is the index for the individual, and t = 0, ..., T represents the time points.
The probability P (Yit = yit|Xit = xt) represents the measurement error. For identifica-
tion reasons, we restrict the probability of observing a state Yit conditional on the true state
Xit to be constant over time, so P (Yt−1 = s|Xt−1 = r) = P (Yt = s|Xt = r) for every t. With
these restrictions, the model is identified with at least three time points (Vermunt et al.,
1999).
Since controlling for heterogeneity in Markov models for income mobility is necessary
(Shorrocks, 1976), we control for observed time-constant and time-varying characteristics
in our Latent Markov model following the approach suggested by Vermunt et al. (1999).
Specifically, we allow the covariates Zit to affect the latent transition probabilities between
latent states Xit−1, Xit. These covariates are assumed to be uncorrelated to measurement
error. This assumption seems to be plausible, as Bound et al. (2001), in their survey
of studies on measurement error, found no consistent evidence that measurement error is
correlated with demographic or human capital characteristics, especially when restricting
the estimation to male workers.
The transition probabilities between earnings states can also be affected by unobserved
personal characteristics, such as ability and motivation. Failing to control for such unob-
servables may result in an overstatement of the effect of the observed covariates. In the
framework of Markov models, this is usually tackled in a non-parametric way by assuming
that individuals belong to different Markov chains. The simplest form of these models is
the mover-stayer model of Blumen et al. (1966), which assumes that the population can
be split into two groups with different Markov chains. In one chain (the ‘movers’ chain’),
transitions are unrestricted, while in the ‘stayers’ chain’ the transition probability from state
j in time point t− 1 to the state k in time point t is 1 if j = k and 0 otherwise. Other, more
complicated Mixed Markov models assume the existence of more than two chains and may
even allow for turnover between the chains (for an overview of these studies, see, van de Pol
& Langeheine, 1990).
We prefer to adopt a parametric approach of correcting for unobserved heterogeneity,
which makes our model similar to a random-effects panel regression. Specifically, we intro-
duce an individual-specific unobserved variable Fi that captures time-invariant individual
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effects. Fi is assumed to follow a normal distribution with a mean equal to 0 and a variance
equal to σF , which is a parameter to be estimated by the model (Fi ∼ N(0, σF )).
The joint probability of having a particular state path conditional on covariate values
can be expressed as:
P (Yi = yi|Zi) =
∫ 3∑
x0=1
3∑
x1=1
...
3∑
xT=1
P (Xi0 = x0|Zi1, Fi)
T∏
t=1
[P (Xit = xt|Xit−1 = xt−1, Zit, Fi)]
T∏
t=0
P (Yit = yit|Xit = xt)f(Fi)dFi , (5.4)
where f(Fi) is the density function for the individual effects Fi.
We should stress here that our Mixed Latent Markov model still relies on the Markov
assumption; that is, the state of an individual i at time point t, Xit, is independent of the
state at time point t′, Xit′ , where t
′ < t− 1, conditional on the state at t− 1, Xit−1, but also
on the individual’s value of the covariates Zit and the time-constant unobserved individual
effects Fi.
Does the model really detect the true transitions?
Since our approach is not based on validation data, the question that emerges is how well
the Mixed Latent Markov model can distinguish true transitions from spurious transitions.
What the model actually does is derive from the longitudinal information for all individuals
a pattern of ‘regular transition behaviour’ for individuals belonging to state x (Vermunt,
2004). A spurious transition results in a violation of the first-order Markov process. For
example, let us assume that an individual being truly low paid from t− 1 until t+1 reports
mistakenly that he is in higher pay in t. This means that we observe a transition from
low to higher pay from t − 1 to t and another transition from higher to low pay from t to
t + 1. If patterns like this are common in the data, the state at t − 1 will determine the
state in t + 1, which is a deviation from the first-order Markov model. Our model will,
therefore, consider a large part of these transitions as spurious and filter them out as serially
uncorrelated measurement error. Measurement error is the mechanism that most probably
produces such transitions. However, can it also be the case that there is a true second-order
Markov process determining low-pay transitions?
In the above-mentioned example, the individual may truly move from low to higher pay
from t− 1 to t and return to low pay from t to t+ 1. A possible reason for such a true but
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unexpected transition could be a one-time bonus from his employer or just the fact that the
position of the worker in the wage distribution in t− 1 was so close to the low-pay threshold
that a small overall change in the distribution moves him above this threshold in t. In this
case, our model regards his transition from low pay to higher pay and back again to low pay
as spurious.
The obvious result of this is that our model, as well as other similar models, may slightly
overestimate the amount of measurement error, as it cannot distinguish between measure-
ment error and true random transitions. From a policy perspective, however, this is not
necessarily bad. Economic research is interested in distinguishing the permanent from the
transitory component of income. Accordingly, our model does not only filter out measure-
ment error but may also remove the transitory moves from the earnings states. Thus, the
‘true’ transitions we estimate are the transitions between the states xj and xk when accom-
panied by a change in transition ‘behavior’; from the transition ‘behaviour’ corresponding
to individuals in state xj to the transition ‘behaviour’ of individuals in state xk.
Parameter estimation
The estimates for the parameters of our model are obtained by means of maximum likelihood.
Specifically, we use a variant of the well-known Expected Maximization (EM) algorithm
(Dempster et al., 1977), which switches between an E step and a M step until it achieves
convergence. The E-step of the EM algorithm involves computing the expected value of
the complete data log-likelihood or, more intuitively, filling in the missing data (here the
unobserved class memberships and the unobserved random effects) with their expected values
given the current parameter values and the observed data. In the M step, standard estimation
methods are used to update the model parameter such that the expected complete data log-
likelihood is maximized. In our case the M step involves using the filled-in expected values
as though these were observed data in logistic regression analysis. The E and M steps cycle
until a certain converge criterion is reached.
The relevant variant of EM, which is called the forward-backward or Baum-Welch algo-
rithm, is implemented in the recent syntax version of the statistical software LatentGOLD
(Vermunt & Magidson, 2007). The standard EM algorithm cannot be applied for Latent
Markov models for many time points T , as the time and storage needed for computation
increases exponentially with T (Vermunt et al., 1999). The extended version of the forward-
backward algorithm we applied supports multivariate analysis and control for unobserved
heterogeneity, features that are required for our analysis. Details on this algorithm can be
found in Vermunt et al. (2007).
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5.4 Data and main concepts
The study uses data for the period 1991-2004 from three national panel datasets. For the
UK, we use waves 1 to 14 of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) (Taylor et al.,
2006), covering the years 1991-2004. For Germany, we make use of 14 waves of the German
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) (Wagner et al., 1993), which cover the period 1991-2004.
For the Netherlands, our data come from the Socio-Economic Panel (SEP) (CBS, 1991). We
make use of the last 12 waves of the panel, covering the years 1991-2002. The information
from the three datasets has been made highly comparable for the purpose of this study3.
In the light of the discussion in section 5.3, we compare these three countries with respect
to the amount of ‘permanent’ low-pay transitions. In the liberal-unregulated labour market
of the UK, individuals are supposed to experience a higher level of wage mobility than
in both the semi-regulated Dutch labour market and the highly regulated German labour
market. A model that does not control for measurement error may over- or underestimate
cross-country differences due to possible differences in the amount and type of error between
the three national datasets.
Since we focus on earnings transitions of employed individuals, our sample consists of
prime age males (aged 25-55). We restrict our sample to males in order to avoid the problem
of endogeneity of female labour supply. Our main economic variable is the earnings state of
the individual, defined as the level of the hourly wage. Since there is no direct information
available on an individual’s hourly wage, this is computed by dividing the total gross annual
earnings from paid employment by the total amount of the annual hours worked. As in
the SEP and the GSOEP, only retrospective wage information is available, the wage in t is
derived from wave t + 1. We define two real earnings states, low paid and higher paid, as
well as an ‘other’ (non-employment) state.
Only individuals reporting paid employment as their main employment status are clas-
sified in one of the two earnings states. The self-employed are clustered in the ‘other’ state
(non-employment state). Individuals who are in education or in apprenticeship - especially
relevant for Germany - are also classified as non-employed. This ‘other’ state is very het-
erogeneous implying that transitions to and from ‘other’ cannot be expected to have a clear
interpretation. However, the inclusion of such a state in our dependent variable is important
from both a substantial and methodological point of view. Several studies, such as Cappel-
lari and Jenkins (2004a) and Stewart (2007) show that transitions to non-employment are
common for low-paid workers. Moreover, ignoring the non-employment state would make it
impossible to define a Latent Markov model as the latent states should not only be mutually
3The BHPS data were made available by the Data Archive at Essex University. The GSOEP was provided
by the German Institute for Economic Research. The SEP was made accessible by Statistics Netherlands.
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Table 5.1: Model comparison
UK Netherlands Germany
Log BIC Log BIC Log BIC
Model Likelihood (log lik.) Likelihood (log lik.) Likelihood (log lik.)
1. Markov -25,139.7 50,351.1 -15,868.8 31,805.4 -24,133.0 48,338.6
2. Latent Markov (LM) -23,979.7 48,085.0 -15,262.2 30,643.2 -23,327.2 46,781.5
3. Markov with covariates -23,723.5 48,272.5 -15,501.4 31,630.4 -16,543.9 34,195.7
4. LM with covariates -22,790.3 46,459.9 -14,968.0 30,614.3 -16,238.7 33,639.9
5. Mixed Markov with covariates -23,040.8 46,943.0 -15,172.3 31,006.1 -16,272.5 33,689.3
6. Mixed Latent Markov with covariates -22,528.9 45,973.1 -14,941.2 30,594.7 -16,055.9 33,310.6
exclusive but also exhaustive.
Each individual is included in the analysis from the time point he first enters the survey.
Using maximum likelihood estimation with missing data, we deal with the fact that at
some occasions information for the earnings state of the individual may be missing, due to
non-response or temporary attrition. This approach does not cause any bias as long as non-
response is random conditionally on observed values, that is, as long as the missing data is
missing at random (MAR). Missing values in covariates were imputed by interpolation when
possible.4 The remaining missing values were imputed by the mean of the relevant variable.
5.5 Measurement error and its effect
Descriptive part
In total, we applied six versions of the model described by equations (5.3) and (5.4); namely,
a first-order Markov model, a Latent Markov model, a first-order Markov model with co-
variates, a Latent Markov model with covariates, a first-order Markov model with covariates
controlling for unobservables (Mixed Markov model) and finally a Mixed Latent Markov
model correcting for both measurement error and for observed and unobserved heterogene-
ity. The Log-Likelihood values and the BIC values for these models are reported in Table
5.1. This Table shows that Model 2 fits the data considerable better than Model 1, Model
4 better than Model 3 and Model 6 better than Model 5. This indicates that correcting
for measurement error is important, regardless of whether we control for observed and un-
observed heterogeneity. Also controlling for observed characteristics improves the fit of the
4For example if the individual reported ‘higher education’ in t− 1 and t+1, and the value for education
was missing for t we imputed the value for education in t as being ‘higher education’.
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Table 5.2: The size of the measurement error
UK Germany
Observed state Observed state
low high other low higher other
Latent
state
low 0.658 0.259 0.083 low 0.694 0.272 0.034
(0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.016) (0.016) (0.006)
higher 0.013 0.972 0.016 higher 0.004 0.995 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
other 0.009 0.007 0.984 other 0.000 0.004 0.996
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Netherlands
Observed state
low higher other
Latent
state
low 0.619 0.246 0.135
(0.025) (0.020) (0.024)
higher 0.007 0.944 0.049
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
other 0.009 0.006 0.985
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
model, as can be seen by comparing the fit of either Models 1 and 3 or Models 2 and 4.
Correcting for unobservables improves further the fit of the model (comparison of Models 3
and 5, and Models 4 and 6), but there is one exception. When correction for measurement
error is applied, the introduction of a random effects term for the unobservables no longer
improves substantially the fit of the model for the Netherlands (comparison of Models 4 and
6). This means that whereas correction for measurement error explains a large part of the
effect of the unobserved factors on earnings mobility, such as ability and effort, the term for
the unobservables is unable to capture the full effect of measurement error.
A question we wish to answer is how much classification error exists in earnings states.
The amount of measurement error can be derived from the estimated values the probabilities
P (Yit = yit|Xit = xt) that are presented in Table 5.2. These estimates indicate that there is
a large amount of classification error for the low-paid workers in all three countries. In the
Netherlands, 38.1% of the low-paid workers are misclassified into another state, while in the
UK this figure is 34.2%, and in Germany 30.6%. In all three countries, the misclassification
of low-paid workers is more likely to be into the higher earnings state than into the other
(non-employment) state, which shows that many workers that are truly low paid are observed
to have earnings above the low-pay threshold.
Measurement error for workers who are truly in the higher-paid and non-employment
states is considerably lower than in the low-paid state. In the three countries under scrutiny,
it ranges between 0.5% and 5.6% for the higher paid and between 0.4% and 1.6% for the
non-employed.
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Table 5.3: Observed and latent transitions
Observed transitions Latent transitions
United Kingdom
State in t State in t
low higher other low higher other
State
in t − 1
low 0.499 0.371 0.130 low 0.793 0.152 0.055
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.005)
higher 0.046 0.883 0.071 higher 0.010 0.964 0.026
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
other 0.052 0.116 0.832 other 0.042 0.031 0.928
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Netherlands
State in t State in t
low higher other low higher other
State
in t − 1
low 0.413 0.375 0.212 low 0.798 0.142 0.060
(0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013) (0.009)
higher 0.022 0.868 0.110 higher 0.005 0.984 0.012
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
other 0.048 0.139 0.813 other 0.044 0.027 0.930
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Germany
State in t State in t
low higher other low higher other
State
in t − 1
low 0.427 0.407 0.166 low 0.751 0.168 0.081
(0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008)
higher 0.026 0.933 0.041 higher 0.008 0.967 0.025
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
other 0.067 0.110 0.824 other 0.059 0.043 0.898
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Note: The observed transitions are estimated with the first-order Markov model. The latent transitions
are estimated with the MLM model. The reference person in the MLM model is a person having the
‘average’ characteristics. The covariates included in the MLM model are calendar time, age, education,
labour market experience (not available in the Netherlands) and the Gini coefficient.
The implication of controlling for possible classification errors on the estimates of the
transition probabilities between earnings states is illustrated in Table 5.3. The left panel of
the table shows the observed transitions while the right panel shows the true (i.e. latent)
transitions. Observed transitions represent the estimated transitions from the simple first-
order Markov model (Model 1), and latent transitions denote the estimated transitions from
the Latent Markov model without covariates (Model 2). The former are thus transitions
that are ‘contaminated’ by measurement error while the latter are ‘error-free’. Verifying
the findings of previous research, we find that low-pay transitions are considerably less than
originally thought. More specifically, we find that observed transitions from low to higher
pay are overestimated by a factor of 2.4 - 2.6. Without controlling for measurement error,
37.1% of British low-paid workers increase their earnings above the low-pay threshold in
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a one-year period. This fraction of year-to-year movers drops to 15.2% when we control
for measurement error. Results for the other two countries are similar. The ‘true’ amount
of transitions from low to higher pay in Germany is 16.8% and not 40.7% as the ‘error-
contaminated’ model suggests. In the Netherlands, the true low-to-high pay transitions are
even less frequent: 14.2% compared to 37.5% as estimated by the first-order Markov model.
In all three countries, the transitions from higher to low pay are also severely overesti-
mated. Although the transition probabilities are much lower than those from low pay, the
fraction of spurious transitions is larger. More specifically, in the UK, these transitions are
overestimated by a factor of 4.6, in the Netherlands by 4.4, and in Germany by 3.6.
Interesting cross-country differences emerge from Table 5.3. In accordance with Pavlopou-
los and Fouarge (2006), the smallest low-to-higher pay transition probability among the three
countries under scrutiny is found for the Netherlands. Although, this country is the most
egalitarian in terms of wage inequality, it presents the largest persistence in low pay. The
highest transition probability from low to higher pay is found in Germany.
A sensitivity analysis
The analysis we performed until now was based on a low-pay threshold equal to two-thirds
of the median wage. However, the OECD (1996) suggests that both the incidence of low pay
within a country and the ranking of countries with respect to low-pay incidence are sensitive
to the choice of the low-pay threshold. To check whether our results are also sensitive to
this choice, we repeated the same analysis with different low-pay thresholds. We restrict
our tests to relative measures of low pay as these are more appropriate for cross-country
comparisons than absolute measures (Fo¨rster, 1994). More specifically, instead of two-thirds
of the median wage as low-pay thresholds, we use 50% and 40% of the median hourly wage
as well as the 25th percentile of the hourly wage distribution. The 50% of the median is
a measure used often by EUROSTAT, while the 40% of the median is a level close to the
UK poverty line derived from the Supplementary Benefit scale. The 25th percentile of the
wage distribution provides a purely relative threshold assuming that the fraction of low-paid
workers is constant across time points. Figure 5.1 shows that moving the low-pay threshold
from two-thirds of the median to the 50% of the median results in a considerable reduction
in the proportion of the low paid in all three countries. The elasticity of the proportion of
low paid with respect to the percentage of the median at which the low-paid threshold is set
equals 1.095 in the UK, 0.845 in Germany and 0.595 in the Netherlands.5 This means that
the percentage of low-paid workers is most sensitive to the low-pay threshold in the UK, and
5These elasticities are calculated for values close to 66% of the median.
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least sensitive in the Netherlands.
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of the hourly wage for male workers aged 16-55 and for the year
2000.
Table 5.4 presents the main findings from the analysis using each of these alternative
definitions of low pay, where we concentrate on transitions from low pay. As can be seen, the
lower the percentage of the median at which the threshold is set, the higher the transition rate
out of low pay. The ranking of countries with respect to the low-pay transition probability
remains unchanged when we consider the aggregate transition probability from low pay.
However, if we focus on transitions from low to higher pay, the transition probability is the
highest in the UK when we apply the thresholds of 40% or 50% of the median, whereas it is
highest for Germany with the higher threshold. It seems, therefore, that the liberal British
labour market ensures slightly higher mobility rates to workers that are at the very low end
of the wage distribution than is the case for the highly regulated German labour market.
Since the wage distribution of the UK is more left-skewed than the German distribution,
the average distance from the low-pay threshold is much larger in the UK than in Germany,
which makes crossing the threshold much more difficult for the British low-paid workers
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Table 5.4: Sensitivity of low-pay transitions to the low-pay threshold
UK Netherlands Germany
low higher other low higher other low higher other
2/3 of the
median
0.793 0.152 0.055 0.798 0.142 0.060 0.751 0.168 0.081
(0.010) (0.009) (0.005) (0.015) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008)
50% of the
median
0.728 0.203 0.069 0.776 0.159 0.065 0.714 0.190 0.096
(0.016) (0.014) (0.008) (0.031) (0.027) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012)
40% of the
median
0.704 0.208 0.088 0.749 0.176 0.075 0.689 0.199 0.112
(0.023) (0.019) (0.016) (0.045) (0.042) (0.022) (0.023) (0.020) (0.017)
25th
percentile
0.857 0.100 0.043 0.868 0.104 0.028 0.844 0.100 0.056
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Note: These transition probabilities are estimated using separate Latent Markov models, each time by using a different
low pay threshold. Here we only present the transition probabilities from low pay.
than for the German ones. When we apply a lower threshold, the average distance from the
threshold in the UK is decreased and low-pay transition probabilities increase considerably.
Again, the lowest low-pay transition probabilities are found in the Netherlands.
Analytical part
As a next step in our analysis we assess the impact of classification errors in the earnings
state on the estimated covariate effects of our panel-regression model. For this purpose, we
compare the estimates from Model 5 and Model 6. The main variables of interest are labour
market events that can potentially account for a considerable wage change, and can therefore
cause a transition from low to higher pay or vice versa. These event variables are a change
of employer, an occurrence of formal training, a transition from a temporary employment
contract to a permanent one, or vice versa, and a transition from part-time employment
to full-time employment, or vice versa. We also investigate the effect of the life events of
marriage and divorce. Our control variables are calendar time, age, education, and labour
market experience. To make cross-country comparisons in low-pay transition probabilities
possible, we need to account for the different structure of the wage distribution in different
countries. This is accounted for by using the Gini coefficient for wage inequality as a control
variable.
One commonly-used specification is to allow covariates to affect the probability of being
in a certain state at a time point t. We use another more flexible specification in which
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covariates have an effect on making a particular type of transition. For example, our model
estimates the effect of a job change on making a transition from low pay to higher pay
rather than ‘just’ estimating the effect of this covariate on being in low pay. The statistical
significance of the difference between the estimate of each covariate effect in the ‘error-
contaminated’ model (Model 5) and the ‘error-free’ model (Model 6) is assessed using a
Hausman test.
We first discuss the estimates from Model 6, the ‘error-free’ model. Table 5.5 shows that
different events account for low-pay transitions in different countries. Job-related training
has a positive effect on the probability of a low-to-higher pay transition in the UK and in
the Netherlands, while it has no effect in Germany.6 In the UK, a job change increases the
probability for a low-to-higher pay transition. However, this is not the case in Germany.
The latter finding for Germany seems to contradict the findings of Pavlopoulos et al. (2007)
that show that a job change can produce significant wage gains for low-paid workers. These
differences may be due to two factors: firstly, in the two studies wage mobility is modelled
in a different way. Pavlopoulos et al. model absolute wage growth, while in this study we
model the probability of moving from low pay to high pay and vice versa. Secondly, the
samples in the two studies are different. Pavlopoulos et al. consider only full-time workers,
while here, we include in our sample both full-time and part-time workers. Furthermore, in
both the UK and Germany, a job change increases the probability of moving from higher to
low pay.
Changes in the employment contract type do not account for low-pay transitions in
the UK or the Netherlands. The only significant finding is that a shift from permanent to
temporary employment increases the probability of a higher-to-low pay transition in the UK.
The findings for these two countries are not surprising, as in neither of them is a temporary
contract a characteristic of a ‘bad’ job. Since in the British labour market employment
protection for both permanent and temporary workers is low, both types of employment
have the same status with respect to job quality. The Dutch labour market is also featured
with a high level of flexibility, which in turn produces a high level of occupational mobility
(Muffels & Luijkx, 2006). We should stress here, however, that in the Netherlands, changes
of the employment contract and shifts from part-time to full-time employment, or vice versa,
may also have captured the effects of a job change, as in this country we did not include a
relevant variable due to data artifacts.
The picture for Germany differs considerably from the UK and the Netherlands. A
shift from temporary to permanent employment increases the probability of a low-paid to
6Our variable for training does not include apprenticeship. In Germany, apprenticeship is included as a
control variable. Our results show that having apprenticeship qualifications increases the probability of a
low-paid to higher-paid transition. Since our focus is on events, we do not present these results here.
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Table 5.5: Results from the Mixed Latent Markov model
The UK The Netherlands Germany
Origin Destination no ME with ME Difference no ME with ME Difference no ME with ME Difference
state state correction correction correction correction correction correction
Marriage
Low Higher 0.229 0.349 -0.047 0.252 0.093 0.384
Low Other -0.648 -0.864 0.059 0.430 -0.382 -0.067
Higher Low -0.245 -1.384 0.054 1.357∗ -0.199 -0.068
Divorce
Low Higher -0.454 -1.486 -0.703 0.144 0.771 0.698
Low Other 0.347 0.529 -4.583 -4.258 -1.457 -2.282
Higher Low 0.186 0.041 0.493 -1.806 -0.692 -4.497
Training
Low Higher 0.184 0.387∗∗ 52.3%∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗ 0.909∗∗∗ 36.3%∗∗∗ -1.332∗∗∗ -0.801 -66.3%∗∗∗
Low Other -0.327∗∗ -0.544∗∗ 40.0%∗∗∗ -0.075 -0.300 0.580 4.210∗∗∗ 86.2%∗∗
Higher Low -0.296∗∗∗ -0.414∗∗ 28.5%∗∗∗ -0.107 -0.300 1.336∗∗∗ 1.236∗∗∗ -8.1%
Job change
Low Higher -0.058 0.255∗∗ 122.9%∗∗∗ 0.232 0.075
Low Other - - - -
¯
Higher Low 0.811∗∗∗ 1.545∗∗∗ 47.5%∗∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ 43.9%∗∗∗
Temporary to
permanent
contract
Low Higher 0.136 -0.406 -0.390 0.178 0.457∗ 0.644∗∗ 29.1%∗∗∗
Low Other - - - - -
Higher Low 0.461 -0.027 -0.037 -3.514 -0.430∗ -1.222∗∗∗ 64.8%∗∗∗
Permanent to
temporary
contract
Low Higher -0.014 0.348 0.827∗∗∗ 0.401 -106.5%∗∗∗ -0.592∗∗ -0.293 -102.1%∗∗∗
Low Other - - - - - -
Higher Low 0.569∗ 1.548∗∗∗ 63.3%∗∗∗ -0.343 -0.830 0.861∗∗∗ 1.357∗∗∗ 36.5%∗∗∗
Full to part
time work
Low Higher -0.337 -0.976 -0.026 -0.075 -0.301 -0.770
Low Other - - - - -
Higher Low 0.493 2.290∗∗∗ 78.5%∗∗∗ 0.944∗∗∗ 2.877∗∗∗ 67.2%∗∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗ 1.148∗∗∗ 43.7%∗∗∗
Part to full
time work
Low Higher -0.322 0.063 0.037 0.606 -0.203 0.085
Low Other - - - - - -
Higher Low 1.107∗∗∗ 2.509∗∗∗ 55.9%∗∗∗ 0.767∗∗ 2.934∗∗∗ 73.8%∗∗∗ 1.321∗∗∗ 2.287∗∗∗ 42.2%∗∗∗
Unobserved
heterogeneity
Higher 1.605∗∗∗ -1.953∗∗∗ 182.2%∗∗∗ -1.723∗∗∗ -0.219 -687.3%∗∗∗ -1.508∗∗∗ -0.570∗∗∗ -164.8%∗∗∗
Other -0.401∗∗∗ -0.098 -308.7%∗∗∗ -0.384∗∗∗ 1.371∗∗∗ 128.0%∗∗∗ -0.373∗∗∗ -2.580∗∗∗ 85.5%∗∗∗
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The dependent variable is the earnings state. It takes three values: low pay, higher pay and other. Transitions between all states are modelled. However, here we only present the estimates on
the transitions from low to higher pay, from low to the ‘other’ state and from higher to low pay. The control variables are calendar time, age, education, labour market experience and the Gini
coefficient.
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higher-pay transition and decreases the probability of a higher-paid to low-paid transition.
The reverse shift from permanent to temporary employment increases the probability of a
higher-paid to low-paid transition. Again, this is not surprising, as temporary employment
in Germany holds a much lower status than in the UK and the Netherlands. The German
labour market is a typical ‘insiders’ labour market, where workers in the primary segment
enjoy a high level of employment protection and higher wages, while their colleagues in the
secondary segment are much less protected and much more exposed to low pay (Blossfeld,
2001). A shift from temporary to permanent employment is likely to represent a move from
the secondary segment to the primary segment of the labour market.
A shift from full-time to part-time employment or vice versa is also an important deter-
minant of low-pay transitions. A common finding for all three countries emerges: there is
no significant effect on transitions from low to higher pay from a change from full-time to
part-time employment. Moreover, in all three countries, such a shift increases the probability
of a transition from higher to low pay. This results is plausible, as a shift from full-time to
part-time employment may be accompanied by a demotion or a shift to a job that is less
important for the firm. We would expect this effect to be stronger in countries such as Ger-
many, where part-time employment is uncommon and therefore holds a low status, than in
countries such as the UK and the Netherlands, where part-time employment is widespread.
Nevertheless, the estimated effects are large and significant in all three countries.
The reverse shift, from part-time to full-time employment also increases the probability
of a transition from higher to low pay. This result is definitely counter-intuitive. In countries
where part-time work holds a considerably low status, such as Germany, we would expect
shifts from part-time to full-time employment to have a positive effect on the low-to-higher
pay transition probability. On the contrary, in countries where part-time employment is
not an indicator of job quality, such as the UK and the Netherlands, we would expect to
find smaller effects than in Germany. However, these expectations are not supported by
our findings. An explanation for this could be a possible correlation between the error
in the dependent variable and the relevant covariate. Working hours is used both for the
construction of our dependent variable (i.e. the earnings state) and for the definition of a
dummy for a full-time to part-time shift as well as for a part-time to full-time shift. Therefore,
any error in the measurement of the number of working hours affects both variables.
As far as the expected impact of correcting for measurement error is concerned, the
findings in Table 5.5 are in accordance with our expectations. Comparing the estimates of
Models 5 and 6 shows that many covariate effects are attenuated when not controlling for
measurement error. For example, the effect of job change on the transition from higher to
low paid in the UK is underestimated by 47.5%. The effect of training on the transition from
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low to higher pay in the Netherlands is underestimated by 36.3%. However, in some cases
covariate effects are overestimated when measurement error is not controlled for. The effect
of training on the transition from low to higher pay in Germany in overestimated by 66.3%.
We should remember here that the difference in the sizes of the covariate effects between
Models 5 and 6 may also represent processes other than just correction for measurement
error in the dependent variable. If there is error in the measurement of the covariates, then
this error might be correlated with the error in the dependent variable. In this case, what
is being measured is a combination of two processes: the attenuation of the effect of the
covariate due to the classification error in the earnings state, and the ambiguous effect of
the correlation of the errors in the dependent and the independent variable.
In most cases, however, the effect of the covariates is strengthened when correcting for
measurement error. Therefore, controlling for classification error in the earnings state is
necessary in order to obtain correct (or at least more correct) estimates of the covariates.
5.6 Conclusions
In this study, we investigated the effect of measurement error on observed low-pay transi-
tions in survey data. Compared to previous approaches, the advantage of our method is
that it does not require the use of validation or re-interview data. It is instead based on
longitudinal information on a single measure of income - the hourly wage. As in all relevant
studies without validation data, correction for measurement error requires making certain
assumptions. Classification error was assumed to be serially uncorrelated as well as indepen-
dent of the covariates. Although these assumptions might sound daring, no clear evidence
against their validity exists. While our approach cannot distinguish between measurement
error and certain other forms of randomness in earnings transitions, it is quite powerful when
one is interested in investigating the ‘permanent transition behavior’ of individuals, which
is what is of main interest from a policy perspective.
Our Mixed Latent Markov model was applied to survey data from the UK, Germany
and the Netherlands. Controlling for measurement error is found to be necessary in order
to produce robust estimates of low-pay transitions. Low-wage mobility is considerably lower
than originally thought. Whereas descriptive statistics from household surveys show that
at least one third of low-paid workers increase their earnings above the low-pay threshold
within one year, our study indicates that the true year-to-year upward mobility for the low
paid is no greater than 17%.
Correcting for measurement error also allowed us to estimate the ‘true’ cross-country
differences in low-pay mobility. In all three countries, a considerable amount of low-pay
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persistence emerges. Furthermore, the ranking of countries with respect to this persistence
is rather surprising. Probably the most unexpected finding concerns the position of the
Netherlands. In this country, we found the lowest proportion of low-paid workers among all
three countries. However, in the Netherlands the low-paid workers have the lowest probability
of improving their earnings status of all three countries. It is evident, therefore, that although
low pay is less common in the Netherlands than in the UK and in Germany, the combination
of job security with flexibility that characterizes the Dutch labour market does not ensure
good prospects for the low-paid workers. The liberal labour market of the UK performs
somewhat better with respect to low-pay transition probabilities than the Dutch labour
market. However, it seems that the high levels of job mobility in the UK do not ensure
sufficient upward mobility opportunities for the workers in the lowest part of the distribution.
According to the most commonly-used low-pay threshold (i.e. two-thirds of the median wage)
the highest low-pay mobility levels are found in the regulated labour market of Germany.
Mobility rates in the UK and in Germany become similar (although slightly higher in the
UK) if we move the threshold further towards the lower end of the wage distribution.
Moreover, we investigated the amount of bias that classification error may cause in the
estimates of a panel-regression model for low-pay transitions. Our main finding was that
most of the effects of labour market events - job change, training, shift from temporary
to permanent employment, from part-time to full-time employment and vice versa - are
considerably attenuated due to measurement error. These events can indeed account for
low-pay transitions. However, their effect varies between countries.
An extension of this study may concern relaxing the first-order Markov assumption.
Several studies, such as Shorrocks (1976) and Lillard and Willis (1978), suggest that higher
order processes determine income mobility. According to these studies, the higher order
processes are caused by heterogeneity and unobserved serial correlation. Measurement error
is another source for such higher order processes. Most of these problems of the first-order
Markov model were tackled in this paper. Nevertheless, investigating the existence of further
higher order dependencies may be useful in explaining wage mobility.
The applicability of the method described is not restricted to earnings dynamics. The
study of employment transitions is the first obvious candidate for such an approach. Further-
more, the effect of measurement error on low-pay mobility has not been fully explored in this
study. More specifically, we were not able to distinguish spurious transitions from certain
forms of random - but true - transitions. Combining data sources for earnings - panel survey
and administrative sources - may help us identify measurement error. Another interesting
challenge for further research is to combine the correction method for measurement error
provided by this paper with the correction for the endogeneity of initial conditions, non-
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response and attrition suggested by other studies on income dynamics (Stewart & Swaffield,
1999; Cappellari & Jenkins, 2004b).
Appendix: Description of the variables
Calendar time: We use dummies for every year. For the UK, this varies between 1991 and
2004, for Germany between 1991 and 2004 and for the Netherlands between 1991 and 2002.
Gini coefficient: This is the Gini coefficient for the male hourly wages. It is calculated on
a yearly basis.
Education: This is the highest educational level completed by the individual. It can take
three values, lower than high school, high school and higher education.
Training: It takes the value 1 when the individual received formal training during the year
prior to the survey and 0 in all other cases.
Labour market experience: Measured in months. This is available only for the UK and
for Germany. It is constructed by combining data from the yearly files and the employment
history files of BHPS and GSOEP.
Age: Measured in years.
Marriage: It takes the value 1 when the individual became legally married during the year
prior to the survey and 0 in all other cases.
Divorce: It takes the value 1 when the individual got a divorce during the year prior to the
survey and 0 in all other cases.
Job change: It takes the value 1 when the individual changed an employer during the year
prior to the survey and 0 in all other cases. It also takes the value 0 when the individual
moves from or to non-employment as well as when he remains in non-employment. This
variable was not included for the Netherlands.
Temporary to permanent: It takes the value 1 when the individual reported being em-
ployed with a temporary contract in t − 1 and being employed with a permanent contract
in t and 0 in all other cases. It also takes the value 0 when the individual moves from or to
non-employment as well as when he remains in non-employment.
Permanent to temporary: It takes the value 1 when the individual reported being em-
ployed with a permanent contract in t − 1 and being employed with a temporary contract
in t and 0 in all other cases. It also takes the value 0 when the individual moves from or to
non-employment as well as when he remains in non-employment.
Part-time to full-time: It takes the value 1 when the individual reported being employed
part-time in t−1 and being employed full-time in t and 0 in all other cases. It also takes the
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value 0 when the individual moves from or to non-employment as well as when he remains
in non-employment.
Full-time to part-time: It takes the value 1 when the individual reported being employed
part-time in t−1 and being employed full-time in t and 0 in all other cases. It also takes the
value 0 when the individual moves from or to non-employment as well as when he remains
in non-employment.
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Chapter 6
Wage Mobility: Summary and
Discussion
The aim of this thesis was to investigate wage mobility at the micro level and at the macro- or
cross-country level. At the micro level we examined the extent to which people move between
the different parts of the wage distribution and the factors that determine these moves. In
addition, we studied whether the factors that determine wage mobility are different across
the various parts of the wage distribution. Special attention was paid to the wage mobility
patterns of individuals at the lowest part of the distribution. At the macro level, our aim was
to investigate the effect of labour market institutions on wage mobility. As our focus was on
wage mobility at the micro and macro levels we applied a multilevel approach. In addition to
exploring individual and cross-country differences in wage dynamics, we studied whether the
determinants of wage mobility at the individual level vary across countries having different
institutional characteristics. In other words, we investigated whether and how individual
and institutional characteristics interact in the way they affect wage dynamics.
More specifically, in Chapter 1, we raised five research questions that we tackled in this
thesis:
Research question 1: Is wage mobility different for the various parts of the wage
distribution?
This question was tackled in Chapters 2, 4 and 5. In Chapter 2, we modelled the full set
of origin states - deciles - in the wage distribution using a flexible multinomial logit model
that applied restrictions that are common in log-linear analysis. Our study contributes to
our knowledge on the effect of the origin state on wage mobility, as previous studies were
mostly descriptive and did not provide a formal test of the differences in the wage dynamics
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between the various parts of the distribution. Wage mobility was defined here by the year-
to-year changes in the decile position in the wage distribution. In Chapter 2 we established
that year-to-year positional mobility varies considerably across the different parts of the
wage distribution. We found low mobility levels in both the bottom and the top of the
distribution, and somewhat higher mobility levels in the middle of the distribution. This
result is in accordance with the descriptive findings of previous research. In Chapters 4 and
5, we investigated whether the returns to certain labour market events are different across the
various parts of the wage distribution. Chapter 4 examined the relationship between wage
mobility and job change, and distinguished between low-paid, medium-paid and high-paid
workers. In this chapter, it was shown that the low-paid worker gains a higher increase of his
wage from a job change - as a percentage of his initial wage - than the high-paid worker. On
average, the low-paid external mover (in the UK) enjoys a 6.7% higher wage growth than the
low-paid stayer, or (in Germany) a 6.3% higher wage growth than the low-paid stayer. The
wage growth of the high-paid external mover is, on average, the same (in Germany) or even
lower (in the UK) than the wage growth of the high-paid stayer. Chapter 5 investigated
the wage returns of several labour market events: a job change, an employment contract
change and a shift from part-time to full-time employment and vice versa. In this chapter,
we distinguished between low-paid and higher-paid workers, and we modelled the transition
probability between these two states, while controlling for transitions to non-employment.
As far as the event of a job change is concerned, the main results of Chapter 4 and Chapter
5 are similar. In both chapters, we find that the wage returns of a job change are different
for the low-paid and for the high-paid worker. On average, the low-paid worker benefits
relatively more from a job change than the high-paid worker. Furthermore, in Chapter
5, we found that in most cases a shift from a permanent to a temporary contract as well
as a shift from part-time to full-time employment, or vice versa have a different effect for
the low-paid worker and the higher-paid worker.1 A ‘negative’ event - i.e. a shift from a
permanent to a temporary contract, and a shift from full-time to part-time employment - has
a negative effect on the wage mobility of the higher-paid workers only. The relevant ‘positive’
effect - i.e. a shift from a temporary to a permanent contract and a shift from part-time
to full-time employment does not always have a positive effect on the wage mobility of the
low-paid workers. These findings suggest that the pay-off from these labour market events is
conditional to the pay level. Differences in labour market behaviour and in the availability
of jobs for the low-paid and the high-paid worker seem to determine whether they benefit
1By ‘different effect’ we do not mean that the coefficient has a different sign for the low-paid and higher-
paid worker. By contrast, a similar effect would mean that, for example, a shift from a temporary to a
permanent contract increases the probability of a low-to-higher pay transition and decreases the probability
for a higher-to-low pay transition.
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from these events.
Research question 2: Do European countries differ with respect to wage mobility,
and which factors explain these cross-country differences?
This question was tackled in all four essays of this thesis. The reason for studying cross-
country differences in wage mobility was that we wanted to investigate the effect of labour
market institutions in shaping patterns of wage dynamics. This was done by following a
two-pronged approach. Firstly, in Chapter 2, we followed a direct approach and examined
whether specific measures for labour market institutions can account for the cross-country
differences in wage mobility in 12 European countries. We used two types of measures for
labour market institutions - direct measures of wage-setting institutions, namely trade union
density, collective bargaining coverage, and the Employment Protection Legislation (EPL)
index as well as a classification of countries into regime types according to the characteristics
of their labour market. This classification resembles the classification of Esping-Andersen
(1990). Secondly, in Chapters 3-5, we used an indirect approach and investigated whether
the microeconomic mechanisms that determine wage dynamics differ across countries with
very different institutional characteristics. In these chapters, we were not able to formally
employ a multilevel approach that would allow us to test the impact of institutions. However,
by comparing two or three countries, inferences were able to be made about the possible role
of institutions. These inferences are based on plausible reasoning and not on a formal test.
In Chapter 2, we established that the above-mentioned institutions account for cross-
country differences in wage dynamics. This chapter finds evidence against the assumption
that workers attain higher levels of wage mobility in countries with a liberal-unregulated
labour market than in countries with a highly regulated labour market. The highest mobility
levels were found in countries that combine flexibility in the labour market with a high level
of income and employment security, namely Denmark and the Netherlands. The lowest levels
of mobility were found in two countries with very different labour market institutions; in
the UK, which is supposed to achieve efficiency through increased labour market mobility,
and in Portugal, which has a high level of employment protection (European Commission,
2006). The rest of the Southern European countries were found to differ considerably from
Portugal: Greece, Italy and Spain have higher levels of wage mobility. This finding is rather
surprising, as we expected the strong employment protection regulation of these countries
to result in low levels of wage mobility. A possible explanation for this unexpected finding
could be that the low level of wage mobility in the external labour market is counterbalanced
by a high level of in-firm or in-job wage mobility. Another explanation involves the existence
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of a large informal sector in the Southern European labour markets that might also exert
a similar up-leveling effect on wage mobility. The only assumption that was clearly verified
was that the countries of continental Europe - France, Germany and Austria - have lower
levels of wage mobility than most of the other countries. In Chapter 2, it was also shown
that the issue of wage mobility is complex and cannot be explained by a single measure
of institutions. Our direct measures for labour market institutions were able to explain
jointly 52.1% of the overall variation in wage mobility. The best performing measure was
the EPL, which explained 34% of the overall variance. The indirect measure of institutions,
the classification of countries by regime type, performed worse than the direct measures,
as it explained 29.9% of the overall variance.2 The lesson to be learnt from these findings
is that direct measures of labour market institutions are better in explaining cross-country
differences in wage dynamics than regime typologies. Nevertheless, the significant part of
the country variance that is explained by the regime types indicates that the way in which
flexibility on the one hand and income and work security on the other hand is balanced
plays a role in explaining country differences even after controlling for a number of important
macroeconomic indicators.
In Chapter 3, we showed that a worker who enters the labour market with a low-paid
job has better chances of escaping low pay when the labour market is highly regulated and
closely linked to the vocational training system than when government intervention in the
labour market is low and the labour market is loosely linked to the education system (see
also discussion for research question 2). This is indicated by the better performance of the
German labour market compared to the British labour market with respect to the low-pay
transition probabilities. In Germany, the estimated low-pay transition probability of the
average worker is .40 while in the UK it is .32. The surprising finding concerns the outcomes
of the Netherlands, which is a country that combines a level of flexibility that is similar to
the UK with an education system and an employment protection regulation that are similar
to Germany. In this country, we found that the low-paid labour market entrants have the
lowest probability of escaping low pay of all three countries (.24).
The findings of Chapter 3 for the ranking of countries with respect to low-pay transition
probabilities are in line with the findings of Chapter 2 for the UK and for Germany but
not for the Netherlands. Taken together, these findings are surprising. Although a strong
low-pay persistence and increased mobility between low pay and non-employment is also
found in other studies (Sloane & Theodossiou, 1998; Stewart, 2007), the dominant view in
2We should remind the reader here that these are not the outcomes of the analysis of the individual-level
data. In Chapter 2, we first estimated a restricted multinomial logit regression model on individual-level
data. The estimates of this model were analyzed further with ANOVA models. The variances reported here
were estimated with separate ANOVA models (see chapter 2).
121
the economic debate suggests that wage mobility levels are higher in the liberal-unregulated
labour market of the UK than in the highly-regulated German labour market. Our descrip-
tive statistics in Chapter 4 are in accordance with this expectation; the average relative
wage growth is higher in the UK than in Germany. Combining the findings of Chapters 2,
3 and 4, we can conclude that although absolute wage mobility is higher in the UK than
in Germany, this does not result in higher positional changes in the wage distribution. In
the UK, the economic upturn of the 1990s led to a considerable wage growth. However,
this wage growth was not accompanied by a large amount of positional changes in the wage
distribution. Chapter 5 corrects for measurement error and suggests that the ranking of the
UK and Germany with respect to low-pay transition probabilities is sensitive to the choice of
the low-pay threshold. When we apply the same threshold as in Chapter 3 - the two-thirds
of the median wage - the ‘true’ low-pay transition probability is higher in Germany than
in the UK. However, when we use a lower threshold (50% or 40% of the median wage) the
UK comes first. It seems, therefore, that the liberal British labour market ensures slightly
higher mobility rates to workers that are at the very low end of the wage distribution than is
the case for the highly regulated German labour market. Since the wage distribution of the
UK is more left-skewed than the German distribution. Therefore, the average distance from
the low-pay threshold is much larger in the UK than in Germany, which makes the crossing
of the threshold much more difficult for the British low-paid workers than for the German
low-paid workers. When we apply a lower threshold the average distance from the threshold
in the UK is decreased and low-pay transition probabilities increase considerably.
As mentioned before, probably the most surprising finding concerns the Netherlands.
Chapter 2 suggests that workers in the Netherlands enjoy a higher positional mobility than
in the UK or Germany. In Chapters 3 and 5, we found that the proportion of the low-paid
workers in the Netherlands is much lower than in the UK and in Germany. Chapters 3 and
5, however, suggest also that Dutch workers at the lowest part of the distribution have the
lowest mobility levels among the three countries. It becomes apparent, therefore, that the
Dutch labour market is successful in keeping at low levels the proportion of workers that
earn low wages and in ensuring high levels of wage mobility to workers in the middle and
the top of the distribution. However, it is not particularly successful in providing mobility
opportunities to workers at the bottom of the distribution. The functional classification
system of jobs in the Netherlands may provide an explanation for this finding. This system
classifies wages assigned to jobs according to skills and education level and creates barriers
for wage increases. Consequently, this may hamper flexibility. It may, therefore, be the case
that this classification system works as a sort of glass ceiling for the low-skilled workers in
the Netherlands.
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Research question 3: Which type of human capital determines whether a low pay
spell at the beginning of the working career is a stepping-stone to better earnings
or a trap that young workers cannot easily escape from?
This question was tackled in Chapter 3. In this chapter, we tested the predictions of the
school-to-work transition theory with respect to the wage and employment perspectives of
the low-paid labour market entrants. The school-to-work transition theory (see, for example,
Ryan, 2001) suggests that wage levels at the beginning of the working career are affected
considerably by the link between the education system and the labour market. If the job
requirements correspond to specific educational or vocational training qualifications, the
screening of workers takes place at the moment of hiring, and the employer can immediately
pay the worker a wage that is close to his marginal productivity. However, when no such
correspondence exists, the employer has little information on the productivity of the worker.
In this case, the education of the worker serves as a signal for his productivity, and the
screening takes place during the initial period after hiring. After this period, the employer
has more information on the productivity of the worker and the wage can increase.
All previous research has focused on studying the consequences of entering the labour
market with a flexible or low-level job. Our contribution is that we investigated the con-
sequences of entering the labour market with a low-paid job. Our aim was pursued with a
competing-risks duration model. The competing risks correspond to the possible pathways
out of low pay: higher pay, unemployment, self-employment and inactivity. Unobserved
heterogeneity was controlled for with the non-parametric approach of Heckman and Singer
(1984). This non-parametric approach is much more flexible than the parametric approach
to control for unobserved heterogeneity that is typically applied in duration models. Our
findings were largely in accordance with the predictions of the school-to-work transition the-
ory. We found that when the link between the education system and the labour market
is strong, general skills that are provided either by education or by vocational training are
rewarded. If this link is weak, skills acquired on-the-job weigh more in determining low-pay
exits. As mentioned above, we found that the country that performs best in terms of ensur-
ing upward mobility opportunities to the low-paid labour market entrants is Germany. The
German apprenticeship system may explain this finding. The majority of young Germans
go through a 2-3 year period of apprenticeship before formally entering the labour market.
Notwithstanding the criticism that has been made of the quality of some of the apprentice-
ship training tracks (Acemoglou & Pischke, 1998; Kiiver & Muysken, 2005), apprenticeships
ensure a smooth transition from education to the labour market for the majority of young
Germans.
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Research question 4: What is the relationship between wage mobility and a job
change with another employer or within the firm, and to what extent does it differ
between the low-paid and the high-paid workers?
This question was tackled in Chapter 4 and also partly in Chapter 5. The job-search
theoretical approach was adopted in Chapter 4. In this chapter, we focused particularly on
a property of the on-the-job search model (Mortensen, 1986) that has been neglected by the
literature despite the fact that the relationship of job mobility and wage mobility has been
extensively investigated. This property suggests that both the probability of changing a job
and the difference between the current wage and the reservation wage are higher for the
low-paid worker than for the high-paid worker (van den Berg, 1992). Another novel aspect
of this study is that we investigated whether the relationship between wage mobility and
job change varies across external and in-firm job changes. This issue has also received little
attention in economic research. Moreover, the available empirical evidence is contradictory
as some studies find a positive effect of within-firm job changes on wage growth, while other
studies find a negative effect. The endogeneity of wage growth with respect to job change
was tackled with a two-step estimation of the Heckman type. Our findings were not always
consistent with the theoretical model. The probability of changing jobs was found to be
higher for the low-paid worker than for the high-paid worker in only one of the countries
(the UK). The relative wage return of an employer change was always found to be higher
for the low-paid than for the high paid worker. This finding pertained to job changes within
the same firm, but only in the UK. In Germany, within-firm job changes do not produce, on
average, any wage gains either for the low-paid worker or for the high-paid worker. Individual
behaviour seems therefore sometimes to be more complex than the simple job-search model
suggests. This seems to be more the case for the high-paid workers. On average, these
workers do not benefit a great deal from a job change. However, high-paid workers may
benefit from other monetary or non-monetary types of compensation that are not captured
by our analysis. More specifically, our dependent variable in Chapter 4 is the hourly wage.
Some workers - usually high-paid workers - receive bonus payments that are paid on a yearly
basis, or other forms of fringe benefits.
As mentioned above, the findings of Chapters 4 and 5 confirm that the effect of a job
change on wage mobility is different for the low-paid workers compared to the high-paid
workers. Nevertheless, some differences emerge in the findings of these two chapters. In
Chapter 5 we find that, in Germany, a job change does not increase the probability of a
transition from low pay to higher pay and that it increases the probability of a transition
from higher pay to low pay. By contrast, in Chapter 4, we found that in Germany the low
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paid worker changing employer enjoys a higher wage return than a colleague staying in the
same job. Furthermore, in Chapter 4 we found that in Germany, no differences in wage
returns emerge between the high-paid external movers and the high-paid stayers. These
differences may be due to two factors: firstly, we model wage mobility in the two chapters in
a different way. In Chapter 4, we model absolute wage growth, while in Chapter 5 we model
the probability of moving from low pay to high pay and vice versa. Secondly, our samples
in the two chapters are different. In Chapter 4, we consider only full-time workers, while in
Chapter 5, we include both full-time and part-time workers in our sample.
Research question 5: What is the effect of measurement error on the number of
low-pay transitions that we estimate in survey data and on the estimated covariate
effects in a low-pay transition model?
This question was tackled in Chapter 5, which investigated low-pay transition proba-
bilities for prime-age male workers. Previous research has shown that measurement error
may cause a considerable overestimation of earnings transitions. Studies have found that
half the poverty transitions in the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) and in
the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) are spurious. Despite these findings, most
studies on earnings dynamics have ignored this phenomenon. In the studies that control
for measurement error, the best suggested approach is the Latent Markov model of Rendtel
et al. (1998). In Chapter 5, we advanced this approach. While Rendtel et al. controlled
for measurement error in aggregate transition probabilities, we also corrected for observed
and unobserved heterogeneity and worked with a much longer time series. Our econometric
model was a random-effects multinomial logit model with a latent structure to correct for
measurement error. By controlling for measurement error, we were able to estimate the
error-free transition probabilities in the UK, Germany and the Netherlands. By controlling
for heterogeneity we were able to investigate the effect of measurement error in the earnings
state (low-paid, higher-paid, other) when used as a dependent variable in a panel regression
model. In our multivariate model, we included covariates that can account for a considerable
upward or downward change in the wage, and can therefore cause a worker to move from low
pay to higher pay or vice versa. These covariates are labour market events; a job change, a
change of employment contract type as well as a shift from part-time to full-time work or
vice versa.
Because low-pay mobility was also investigated in chapters 2-4, it makes sense to compare
our findings from these chapters with the findings of Chapter 5. The finding of Chapter 2 was
that workers in the lower part of the distribution attain low levels of mobility. In Chapter
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3, we found that the majority of the individuals that start their working career with a low-
paid job have a high probability (.274 - .467) of increasing their earnings above the low-pay
threshold within one year. The ‘key’ for the progression of their earnings is the education
level, vocational training or firm-specific skills depending on the country in which they work
(see discussion for research question 3). However, there is another smaller group of low-
paid job starters that have few chances of improving their earnings (.019 - .083). Chapter
4 focused on prime-age workers and suggested that a voluntary employer change can be a
good career move for the low-paid worker. In the UK, the low-paid worker can also improve
his earnings by voluntarily changing jobs within the firm. Chapter 5, however, argues that
we should be less optimistic about the upward wage mobility of the low-paid worker. In
this chapter, we find that at least half of the low-pay mobility we observe is either due to
measurement error or due to random and transitory moves out of low pay. More specifically,
in Chapter 5, we found that the low-pay transition probability is no more than .17 instead
of the .29 - .48 that is suggested by previous studies that do not control for measurement
error.
Moreover, in Chapter 5, we found that classification error in the earnings states causes a
considerable underestimation of much of the effect of the covariates of our panel regression
model. More specifically, we found that the effect of a job change is underestimated by 43.9%
- 102.9%. The effect of a change of contract type is underestimated by 29.1% - 63.3% and
the effect of a shift from full-time to part-time employment and vice versa is underestimated
by 42.2% - 78.8%. However, we should be cautious when drawing conclusions on the basis of
these results alone. If error in the measurement of the covariates is present, then this error
might be correlated with the error in the dependent variable. In this case, what is being
measured is a combination of two processes: the attenuation of the effect of the covariate due
to the classification error in the earnings state, and the ambiguous effect of the correlation of
the errors in the dependent and independent variable. It is probably due to this that some
of the covariate effects are larger in the model that does not correct for measurement error
than in the error-free model.
The policy relevance of our findings
Our findings are particularly relevant from a policy perspective. It is apparent that institu-
tions influence wage mobility. This is the finding of both our direct and indirect approach
to studying the effect of institutions. In Chapter 2, we showed that measures for institu-
tions account for a large part of cross-country differences. In chapters 3-5, we showed that
the microeconomic mechanisms that determine wage dynamics vary when the institutions
regulating the labour market are different. The findings of Chapter 3 suggest that initial
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vocational training - e.g. through a period of apprenticeship - may help young individuals
to increase their earnings at the beginning of their working career.
The main conclusion concerning policies is that a higher level of labour market flexibility
does not always go hand-in-hand with more wage mobility opportunities for workers. By
flexibility policies we mean measures that promote labour market mobility, such as the relax-
ation of stringent firing and hiring regulations and the stimulation of temporary employment
and flexible working hours. On average, the highest levels of wage mobility were found in
countries that combine a flexible labour market with a high level of income and work security,
i.e. in the Netherlands and Denmark. However, adverse effects of flexibility policies seem
to concern the low-paid workers that can improve living standards with an upward change
in their wage. In both the UK and the Netherlands the labour market is characterized by a
high level of flexibility. In the UK, the extent to which the state intervenes and the influence
of trade unions are both small. A national minimum wage was introduced relatively late, in
1999 and firing and hiring regulations are weak for both permanent and temporary workers.
Consequently, the levels of job and employment mobility are exceptionally high. In the Dutch
labour market, labour market institutions are stronger than in the UK. There is a national
minimum wage for those who are 21 years old or older with sub-minimum rates for workers
up to 21 years of age. Collective bargaining regulates pay and employment conditions for
the great majority of the Dutch workers. However, there is a lot of flexibility with respect to
temporary contracts and working hours. Therefore, employers have more room to manoeu-
vre and to use these regulations in order to adjust to changing economic conditions, which
in turn produces a high level of job turnover. Nevertheless, in neither of these two countries
do low-paid workers benefit from the high level of labour market flexibility. Furthermore,
in the UK, notwithstanding the high levels of wage growth, the position of all workers in
the wage distribution does not change easily. More upward mobility opportunities for the
low-paid workers emerge in Germany, where levels of temporary employment are moderate -
with the exception of apprenticeships - and earnings progression is regulated extensively by
collective bargaining. It becomes apparent, therefore, that there are winners and losers with
respect to outcomes of the flexibility policies and that the low-paid workers usually belong
to the losers group.
Issues open for further research
This thesis has tackled issues concerning wage mobility at the micro-level and macro-level. It
extended our understanding of the role of the initial position in the wage distribution as well
as of the role of labour market institutions in shaping wage mobility patterns at both levels.
However, some issues remained unsolved. There are three players in the labour market: the
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workers, the firms and the government, all affecting the levels of wage mobility: the state by
setting the rules and the institutional conditions under which wage bargaining takes place;
the firms through their human resource policies and strategies in particular their wage offers
and the workers, collectively through trade unions and their wage demands and individually
through their skills, effort and productivity. This thesis dealt extensively with one of these
players, the workers, and we have also tried to investigate the role of another player - the
government. The role of firm characteristics has been accounted for insofar as these could
be linked to the worker. For example, in our analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 we controlled
for the firm size and the business sector in which the worker is employed, but we could not
control for the age or the economic performance of the firm or the sector. Moreover, the
data that we used did not allow us to follow firms over time or to control for unobserved
firm or sector characteristics that may be particularly relevant in determining the wages of
the workers. Investigating jointly the effect of individual and firm characteristics may also
prove informative regarding which of these two types of characteristics are more important
in determining wage dynamics.
The issue of the effect of labour market institutions on wage mobility has also not been
fully explored. As mentioned earlier, the available direct measures of these institutions are
often a proxy for the levels of flexibility and not ‘hard figures’. The indirect measures, such
as the classification of countries into regime types, are also inadequate. For various reasons,
when we find an effect of the regime type, it is unclear whether this represents the effect
of the institutional set-up or the effect of other country-specific factors, such as culture,
or the effect of differences in natural resources, inherited wealth or even differences in the
environmental condition. The inadequacy of these measures led us to focus more on general
cross-country differences rather than on formally testing the precise effect of institutions.
The improvement in the way labour market institutions are measured can provide the tools
in the future for improving research endeavours on explaining wage dynamics at the macro
level.
Additionally, there are several ways to extend the research on the effect of labour market
institutions on wage mobility. In Chapter 2 we investigated the effect of institutions on
positional mobility. Looking also at other aspects of mobility, such as absolute mobility,
will provide a more complete picture of the cross-country differences in wage dynamics and
will further allow us to examine the effect of institutions. Another extension concerns the
study of the interaction between institutions and the origin state in the wage distribution. In
Chapter 2 we also investigated cross-country differences in wage mobility as well as mobility
differences across the various parts of the wage distribution. These two variables - country
and origin state - were not interacted as this would require the estimation of a model with
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a huge number of parameters. Institutions, however, may not only affect the overall level
of wage mobility in a country but also the differences in mobility levels between the various
parts of the wage distribution. Such an analysis will hopefully be possible in the future with
the availability of advanced statistical software tools.
Investigating the effect of the origin state on wage mobility raises, inevitably the issue
of initial conditions. As many studies have pointed out, the sample of individuals being
in a certain pay level (for example low pay) at a given point in time is not random. In
our analysis, initial conditions were treated as exogenous since modelling their endogeneity
would considerably complicate our analysis. This means that the findings of Chapter 4
- and also possibly of Chapter 3 - with respect to the origin state may be biased due to
this endogeneity of initial conditions. Nevertheless, in Chapters 3 and 4 where the initial
conditions may feature, we controlled for unobserved heterogeneity using rather long time
series. Because of that, we were able possibly to partly capture the effect of initial conditions.
At the individual level, a possible extension concerns female wage dynamics, since we have
only dealt with the wage mobility of male workers. The reason for this was that the labour
supply behaviour and the working careers of male and female workers are very different.
Especially in countries such as the Netherlands and Germany, part-time employment is
very common among female workers. Female workers combine their employment with caring
activities much more often than men. Women also interrupt their working career much more
often than men in order to allocate more time to child care. Transition patterns are therefore,
also very different. Consequently, including female workers would require accounting for
these different choices or constraints that female workers experience. Such an extension may
also provide more insight into the existence of gender differences in labour market mobility
patterns. Labour market patterns of females tend to change over time. Recent research shows
that younger generations of females are investing more in human capital and allocating more
time to work than older generations. Research into the differential wage mobility patterns
of different generations requires other kind of data (life-course data) and approaches.
Another possible extension at the individual level concerns household wage dynamics.
Couples often make joint decisions on their labour supply, as they want to allocate their
time between paid employment and household work. It is therefore particularly pertinent to
investigate joint wage dynamics of couples.
Finally, in this thesis we explored specific methodological issues concerning low-pay mo-
bility, such as measurement error. However, the effect of measurement error on low-pay mo-
bility has not been fully explored. More specifically, we were not able to distinguish spurious
transitions from certain forms of random (but true) transitions. Combining data sources for
earnings - panel survey and administrative sources - may help us to identify measurement
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error. Furthermore, previous research has shown that controlling for initial conditions and
non-response is necessary in order to estimate true state dependence in wage mobility pat-
terns. Combining the approach presented in Chapter 5 to control for measurement error
with the approaches of other studies to control for initial conditions and non-response may
provide a better estimate of the effect of the origin state on low-pay dynamics.
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Samenvatting
Loonmobiliteit is een belangrijk onderwerp vanuit theoretisch, empirisch en beleids perspec-
tief. Meer flexibiliteit op de arbeidsmarkt samen met een hoge mate van baanzekerheid
is een van de belangrijkste doelen van de Europese Unie. Het bereiken van deze doel-
stelling moet van de Europese Unie ‘de meest concurrerende en dynamische economie in
de wereld ’ maken.3 Verschillende economische theorie?n, zoals de menselijk kapitaal theo-
rie, de job-search theorie en de job-matching theorie, proberen loonmobiliteit op individueel
en macroniveau te verklaren. Veel studies hebben deze theorien empirisch getoetst, maar
studies die onderzoek naar loonmobiliteit op macro- en microniveau combineren zijn echter
schaars. Bovendien is ook weinig onderzoek uitgevoerd naar het effect van de positie in de
loonverdeling op loonmobiliteit.
In dit proefschrift onderzoeken we loonmobiliteit zowel op micro- als op macroniveau.
Op microniveau bepalen de vaardigheiden, het talent en de prestatie van de werknemer het
niveau en de mobiliteit van het loon. Op macroniveau kunnen instituties loonmobiliteit
bevorderen of juist afremmen. Ten eerste zijn er instituties die direct invloed op loonmo-
biliteit hebben, zoals het minimumloon en vakbonden. De invloed van vakbonden wordt
gewoonlijk gemeten door de vakbondsdichtheid en de dekkingsgraad van de collectieve ar-
beidsovereenkomst. Ten tweede zijn er andere instituties die een indirecte invloed op loon-
mobiliteit hebben, namelijk via baanmobiliteit. Het gemak om tijdelijke contracten te ge-
bruiken, of om werknemers in dienst te nemen of te ontslaan zijn dergelijke instituties. Deze
instituties be?nvloeden het landelijke niveau van baanmobiliteit. Aangezien loonmobiliteit
tussen banen groter is dan loonmobiliteit binnen banen, hebben die instituties een sterke
invloed op loonmobiliteit. De invloed van instituties hebben we onderzocht door landen
met elkaar te vergelijken. Overigens richtten we ons in dit proefschrift alleen op mannelijke
werknemers.
De volgende vijf vragen hebben we in het bijzonder aangepakt: (i) Zijn er verschillen in
loonmobiliteit tussen de verschillende segmenten van de loonverdeling? (ii) Zijn er verschillen
in loonmobiliteit tussen de Europese landen en welke factoren zijn verantwoordelijk voor die
3Strategische doel voor 2010, Lisbon European Council, March 2000.
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verschillen? (iii) Welk type menselijk kapitaal bepaalt of een laagbetaalde periode aan het
begin van de loopbaan een stepping-stone is naar een hoger loon of juist een val waar jonge
werknemers niet eenvoudig uit kunnen ontsnappen? (iv) Wat is de relatie tussen loonmo-
biliteit en een baanverandering en is deze relatie anders bij interne (binnen hetzelfde bedrijf)
of een externe baanverandering? Verschilt deze relatie tussen laagbetaalde en hoogbetaalde
werknemers? (v) Wat is het effect van meetfouten op het aantal van low-pay transities in
survey data en op de invloed van covariaten in een low-pay transitiemodel?
De eerste vraag is beantwoord in de Hoofdstukken 2, 4 en 5. In Hoofdstuk 2 hebben
we de jaar-naar-jaar mobiliteit tussen de verschillende segmenten van de loonverdeling in 12
landen onderzocht. We hebben het European Community Household Panel gebruikt. We
controleerden voor de complete reeks van herkomstposities - decielen - in de loonverdeling.
Aan de onderkant en bovenkant van de verdeling bleek weinig mobiliteit te zijn, terwijl in het
midden meer mobiliteit plaatsvond. In de Hoofdstukken 4 en 5 hebben we onderzocht of de
loonmobiliteit van bepaalde arbeidsmarktgebeurtenissen verschilt tussen de segmenten van
de loonverdeling. Hoofdstuk 4 gaat over de relatie tussen loonmobiliteit en baanverandering
in twee landen: het Verenigd Koninkrijk (de UK) en Duitsland. We onderscheidden drie
segmenten: laagbetaalde, middelhoogbetaalde en hoogbetaalde werknemers. We vonden dat
een laagbetaalde werknemer die naar een ander bedrijf gaat een gemiddeld 6.7% (in de UK)
of 6.3% (in Duitsland) hogere loongroei heeft dan zijn collega die in dezelfde baan blijft.
De loongroei van een hoogbetaalde werknemer is doorgaans hetzelfde (in Duitsland) of lager
(in de UK) dan die van zijn collega die in dezelfde baan blijft. In Hoofdstuk 5 hebben we
de return van verschillende arbeidsmarktgebeurtenissen in drie landen (de UK, Duitsland
en Nederland) onderzocht: een baanverandering, een wijziging van het arbeidscontract, een
wijziging van deeltijd naar voltijd werk en vice versa. We vergeleken laagbetaalde met
hoogbetaalde werknemers Onze afhankelijke variabele was de kans op een transitie van laag
uurloon naar een hoger uurloon en vice versa. Bovendien controleerden we voor transities
naar baanloosheid. In bijna alle gevallen heeft een wijziging van een vast naar een tijdelijk
contract en een wijziging van voltijd naar deeltijd werk en vice versa een verschillend effect
voor laagbetaalde en hoogbetaalde werknemers. Een ’negatieve’ wijziging (van een vast naar
een tijdelijk contract of van voltijd naar deeltijd werk) heeft alleen een negatieve invloed op
de loonmobiliteit van hoogbetaalde werknemers. Een ’positieve’ wijziging (van een tijdelijk
naar een permanent contract of van deeltijd naar voltijd werk) heeft niet altijd een positief
effect op de loonmobiliteit van laagbetaalde werknemers.
De tweede onderzoeksvraag werd in alle vier de hoofdstukken van het proefschrift beant-
woord. We hebben crossnationale verschillen in loonmobiliteit onderzocht omdat we de in-
vloed van instituties wilden onderzoeken. Dit hebben we op twee manieren aangepakt. Ten
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eerste hebben we in Hoofdstuk 2 een directe aanpak gebruikt. We hebben instituties direct
en indirect gemeten: direct, door de vakbondsdichtheid, de dekkingsgraad van de collectieve
arbeidsovereenkomst en de Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) index; en indirect, via
een classificatie van landen naar regimetypen, die op de classificatie van Esping-Andersen
(1990) lijkt. Ten tweede hebben we in de Hoofdstukken 3-5 een indirecte aanpak gebruikt.
In deze hoofdstukken zijn we nagegaan of de micro-economische factoren die loonmobiliteit
be?nvloeden verschillen tussen landen met verschillende instituties. We vergeleken twee of
drie landen, waaruit we de invloed van instituties konden afleiden (vanwege dit kleine aantal
macro-eenheden konden we geen multilevel analyse doen).
In Hoofdstuk 2 vonden we aanwijzingen tegen onze verwachting dat de loonmobiliteit
hoger zou zijn in landen met een liberale arbeidsmarkt dan in landen met een streng gereg-
uleerde arbeidsmarkt. De meeste loonmobiliteit vonden we in landen die flexibiliteit op de
arbeidsmarkt combineren met inkomens- en werkzekerheid: Denemarken en Nederland. De
minste loonmobiliteit vonden we in twee landen met heel verschillende instituties: in de UK
dat efficiency wil bereiken door veel arbeidsmarktmobiliteit en in Portugal dat een hoog
niveau van werkzekerheid heeft (European Commission, 2006). In de andere Zuid-Europese
landen - Griekenland, Itali? en Spanje - is de loonmobiliteit veel hoger dan in Portugal.
In centraal Europa - Frankrijk, Duitsland en Oostenrijk - is de loonmobiliteit lager dan in
de meeste andere landen. Bovendien werd in Hoofdstuk 2 gevonden dat het thema loon-
mobiliteit complex is en niet door een enkele maat van instituties verklaard kan worden.
Onze direct maten van instituties verklaarden samen 52.1% van de totale variantie in loon-
mobiliteit. De beste maat is de EPL index die 34% van de totale variantie verklaarde. De
indirecte maat - de classificatie van landen naar regimetypen - presteerde slechter dan de
directe maten. Deze maat verklaarde 29.9% van de totale variantie.
In Hoofdstuk 3 vonden we dat jonge werknemers die hun loopbaan met een laagbetaalde
baan beginnen meer kansen hebben om de lage loongrens te passeren in Duitsland dan in de
UK. In Duitsland is de geschatte transitiekans .40, terwijl die in de UK .32 is. Het resultaat
voor Nederland is verassend: Nederlandse jonge werknemers hebben de laagste kansen op
opwaartse mobiliteit (.24).
In Hoofdstuk 4 hebben we de absolute loonmobiliteit in Duitsland en de UK onderzocht.
Hier vonden we dat de gemiddelde loongroei als percentage van het vorig loon hoger is in
de UK dan in Duitsland. Als we de bevindingen van de Hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4 combineren
kunnen we concluderen dat de hogere absolute loonmobiliteit in de UK vergeleken met
Duitsland niet resulteert in een hogere relatieve loonmobiliteit.
In Hoofdstuk 5 corrigeerden we low-pay transitiekansen voor meetfouten. De rangschikking
van de UK en Duitsland wat betreft de low-pay transitiekansen blijkt afhankelijk te zijn van
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de lage loongrens. Als we dezelfde grens als in Hoofdstuk 3 gebruiken - tweederde van het
mediane uurloon - is de ‘echte’ low-pay transitiekans (zonder meetfouten) - groter in Duit-
sland dan in de UK. Maar bij gebruik van een lagere grens - 50% of 40% van het mediane
uurloon - is de volgorde andersom. Deze bevindingen lijken erop te wijzen dat de liberale ar-
beidsmarkt van de UK de loonmobiliteit van werknemers helemaal onderaan de loonverdeling
meer vergemakkelijkt dan de gereguleerde Duitse arbeidsmarkt.
De derde onderzoeksvraag werd in Hoofdstuk 3 beantwoord. Eerder onderzoek heeft
vooral de consequenties van intrede op de arbeidsmarkt met een flexibele of lage status
baan bestudeerd. Onze bijdrage is dat we de gevolgen van arbeidsmarktintrede met een
laagbetaalde baan onderzoeken. We gebruikten een competing-risk duration model, waar-
bij de competing risks de mogelijke routes uit low pay zijn: hoger loon, werkloos, zelfs-
tandig en inactief. We controleerden voor niet-geobserveerde heterogeniteit met de non-
parametrische methode van Heckman and Singer (1984). De voornaamste bevinding was dat
als de aansluiting tussen het onderwijssysteem en de arbeidsmarkt goed is (zoals in Duit-
sland), de vaardigheiden die door onderwijs of beroepsonderwijs worden gegeven zijn, het
belangrijkst zijn. Terwijl als de aansluiting minder goed is (zoals in de UK), de vaardigheiden
die binnen het bedrijf worden verkregen er het meest toe doen. In Duitsland hebben jonge
laagbetaalde werknemers meer kansen op opwaartse loonmobiliteit dan in de UK. Het Duitse
systeem met stageplaatsen kan een verklaring voor onze bevinding zijn. De meerderheid van
de Duitse jonge werknemers doen een stage van twee ? drie jaar voordat ze zich formeel
op de arbeidsmarkt begeven. Ondanks de kritiek op het Duitse systeem met stageplaatsen
(Acemoglou & Pischke, 1998; Kiiver & Muysken, 2005), blijkt dat dit systeem voor jonge
Duitsers een geleidelijke transitie van onderwijs naar de arbeidsmarkt bewerkstelligt.
De vierde onderzoeksvraag werd in Hoofdstuk 4 en ook deels in Hoofdstuk 5 beantwoord.
In Hoofdstuk 4 werd de job-search theoretie gebruikt. In dit Hoofdstuk richtten we ons op
een uitkomst van het on-the-job search model (Mortensen, 1986) waaraan in de literatuur
weinig aandacht wordt besteed (ondanks het feit dat de relatie tussen loonmobiliteit en baan-
mobiliteit een populair onderwerp is). Deze uitkomst houdt in dat zowel de kans voor een
baanverandering als het verschil tussen het huidige loon een het reserveringsloon hoger zijn
voor de laagbetaalde dan voor de hoogbetaalde werknemer (van den Berg, 1992). Bovendien
zijn er verschillen tussen baanveranderingen binnen en buiten het bedrijf. Het probleem van
endogeniteit van loongroei met de baanverandering werd met een tweestaps schatting van
het Heckman model opgelost. Onze bevindingen waren niet altijd in overeenstemming met
het theoretische model. Alleen in de UK is de kans op een baanverandering groter voor laag-
betaalde werknemers dan voor hoogbetaalde werknemers. In zowel de UK als in Duitsland
is de loongroei als gevolg van een baanverandering buiten het bedrijf als percentage van het
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vorig loon groter voor laagbetaalde werknemers dan voor hoogbetaalde werknemers. In de
UK is deze bevinding ook geldig voor een baanverandering binnen het bedrijf, terwijl dit in
Duitsland geen effect heeft.
De vijfde onderzoeksvraag werd in Hoofdstuk 5 beantwoord. In dit Hoofdstuk hebben
we low-pay transitiekansen van werknemers in de UK, Duitsland en Nederland onderzocht.
Onderzoek tot nu heeft aangetoond dat transities tussen loonniveaus sterk worden over-
schat door meetfouten. Wij hebben vooruitgang geboekt op het model van Rendtel et al.
(1998) voor meetfoutencorrectie. Terwijl Rendtel et al controleerde voor meetfouten in to-
tale transitiekansen, hebben wij ook voor geobserveerde en niet-geobserveerde heterogeniteit
gecorrigeerd, en bovendien met een langere tijdreeks gewerkt. Ons econometrisch model
was een random-effects multinomiaal logistisch model met een latente structuur voor meet-
foutcorrectie. De bevindingen van onze studie suggereren dat de helft van de geobserveerde
low-pay mobiliteit in survey data niet echt of random zijn. Concreet hebben we gevonden dat
de low-pay transitiekans maximaal .17 is in plaats van de .29 tot .48 die door andere studies
die niet voor meetfout corrigeerden werd gevonden. Tot slot vonden we dat meetfouten in
loonniveaus een sterke onderschatting van de invloed van covariaten in een panel regressie
model veroorzaakt: Het effect van een baanverandering op de low-pay transitiekans wordt
43.9% - 102.9% onderschat; het effect van een verandering van het werkcontract type wordt
29.1% - 63.3% onderschat; en het effect van een wisseling van deeltijd naar voltijd werk en
vice versa wordt 42.2% - 78.8% onderschat.
De bevindingen van dit proefschrift zijn belangrijk voor het beleid. Ten eerste varieert
loonmobiliteit tussen landen met verschillende arbeidsmarkt instituties; instituties als het
minimuloon, baanzekerheid, en vakbondsdichtheid beinvloeden de loonmobiliteit. Ten tweede
is de voornaamste conclusie voor beleidsmakers dat een hoger niveau van arbeidsmarktflex-
ibiliteit niet altijd samen gaat met grotere loonmobiliteitskansen. Met de term ‘flexibiliteit’
bedoelen we maatregelen die tot meer baanmobiliteit leiden. Afzwakking van de strikte
regels om werknemers in dienst te nemen of te ontslaan, de bevordering van tijdelijke banen
en flexibele arbeidsuren zijn voorbeelden van dergelijke maatregelen. Uit onze bevindingen
blijkt dat de meeste (totale) loonmobiliteit in Denemarken en Nederland voorkomt, landen
die flexibiliteit op de arbeidsmarkt met inkomens- en werkzekerheid combineren. Laagbe-
taalde werknemers profiteren echter niet van de voordelen van flexibiliteitsbeleid: Opwaartse
loonmobiliteitskansen voor laagbetaalde werknemers zijn groter in de streng gereguleerde ar-
beidsmarkt van Duitsland dan in de liberale arbeidsmarkt van de UK en de semi-flexibele
arbeidsmarkt van Nederland. Concluderend: er zijn winnaars en verliezers van het flexi-
biliteitsbeleid en de laagbetaalde werknemers behoren tot de verliezers.
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